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Abstract 
The past decade has seen increasing research interest in compassion to self and others, both as a 
construct and a likely precipitant of psychological wellbeing.  A growing literature base suggests 
that psychotherapeutic interventions aimed at increasing self-compassion can help to alleviate 
negative effects often associated with shame and self-criticism.  Compassion-focused 
interventions have subsequently been proposed for populations likely to experience heightened 
shame.  Despite the interest in this area, only limited research has attempted to explore how 
compassion is understood and experienced among varying populations.  Research that has been 
undertaken has tended to adopt quantitative approaches, utilising self-report measures validated 
with well-educated, often academic, populations.  There is clearly a need for the construct of 
compassion to be explored with other populations, particularly those who may be disadvantaged 
and/or at risk of heightened levels of shame.  One such population is young people who have 
come to the attention of services for engaging in harmful sexual behaviour (HSB).  This research 
therefore intended to fill this gap and extend the existing literature base on compassion by 
employing a qualitative approach.  Nine young people (8 males, 1 female) aged 14-18, who were 
receiving input from youth offending services for HSB, were recruited for this research.  Each 
participant took part in a one-off interview where they were asked about their understanding and 
experiences of compassion to and from self and others.  Adopting a Constructivist Grounded 
Theory methodology, data were analysed through an iterative process of constant comparison, 
leading to the construction of a substantive theoretical model grounded in the data.  The resultant 
model explicates the dynamic and relational process of compassion to self and others 
experienced by young people who have engaged in HSB.  The model is considered in relation to 
existing literature and implications for clinical practice are discussed, along with directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter begins by exploring the current literature-base surrounding compassion, 
including the developing argument for the role of self-compassion in mediating the negative 
effects of shame and self-criticism.  The focus then turns more specifically to those who commit 
sexual offences and, in particular, young people who engage in harmful sexual behaviour.  After 
considering the role of shame in this population, it is argued that compassion is also likely to be 
an important construct warranting exploration.  In the absence of pre-existing research in this 
specific area, the case is made for a need to first understand the meaning and experience of 
compassion to self and others for this group.  The rationale and aims for the current study are 
outlined, before concluding with a chapter summary. 
1.2 Brief background and Rationale 
The last decade has seen increasing academic and clinical interest in compassion to self 
and others, as well as its relationship to various factors including mental health and wellbeing, 
psychopathology, and behaviour.  Posited by some as an effective moderator of more 
problematic states such as shame and self-criticism (Gilbert, 2000a, 2005, 2010a, 2010b), self-
compassion has become the focus of a cluster of therapeutic interventions that seek to alleviate 
the negative effects of shame through developing a self-compassionate stance (Gilbert, 2009a, 
2009b, 2010b; Gilbert & Procter, 2006).  Despite having their roots in evolutionary theory and 
Ancient Eastern philosophy (Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b), compassion-focused interventions within 
the psychotherapeutic fields are in their relative infancy.  Throughout this chapter it shall be 
argued that establishing a sound understanding of compassion as a construct, as well as the 
meaning and experience of compassion to self and others for populations of clinical interest, 
should be the first port of call for researchers wishing to understand the value of self-compassion 
for those at risk of heightened shame.  Whilst this is an expanding field, it is noted that most of 
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the current self-compassion literature has employed quantitative, psychometric-based approaches 
to research, implicit in which is the assumption that compassion can be self-reported and is 
relatively stable across time – at least in the short-term – and context, to the degree that it can be 
accurately measured.  Currently, there is far less available research into the meaning, 
understanding, and experience of compassion to self and others among differing – and especially 
more disadvantaged – populations.  One such population, for whom experiences of shame are 
likely to be problematic and therefore the exploration of compassion to self and others is 
particularly warranted, are young people who engage in harmful sexual behaviour.  To the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is currently no published research on self-compassion among this 
population; it is therefore vital to begin by exploring the meaning, understanding, and experience 
of compassion for this group. 
1.3 Compassion to Self and Others 
To consider the role of self-compassion in human experience, it is first necessary to 
clearly establish what is meant by the term self-compassion.  In addressing this question, it is 
helpful to begin by defining the broader concept of compassion. 
 1.3.1 Defining compassion.  The Oxford Dictionary defines compassion as a 
“sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others” (2017).  Literally 
translating as to “suffer with” (Neff & Davidson, 2016, p.40), the word compassion appears to 
imply an acknowledgement that another is suffering in some way, coupled with a relatable 
response in affect, either through sympathy or concern, to this suffering.  It is however stressed 
that compassion does not equate to empathy, with the key difference being that whilst both 
reflect an ability to take the perspective and feel the emotions of another, compassion involves 
an additional desire to help (Strauss et al., 2016).  Indeed, the Buddhist tradition – from which 
many compassion-focused interventions draw their ethos and approach – defines compassion as 
the wish for another to be free from suffering (Dalai Lama, 2012).  Numerous definitions offered 
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within the psychological and academic literature appear to corroborate this understanding: 
“compassion involves sensitivity to the experience of suffering, coupled with a deep desire to 
alleviate that suffering” (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010, p.351); “[compassion is] a 
deep awareness of the suffering of another coupled with the wish to relieve it” (Gilbert, 2010a, 
p.13).  It appears then that the most widely adopted definition of compassion involves two 
components (Halifax, 2012): 
i. A sensitivity to the experience of another’s suffering 
and 
ii. A desire or motivation to relieve that suffering 
Notably, from this understanding compassion does not require one to act on the desire to relieve 
suffering, and any additional selfless or helping behaviour enacted as a result of feelings of 
compassion may more readily be defined as altruism (Weng et al., 2013). 
To complicate matters, compassion is not consistently defined by these components 
throughout the literature and is sometimes conceptualised more broadly, for example, as “a 
quality that aims to nurture, look after, teach, guide, mentor, soothe, protect, and offer feelings of 
acceptance and belonging” (Gilbert, 2010a, p.217).  A review by Strauss et al. (2016) attempted 
to synthesise various conceptualisations of compassion adopted within the psychological 
literature.  They proposed that compassion involves five elements: recognising suffering, 
understanding its universality, experiencing an emotional resonance (e.g. through feeling 
sympathy, empathy, or concern for those who are suffering), tolerating distress associated with 
witnessing suffering, and a motivation to act or acting to alleviate the suffering.  This more 
recent conceptualisation both includes and extends the dual-component definition offered above.  
It is important to note the variations, however subtle, between what might be considered more 
common-place definitions of compassion and those adopted by professionals and academics, as 
these may highlight potential discrepancies between the understanding and meaning of 
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compassion among varying populations.  Furthermore, the absence of a clear, universal 
definition reflects a likely ambiguity and subjectivity around compassion as a construct, and it 
has been noted that the distinction of compassion from other relatable constructs, such as 
kindness, caring, and altruistic behaviour is not clear-cut (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 
2010). 
 1.3.2 Defining self-compassion.  In essence, having compassion for oneself can be 
viewed as similar to having compassion for another (Neff, 2003a, 2003b).  “Self-compassion is 
simply compassion directed inward, relating to ourselves as the object of care and concern when 
faced with the experience of suffering” (Neff & Dahm, 2015, p.121).  To build on the earlier 
deconstruction of compassion then, self-compassion can be understood as: 
i. A sensitivity to our own experience of suffering 
and 
ii. A desire or motivation to relieve that suffering 
Again, this definition would imply there being no requirement to act to relieve suffering, just a 
motivation to do so.  In adopting the definition of compassion to explain self-compassion, it 
necessarily renders the latter open to the same criticism as the former – that there is likely to be 
ambiguity and subjectivity to self-compassion as a construct, which may be understood and 
experienced differently among varying populations.  Nevertheless, there appears to also be a 
good deal of commonality among the various definitions of compassion and therefore self-
compassion.  Having established an idea of what is meant by (self-)compassion, we can now turn 
to current theoretical perspectives on its development and function. 
 1.3.3 A theoretical basis for compassion to self and others.  Since the turn of the 
century, there has been a growing interest in Western society in compassion as a construct and its 
link to wellbeing.  The promotion of compassion to self and others is not a new concept; in fact, 
it is well embedded within Eastern philosophy and the Buddhist tradition (Neff, 2003b).  But 
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recent years have seen exponential growth, particularly within the fields of psychology and 
psychotherapy, in the development of therapeutic interventions seeking to cultivate these 
qualities, with the aim of promoting psychological wellbeing.  Naturally, this has demanded the 
construction of coherent theoretical frameworks from which to understand the development and 
function of compassion, the key proponents of which are outlined below. 
 1.3.3.1 Buddhist tradition.  In Buddhism, compassion – or “Karuna” – is usually 
understood to mean an active sympathy or willingness to bear the pain of others.  For Buddhists, 
this is a means to realising Enlightenment, but also a manifestation of Enlightenment itself 
(O’Brien, 2017).  The Dalai Lama described compassion as “an aspiration, a state of mind” 
requiring “both wisdom and lovingkindness,” where wisdom refers to an understanding of the 
suffering we wish to relieve, and lovingkindness to the experience of empathy and intimacy with 
other sentinel beings (cited by O’Brien, 2017).  In Buddhist teaching, “in order to have 
compassion for others, we have to have compassion for ourselves” (Chodron, 2010) and specific 
meditative practices, such as the tonglen in Tibetan Buddhism (Chodron, 2010; O’Brien, 2017), 
promote a connection to one’s own suffering along with the suffering of others. 
 1.3.3.2 Neff’s model of self-compassion.  Neff (2003a; 2003b) first attempted to 
conceptualise and measure self-compassion within the academic literature through drawing 
together the key principles from Buddhist tradition pertaining to compassion.  She 
operationalised self-compassion as consisting of three main components: self-kindness, common 
humanity, and mindfulness.  She argued that kindness to the self was a necessary facet of self-
compassion, but that Western culture – although in favour of kindness to others – was far less 
encouraging of self-kindness.  She reflected that it is not uncommon to “encounter extremely 
kind and compassionate people who continually beat themselves up” (Neff & Dahm, 2015, 
p.122), which seems at odds with the Buddhist position that self-compassion must be practised 
before compassion to others can be achieved.  But being able to acknowledge that we are doing 
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the best we can and to show ourselves the support and understanding we would show a friend in 
need was a fundamental aspect of directing kindness towards oneself, allowing oneself to be 
moved by our own distress, which, Neff postulated, would enable the motivation to alleviate 
one’s own suffering to emerge (2003a).  Neff referred to common humanity as the sense that 
difficulties, flaws, and failings are all part of the human condition, and that in suffering we are 
not alone.  She believed that adopting this stance would facilitate a connected mindset in 
response to suffering, allowing individuals to feel less isolated when in pain.  Finally, Neff 
(2003a) identified the ability to approach our negative thoughts and emotions mindfully, with 
balance and equanimity, and without judgement, avoidance, or repression, as key to fostering a 
self-compassionate stance.  Fundamentally, Neff viewed self-compassion as an inherent trait 
developed in childhood, although did qualify this with an assertion that this trait can be built on 
and grown later in life, given the right guidance or conditions (Neff, 2003a; Neff & Dahm, 
2015). 
 1.3.3.2.1 What self-compassion is not.  Having conceptualised what self-compassion is, 
Neff (2003a, 2003b) made important assertions about what self-compassion is not.  She 
distinguished self-compassion from self-esteem, arguing that the latter involves an evaluation of 
the self in comparison to others, potentially resulting in self-absorbed or narcissistic behaviour, 
or even requiring us to put others down in order to feel good about ourselves.  Self-compassion, 
she stated, is different because it does not rely on self-evaluation, promoting instead a stance of 
non-judgemental acceptance.  Neff goes on to separate self-compassion from self-indulgence, 
highlighting that to be truly self-compassionate would mean to avoid unhealthy indulgence for 
the sake of instant gratification (e.g., by smoking, taking recreational drugs) as this may 
ultimately harm longer-term wellbeing.  Finally, she distinguished self-compassion from self-
pity, asserting that self-pity emphasizes personal suffering and egocentric feelings of isolation, 
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whereas self-compassion, by her definition, would promote social connectedness and frame 
suffering in the context of a shared human experience (2003a). 
1.3.3.3 The compassionate mind: an evolutionary perspective.   Whilst Neff’s work 
offers a relatively comprehensive model for understanding what it means to be self-
compassionate, Gilbert’s (2010a) work on the Compassionate Mind provides a theoretical basis 
for the evolutionary social function of compassion, as well as its role in promoting psychological 
wellbeing.  Gilbert (2010a) described the evolutional origins of the compassionate mind, 
whereby the ability to give and receive compassion develops from basic social motivational and 
functional emotional systems, enabling us to achieve a number of social goals necessary for 
survival – such as caring for kin or seeking out sexual partners.  Gilbert’s conceptualisation of 
compassion centres on two key evolutional theories: social rank theory and social mentality 
theory.  Social rank theory (Gilbert, 2000b) drew on existing ideas about the function of 
hypercompetitive social attitudes (Burkle, Ryckman, Gold, Thornton, & Audesse, 1999) and 
posited that humans are driven to maintain social acceptance and approval in order to maximise 
one’s social rank and therefore be in a more desirable position to compete for social advantages.  
From this perspective, experiences of compassion serve an evolutionary function: to promote 
social acceptance and belonging; for a loss of social connectedness would represent a social 
threat (Gilbert, 2000b) and has been linked to psychological distress (Lee, Draper, & Lee, 2001). 
Social mentality theory (Gilbert, 2000a) posits that humans possess internal systems that 
generate patterns of cognition, affect, and behaviour, which evolved to facilitate interpersonal 
relating through the interpretation and enactment of social roles.  These systems – or ‘social 
mentalities’ – serve specific functions and enable individuals to solve various social challenges 
essential to human survival, such as care-seeking or competing for resources.  As such, humans 
have access to a plurality of social roles, meaning we can feel different things and play different 
parts, according to the state of mind we are in.  The roles that individuals adopt at any given time 
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are informed by the detection and decoding of social signals, as well as an individual’s 
interpretation of the emotions evoked within them as a result of the response in others to their 
role enactment.  The evocation of positive affect is usually indicative of role success, whereas 
negative affect will signal failure.  In the roles enacted by mother and infant, for example, 
effective proximity and attunement will likely evoke positive affect, but separation may evoke 
feelings of a negative disposition.  The appropriateness of the adopted role relies on the accurate 
and competent evaluation of social signals.  It is however common for aversive role mismatches 
to occur; for example, between the individual who anticipates a sexual encounter with another, 
and the other who perceives their relationship to be one of friendship.  In his explication of social 
mentalities, Gilbert (2000a) goes further to suggest that as a result of the higher-order thinking 
abilities – and thus self-consciousness – evolved in humans, such as the ability to self-reflect, 
social mentalities can be activated on an intrapersonal level (through a process of self-to-self 
relating), as well as for their original function in interpersonal (self-to-other) relating. 
On the basis of these theories, Gilbert (2005, 2010a) identifies a tripartite model 
comprising three main emotional systems inherent in human experience: the ‘drive (for 
resources) system’ helps motivate us towards a desired goal; the ‘threat-system’ enables us to 
safety-seek and protect ourselves from danger; and the ‘soothing system’ allows us to foster 
safety from within, evoking warmth and compassion in a non-judgemental and mindful way 
(Gilbert, 2010a).  Within the three-systems model, compassion is understood as relating to the 
soothe-system and is connected to care-seeking and caregiving behaviours on an interpersonal 
level, but can also be internalised through a process of self-relating (self-compassion).  
Compassion, in this sense, can be played out in three directions: from oneself to another, from 
others to the self, and from self to self (Gilbert & Choden, 2013).  These systems and the social 
mentalities they subsume develop or mature to varying degrees as a direct result of our 
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environment and significant interpersonal experiences (with key attachment figures for example) 
to ensure our survival. 
1.3.3.3.1 The role of attachment.  Attachment theory was first proposed by Bowlby 
(1969, 1973, 1980), who highlighted the importance of the early relationship between an infant 
and their primary caregiver(s) in shaping their social, emotional, and cognitive development.  
Infants have an innate urge to seek-care from their available attachment figures, without whom 
they would not survive (Bowlby, 1969).  The specific relational patterns experienced within 
these early interactions lay the blueprint for more established patterns of relating to significant 
others, such as peers and romantic partners, later in life (Allen & Land, 1999); such blueprints 
are commonly referred to as attachment styles, or strategies (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 
1978; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Bowlby, 1969).  In essence, the function of an 
attachment relationship is to provide a safe-base from which to explore the world (Bowlby, 
1969).  When attachment figures provide ‘good enough’ care (Winnicott, 1960), it is likely that a 
secure attachment style will be developed (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).  In the 
face of an absent, inconsistent, or threatening attachment figure however, infants are forced to 
adopt safety-strategies to ensure their survival, usually resulting in one of the insecure 
attachment styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).  Adolescence has been recognised 
as a transitional period when greater autonomy is sought so as to no longer rely as much on the 
support of parental figures; it is however recognised that a backdrop of secure attachment 
relationships can greatly enhance this process (Allen & Land, 1999). 
Both Gilbert and Neff put forward the idea that our ability to foster (self-)compassion 
develops in childhood through our interaction with the environment and significant others within 
it.  Gilbert (2010a) was perhaps more specific in directly linking our ability to foster a 
compassionate stance to self and others via the soothe-system and its associated social 
mentalities, to our relational experiences with our key attachment figures.  For the child whose 
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primary caregiver models compassion through warmth, acceptance, and soothing 
containment/safety, the soothe-system is likely to develop accordingly, allowing them to 
internalise such qualities and draw on them when the need arises to offer similar feelings of 
compassion for themselves or others.  For those who have been repeatedly exposed to 
threatening environments – for example interpersonal trauma – the threat-system may become 
over-developed, thus increasing the likelihood that this system will be regularly activated, 
triggering associated emotional responses such as anxiety – linked to hypervigilance for danger, 
and shame – as a maladaptive coping strategy intended to trigger self-criticism and ensure self-
monitoring to promote positive relationships with others (Goss & Allan, 2009).  Similarly to 
Neff’s position that self-compassion can be cultivated through practice, Gilbert (2010a & 2010b) 
argues that the attachment motivational system can be reactivated by the compassion of a 
therapist, or through a compassionate exercise, presenting a further opportunity to develop the 
soothing system.  In Gilbert’s (2010a) three-systems model, development of the soothe-system is 
important as its activation can have a moderating effect on the threat-system, subsequently 
reducing the experience of threat-associated emotions such as shame. 
 1.3.3.3.2 Fears of compassion.  An interesting facet of Gilbert’s theory on compassion is 
the role that the fear of compassion, or indeed self-compassion, plays.  Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, 
and Rivis (2011) postulated that individuals who have experienced threat from others, for 
example through the perpetration of sexual abuse, may come to perceive expressions of 
compassion as posing a threat to one’s safety.  In such circumstances, a fear of compassion may 
serve to protect the individual as a function of the threat-system; however, this can ultimately 
result in the converse effect of preventing the individual from developing the capacity to self-
soothe, therefore limiting their ability to regulate an over-active threat-system.  Following social 
mentality theory (Gilbert, 2000a), it was suggested that an established fear of compassion from 
others in this sense may translate to a general fear of affiliative emotion directed to the self, 
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including when this originates from the self – as in self-compassion (Gilbert et al., 2011).  A 
study by Hermanto and Zuroff (2016) found further evidence for a link between low levels of 
compassion from others, or care-seeking, and low levels of self-compassion.  Interestingly, their 
results suggested that the lowest levels of self-compassion among participants were in fact 
predicted by low care-seeking, but high caregiving.  They proposed that this may relate to a 
compulsive caregiving attachment style (Bowlby, 1977, cited in Hermanto & Zuroff, 2016), 
thought to be predicted by early experiences of the subjugation of their own needs and forced 
care of an attachment figure. 
Gilbert et al. (2011) argued that a fear of expressing compassion towards others was also 
evident in some individuals.  They linked this phenomenon to the wider attachment literature, 
reasoning that a fear of compassion to others could be explained by an insecure attachment style 
(Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), where expressions of compassion from and to a 
primary caregiver were either non-existent or enacted inconsistently.  The fact that Neff (2003a, 
2003b) felt it necessary to distinguish self-compassion from self-pity and self-indulgence implies 
a likelihood that these constructs may be conflated.  As pity and indulgence are often construed 
as undesirable (Neff, 2003a), it seems feasible that a fear around the promotion of such traits 
could act as a barrier to self-compassion.  Studies relating to criminal behaviour have also 
indicated that compassion can be viewed as placing the self in a position of weakness where 
advantage can be taken, or as letting people ‘off the hook’ (McLaughlin, Hughes, Fergusson, & 
Westmarland, 2003).  Fears of compassion arising from interpersonal experiences are important 
to understand as they are likely to influence self-compassion, given social mentality theory’s 
proposition that the same internal systems activated in interpersonal relating are used in self-
relating (Gilbert, 2000a).  Understanding what might get in the way of compassion and how to 
overcome this is also necessary in developing clinical interventions that aim to encourage 
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individuals to foster a compassionate stance – particularly when this in itself may activate a 
threat-response. 
1.3.3.4 The developmental trajectory of compassion.  Gilbert’s (2010a) theory of the 
Compassionate Mind emphasises the important link between early attachment relationships and 
the development of compassion.  But compassion, as defined earlier in the chapter, appears also 
to involve a number of affectual and cognitive capacities, without which the ability to experience 
compassion would seemingly be impeded.  Indeed, well-established neurodevelopmental and 
social psychological research into constructs associated with compassion have identified that 
numerous processes are involved.  By way of example, empathy – thought to be closely linked to 
compassion (Batson, 1991) – has been broken-down into key components including affective 
arousal, emotion understanding, and emotion regulation; each associated with specific regions of 
brain activity and with their own developmental trajectory (Decety, 2010).  The importance of 
perspective-taking has also been highlighted within the morality literature (Gibbs, 2010; Gibbs, 
Basinger, Grime & Snarey, 2007).  Perspective-taking alone is underpinned by specific cognitive 
capacities – such as perspectival coordination and working memory – but also involves social 
processes and is thought to be enhanced by exposure to more diverse social perspective-taking 
opportunities (Gibbs et al., 2007).  The ability to cognitively understand states of mind in self 
and others is often referred to as ‘theory of mind’ (ToM; Wimmer & Perner, 1983); in other 
words, the capacity to understand that individuals possess their own minds and as such can differ 
in their thoughts and intentions.  Whilst ToM and empathy are both likely to be important in 
compassion, they reflect distinct processes.  Empathy, for example, involves an emotional 
resonance and therefore utilises emotion processing at both a cognitive and affectual level 
(Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009), whereas ToM is underpinned by cognitive processes which do not 
necessarily involve an affectual response.  The development of compassion is therefore unlikely 
to be predicted solely by the quality of early attachment relationships; whilst these clearly play 
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an important role, consideration must also be paid to the specific capacities involved in 
experiencing compassion, and the degree to which such capacities have developed within 
individuals. 
Research suggests that humans demonstrate some tendencies towards helping behaviours 
from a young age.  Between 14 and 18 months, infants can begin to comfort others in distress 
and display some spontaneous helping behaviours (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).  In what is 
often termed ‘neurotypical’ development, cognitive and affectual capacities increase with age in 
a relatively linear and predictable fashion.  Whilst some early-years research has suggested that 
babies are born with the capacity to experience some aspects of emotional resonance and 
expression (Dondi, Simion & Caltran, 1999), it is widely recognised that the cognitive abilities 
required to achieve mature empathic understanding develop later in life (Decety, 2010).  key 
proponents of child development theory have emphasised the role of social interaction, including 
modelling, scaffolding, and exposure to diverse social experiences, in the ongoing development 
and maturation of such abilities, as well as others (e.g., Piaget, 1936; Vygotsky, 1978).  Given 
the importance of socialisation and interaction to the developmental process, it follows that 
children who have been deprived of effective social scaffolding – perhaps through interpersonal 
abuse and neglect, or as a result of the limited capacities of their caregivers – may experience 
developmental delay in key areas of functioning, including some of those central to compassion.  
As with Gilbert’s (2010a) model, this perspective would highlight the importance of early 
relationships.  However, it is widely recognised that developmental delay can occur in some 
individuals for various other reasons, seemingly independent of the quality of caregiving and 
attachment.  Key examples of this include the areas of intellectual disability (ID) and social and 
communication difficulties, such as those experienced in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD).  
Whilst there remains speculation around the aetiology of such presentations, there is clear 
evidence to suggest that individuals diagnosed with an ID and/or ASD can experience significant 
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difficulties in social skills (Smith & Matson, 2010), ToM (Ashcroft, Jervis, & Roberts, 1999; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), and executive functioning capacities (Danielsson, Henry, 
Messer & Rönnberg, 2012; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991).  Difficulties in empathy have 
also been acknowledged for individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), 
although it has been proposed that these are more closely linked to difficulties in the cognitive 
imagining of another’s pain and/or perspective taking – particularly when social cues are 
complex or subtle – as opposed to there being an innate inability to experience empathy on an 
affectual level.  Other developmental disorders, such as conduct disorder, are thought to be 
characterised by deficits in the affectual capacity to empathise (de Wied et al., 2006), despite an 
often in-tact – although skewed – capacity to understand mental states (Happe & Frith, 1996).  
This has clear implications for the current research, particularly given the high prevalence of ID 
and ASD in the population of young people who engage in harmful sexual behaviour (see below; 
Hackett, Phillips, Masson, & Balfe, 2013) and the association between offending behaviour and 
conduct disorder (Murray & Farrington, 2010).  Furthermore, it raises a question around whether 
young people with delayed or disrupted cognitive and/or affectual development will possess the 
relevant capacities to enable them to experience compassion and/or to cognitively understand 
these processes and reflect on them through conversation – such as within an interview context.  
One related area of the literature which has attempted to delineate the developmental trajectory 
of processes linked to morality, including the moral emotions, is that of moral reasoning. 
1.3.3.4.1 Moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning, also referred to as moral development, can 
be understood as the evolution of specific beliefs, emotions, attitudes, and behaviours that 
contribute to moral understanding and decision making.  As with other domains of the 
developmental psychology literature, research in this area has sought to understand how and why 
moral reasoning develops in individuals, as well as the specific factors that impact this.  Piaget 
(1932) – thought to be one of the first theorists to apply a psychological framework to moral 
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reasoning – outlined three key stages of moral development in children: the premoral period (0-5 
years) where children have little awareness of socially defined rules, heteronomous morality (5-
10 years) where rules of authority figures are viewed as unalterable, and autonomous morality 
(10 years – adolescence) where rules are understood as negotiable and actions or decisions are 
viewed with the propensity to affect everyone.  Piaget viewed his stages as forming an invariant 
sequence, and emphasised peer-interaction in an individual’s progression through them (1932).  
Kohlberg (1976) built on Piaget’s initial theory, expanding this into a six-stage cognitive-
developmental model which extended beyond childhood to adolescence and adulthood.  In 
addition to peer-interaction, Kohlberg highlighted the importance of wider social engagement in 
the development of moral values and social perspective-taking processes (1976).  Kohlberg 
(1971) argued for the universality of his moral development theory, but has been criticised from 
several angles, including cultural and socioeconomic bias (Snarey, 1985), negation of the role of 
emotion (Sullivan, 1977), and the fact that moral reasoning may not be consistent across all 
contexts (Krebs & Denton, 2005). 
Since Kohlberg, moral development has been studied across the life span and several 
other perspectives have been proposed; some of these highlighting the role of ‘instinct’ in our 
sense of morality (Haidt, 2001), some emphasising social factors including opportunities for 
social perspective-taking (Comunian & Gielen, 2006), and others focusing largely on the role of 
emotion (Eisenberg, 2000).  Hoffman (2000) argued for the centrality of empathy to moral 
reasoning.  Whilst Gibbs (2010) agreed that empathy is key, he argued that Hoffman’s 
perspective was one of ‘affective primacy’ and what was instead needed was a theory of ‘co-
primacy’ which highlights the importance of both empathy and the cognitive integration of moral 
principles.  Thus, this position emphasises the role of both cognitive and affectual processes 
underpinning morality.  Despite the differences between perspectives, there appears to be some 
agreement that moral reasoning develops in individuals to a particular stage and in a relatively 
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linear fashion dependent on a multitude of variables, including those highlighted above.  Palmer 
(2003) integrated this thinking into a developmental theory, whereby the trajectory of moral 
reasoning development is shaped not just by parental and peer influence, but also by information 
processing capacities, and social and environmental factors.  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
empirical research in this area has pointed to a correlational link between moral development and 
factors such as age, education, socioeconomic status, and community participation (Colby, 
Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983; Comunian & Gielen, 2006).  Of particular interest is the 
suggestion that these patterns might be in-part explained by the likelihood that such variables 
would expose individuals to more diverse social opportunities and subsequently influence the 
development of increasing psychological understandings of others and their perspectives – or a 
multitude of ‘theories’ of mind (Gibbs et al., 2007) – thus providing further support for the role 
of empathy and ToM in the maturation of moral reasoning abilities.  As previously noted in the 
context of compassion, it would therefore appear that for individuals whose affective and/or 
cognitive development is delayed or disrupted, we may expect to observe less mature moral 
reasoning.  This is supported by the fact that comparatively less mature moral reasoning has been 
observed in populations with ID; although interestingly, within an ID population, individuals 
who engage in offending have been found to have marginally more mature moral reasoning than 
those with ID who do not offend (Langdon, Clare & Murphy, 2011).  Furthermore, such 
developmental delays may in some cases be contributed to by limited social opportunity and/or 
the quality of parental and peer relationships (Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Palmer, 2003) – 
returning us to the salience of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969).  Research revealing moral 
reasoning at the lower stages in populations of youth who offend (Stams, Brugman, Deković, & 
van Rosmalen, 2006) may go some way to supporting this notion, particularly because of the 
elevated risk of interpersonal trauma and lack of social opportunity often observed in this group 
(Ward, McCormack & Hudson, 2002).  Indeed, Gibbs (2010) argued that a developmental delay 
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in moral judgement, coupled with social skills deficits and distorted cognitions/cognitive 
schemas serving to justify or minimise criminal behaviour are common in groups of offenders. 
Given its association with other ‘moral’ constructs such as kindness, altruism, guilt and 
shame, compassion is likely to be closely linked, if not intrinsic to moral reasoning.  It seems 
plausible, for example, to conclude that experiencing compassion for somebody who 
transgresses may impact one’s reasoning about their guilt and the subsequent action that should 
be taken.  As such, compassion may be a salient component of the stages of moral reasoning 
which demand empathy, ToM, and a motivation to consider the explicit needs of individuals, but 
may be less important at less mature stages which centre on the avoidance of punishment and 
rigid adherence to a global authority.  The definitions of compassion discussed earlier in the 
chapter allude to the importance of both cognitive and affectual processes involved in the 
experiencing of compassion; much like Gibbs’ (2010) emphasis on the co-primacy of empathy 
and moral principles in driving moral reasoning.  It therefore might be predicted that, like moral 
reasoning, compassion will be affected by factors like age, intellect, education, social-interaction 
and exposure to varied social opportunities.  Clearly there is much to be learned from the 
existing literature on moral reasoning and its likely cross-over with compassion; and such 
research may provide a useful framework from which to consider the results of the current study. 
 1.3.3.5 The importance of context.  The preceding sections have outlined an 
evolutionary argument, drawing largely on Gilbert’s work (2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2010a), for 
compassion as a functional emotion associated with caregiving and care-seeking social 
mentalities.  Despite a growing interest in this domain, there remains some discrepancy within 
the literature as to how compassion is experienced from moment to moment, and it has remained 
largely absent from any taxonomy of emotion (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010).  Whilst 
some assert that compassion develops as a trait-like feature, whereby some individuals will 
generally be more compassionate across contexts and timeframes than others (e.g., Neff, 2003a; 
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Neff & Dahm, 2015), in other areas of the literature it is viewed as more of a brief emotional 
state (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010).  It might be argued that evolutionary theories 
assume a little of both perspectives.  On the one hand, compassion is understood as a trait-like 
feature cultivated through early attachment relationships and, for example, the development of 
the soothe-system (Gilbert, 2010a); on the other, it can be triggered temporarily in social 
contexts as a result of the activation of a specific social mentality (Gilbert, 2000a) serving to 
motivate the enactment of a related social role (such as caregiving).  Clearly, there is much to 
learn about the nature of compassion and how it is enacted across various situations. 
Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas (2010) did go some way to delineating contextual 
precipitants to compassion.  Following their review of the existing evolutionary compassion 
literature, they highlighted both the importance of specific antecedents and an appraisal process 
involved in experiences of compassion.  With regard to antecedents, they found that, in-line with 
the definitions offered earlier, compassion arises in response to suffering or harm.  Specific 
antecedents in the literature related to pain, illness, sadness, disability, homelessness/poverty, 
victims of catastrophe, and children or babies in need.  They also proposed an appraisal model, 
whereby compassion was preceded by a distinct chain of appraisals.  They posited that 
individuals assessed costs and gains to the self in four key areas:  
1. Self-relevance: how important the other (object of compassion) was perceived to be 
in relation to self-wellbeing.  For example, how close the relationship was (parent, 
friend, etc.). 
2. Goal-congruence: the extent to which another’s suffering violates the wider goals 
upheld by the self (e.g., that humans should have equal rights). 
3. Blame: the extent to which the other can be blamed for their suffering.  This therefore 
involved an appraisal of the deservingness of compassion. 
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4. Coping ability: a judgement on the individual’s self-ability to cope with the suffering 
of the other and/or resources to offer help. 
The proposal of an appraisal model involved in compassion is interesting in its implication that 
there is a degree of agency involved in the decision to enact compassion.  Human agency has 
been understood to involve intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness, 
and also involves a moral element observed in an individual’s developed capacity to refrain from 
actions that violate, but engage in actions that promote, internalised moral standards (Bandura, 
2006).  Bandura’s (1991, 2006) work on human and moral agency may prove an important 
concept in the current research area, as it may provide some insight into why people who enact 
compassion in some areas of their lives, can – through a process of moral disengagement – carry 
out harmful behaviours in another. 
1.3.4 Assessing compassion.  Being able to appropriately assess compassion is key to 
understanding how compassion is experienced and influenced among varying populations.  The 
ability to effectively assess (self-)compassion is important for both research and clinical practice, 
as it facilitates an evaluation of the effectiveness of compassion-focused interventions (i.e., 
whether they do improve levels of (self-)compassion) and allows for the exploration of specific 
compassion experiences for the individual, from which to direct clinical intervention.  To-date, 
the compassion literature-base has adopted a predominantly quantitative approach to the 
exploration of compassion, with a focus on the development of scales to measure an individual’s 
‘level’ of compassion to self and/or others.  The Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003b), a 
26-item self-report measure, was the first designed and currently most frequently used scale for 
this purpose.  Asking respondents to answer questions spanning six factors based on Neff’s 
(2003a) model (self-kindness/self-judgement, common humanity/isolation, and 
mindfulness/over-identification), the SCS calculates a self-compassion score, where higher 
scores represent greater self-compassion.  Other commonly used scales include the Fears of 
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Compassion Scale (Gilbert et al., 2011) and the Compassion Scale (Pommier, 2011) that seek to 
measure aspects of compassion in a similar way. 
Strauss et al. (2016) systematically reviewed nine measures purported to measure 
compassion to self and/or others.  They looked at the SCS, SCS: short form (Raes, Pommier, 
Neff, & Van Gucht, 2011), Compassionate Love Scale (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005), Santa Clara 
Brief Compassion Scale (Hwang, Plante, & Lackey, 2008), Compassion Scale (Martins, 
Nicholas, Shaheen, Jones, & Norris, 2013), the Compassion Scale (Pommier, 2011), Relational 
Compassion Scale (Hacker, 2008, cited in Strauss et al., 2016), Compassionate Care Assessment 
Tool (Burnell & Agan, 2013), and the Schwartz Center Compassionate Care Scale (Lown, 
Muncer, & Chadwick, 2015).  They concluded that due to low quality ratings linked to poor 
internal consistency and insufficient evidence presented for the factor structure, and in the 
absence of any examination of floor/ceiling effects, test–retest reliability, or discriminant validity 
for most measures, there currently exists no self- or observer-rated scale of compassion that is 
psychometrically robust.  Strauss et al. (2016) highlighted that the development of a measure of 
compassion in the absence of a clear definition of compassion is problematic. 
1.3.4.1 Critique of the quantitative approach to assessing (self-)compassion.  Whilst the 
development of quantitative scales has facilitated the progression of (self-)compassion research, 
there are a number of potential limitations to this approach that should be borne in mind.  In 
addition to the poor psychometric properties of current scales highlighted above, most available 
scales appear to imply the existence of compassion, including self-compassion, as an objective 
construct, distinct from other constructs with which it consistently proves to be highly correlated 
(e.g., kindness, altruism, empathy; Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010).  Despite some 
acknowledgement across the literature that environment, state of mind, and interpersonal relating 
all play a role in compassion experiences (e.g., Gilbert, 2000a, 2010a), implicit in these measures 
is the assumption that an assessment of an individual’s ‘level’ of compassion can be accurately 
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obtained through self-report questionnaires that fail to take into account current contextual 
factors.  Furthermore, most research in this area to-date has been correlational, and in so is 
limited in its ability to explain the potentially complex relationship or interplay between various 
affiliative and/or negative emotions.  An argument could therefore be made for the enrichment of 
the current literature base through further qualitative research.  Indeed, a study by Reddy and 
others (2013), which assessed a cognitive-based compassion training intervention with 
adolescents in care, suggested that qualitative methods of data collection were able to detect 
possible clinical change that the SCS did not.  This may also speak to the complex nature of the 
affiliative emotions, including compassion, pointing to the need for more qualitative research to 
explore compassion as a construct.  This could be particularly pertinent research among 
disadvantaged populations, for whom there is little work published in relation to their 
understanding and experience of compassion to self or others.  A study by Pauley and 
McPherson (2010) used Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to explore the experience of 
self-compassion among a clinical sample of adults with depression and anxiety.  Whilst their 
results offered important insight into the experience of self-compassion for this group and in 
many ways appeared to corroborate the existing quantitative literature, much further work is 
required and particularly among other populations of clinical interest. 
1.3.5 Compassion-focused interventions.  Gilbert’s theoretical framework formed the 
basis for a compassion-focused approach to mental health intervention; namely that of 
compassion-focused therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b).  Whilst it is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to offer a comprehensive overview of all current compassion-focused 
interventions and their efficacy, it is important to draw attention here to some of the key findings 
from evaluations of CFT for clinical populations that may bear similar features and experiences 
to the current population of interest.  This helps to build the rationale for the present research 
focus, demonstrating that, as will be argued later, (self-)compassion is likely to be an important 
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treatment target for young people who engage in harmful sexual behaviour, and therefore needs 
to be understood in terms of how this group relate to and experience it as a construct and process. 
Central to Gilbert’s three-system model is the idea that each system interacts with the 
other two, and can therefore influence the degree to which the other systems are activated.  CFT 
therefore seeks to develop an individual’s capacity to foster a self-compassionate stance, 
activating and developing the soothe-system and subsequently helping to alleviate the socially 
isolating effects of shame and other emotions associated with the threat-system (e.g., anger and 
anxiety).  Indeed, research has indicated that both improved levels of compassion and a 
reduction in shame can be achieved through CFT (Gilbert, 2010b; Gilbert & Procter, 2006).  
Further support for the efficacy of CFT has accumulated in the recent literature, with the model 
demonstrating positive treatment outcomes for a variety of populations, including adults with a 
psychosis (Braehler, Gumley, Harper, Wallace, Norrie & Gilbert, 2012) or other severe and 
enduring mental health problem (Gilbert & Procter, 2006).  CFT also helps clients to identify and 
address any fears of compassion that may act as a barrier to the development of the soothe-
system.  In the context of the current research, it is worth noting that compassion-focused 
interventions have been found to be helpful for both adult forensic populations (e.g., Laithwaite 
et al., 2009) and adolescents exposed to adversity in early life (Reddy et al., 2013). 
1.3.6 Self-compassion and shame.  Gilbert’s (2010a) three-system model (discussed 
above) provides a theoretical explanation for a link between self-compassion and shame, 
whereby self-compassion (associated with the soothe-system) can moderate adverse effects 
associated with heightened shame (a feature of the threat-system).  Given that the current study 
intends to explore compassion to self and others, which based on evolutionary theory is likely to 
be closely linked to experiences of shame, it is important to examine what we know about shame 
as a construct, and to further explore its proposed link with self-compassion through the 
consideration of current relevant research.  First though, it is necessary to define shame. 
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1.3.6.1 Defining shame.  Shame is as a self-conscious, other-focused, emotion, driven by 
an evaluation that certain personal attributes or behaviours will be seen as undesirable or 
unattractive by others, thus resulting in rejection and a subsequent perceived threat to the self 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011).  As humans are driven to maintain social connectedness 
(Gilbert, 2000b; Lee, Draper, & Lee, 2001), it could be conceived that experiences of shame 
serve to motivate an individual to engage in reparative action as an attempt to rectify the threat of 
rejection and instead promote social acceptance (Braithwaite, 1989).  Some research, however, 
indicates that experiences of shame have the opposite effect, in that they increase the chances of 
further undesirable behaviour (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011), thus making it more likely 
that social rejection will be the outcome.  Clearly there is conflicting explanatory theory 
underpinning the current understanding of shame.  This dichotomy has been understood by some 
as a conflation of two differing emotions: namely shame and guilt. 
1.3.6.1.1 Shame versus guilt.  The psychology literature makes an important distinction 
between shame and guilt, in that whilst guilt involves “a focus on a specific behaviour – a sense 
that ‘I did a bad thing’, ... shame [involves a more] ... painful focus on the self – a sense that ‘I 
am a bad person’” (Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014, p.800).  Whilst guilt therefore may 
incite a motivation to take reparative action to correct a wrongdoing, shame is seen as the more 
devastating emotion, in that it involves a condemning of one’s own core identity or self-concept 
(Van Vugt et al., 2011).  Juxtaposing shame and guilt, Gilligan (2003) argued that in order to 
experience guilt, one must experience love – both for others and the self.  Shame on the other 
hand, is underpinned by humiliation and a deep sense of personal worthlessness (Gilbert & 
Miles, 2002) – a self-hatred so intolerable that it is often projected outwards through anger and 
violence.  Interestingly, Gilligan posited that shame is closely connected to innocence and guilt 
to pride (2003).  He reasoned that whilst feelings of guilt can connect the individual with 
humility, love, and regret, and thus motivate them to diminish their pride, shame instead leads 
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people to diminish this painful feeling through arrogance and boastfulness, and in doing so 
diminishing their innocence, such as through the commission of violence.  Gilligan (2003) also 
acknowledged the significance of gender here, in that men who have been socialised into the 
male gender role may feel that violence is necessary in a number of contexts to protect ideations 
of ‘masculinity’, whereas social norms often prohibit the use of female violence, resulting in 
feelings of shame for women who aggress. 
This distinction between shame and guilt can also be roughly mapped onto Braithwaite’s 
(1989) ‘Reintegrative Shaming Theory’ from the criminology field, which framed societal 
responses to criminality as having the effect of either ‘disintegrative shaming’ – involving 
practices or policies that focus on punishing the individual, leading to social isolation and 
humiliation (linked to the psychological definition of shame), or ‘reintegrative shaming’ – where 
the behaviour is condemned but the person respected and accepted back into society with a 
chance to make reparations (linked to the psychological definition of guilt) (Tangney, Stuewig, 
& Hafez, 2011), such as through restorative justice (McLaughlin, Hughes, & Westmarland, 
2003).  Shame has then been further conceptualised as comprising of two facets (Gilbert, 1998): 
external shame – characterised by the belief that others will view oneself as defective in some 
way and internal shame – when the emotion is internalised through the negative appraisals of 
one’s own behaviour or attributes, or views the self as globally bad (Goss & Allan, 2009).  
Harris and Maruna (2006) also identify a third classification of shame, which suggests that it can 
arise from the belief that an abstract ethical other would think badly of us following a serious 
transgression.  This recognises the influence of wider social ethical contexts and can be said to 
also fit with Gilbert’s definition of external shame.  Gilbert (2010c) framed shame-based critical 
dialogue as a response to perceived threats to the self, arising from either internal or external 
stimuli.  External threats represent a threat from outside the self, such as the actions of others, 
whereas internal threats are generated internally through our judgements or beliefs about our 
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thoughts, imagination, and emotions; for example, we can feel ashamed of a thought or fantasy.  
Gilbert (2000a) argued that humans are particularly susceptible to internal threats as a result of 
our capacity for self-awareness, which in turn gives rise to the concept of self-identity and 
facilitates self-evaluation. 
1.3.6.2 Adverse effects of shame.  Shame has been associated with a number of other 
difficult experiences such as self-criticism, social isolation, and anger (e.g., Gilbert, 2010a; 
Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Gilligan, 2003; Kolts, 2011).  A variety of mental health difficulties have 
also been linked to heightened levels of shame, including depression and anxiety (Gilbert, 
2000b).  It has been suggested that shame may play a role in precipitating and maintaining 
various dangerous behaviours, such as bingeing and purging in eating disorders (Goss & Allen, 
2009), self-harming behaviours (Gilbert et al., 2010), and violent (Gilligan, 2003) and sexual 
offending (McAlinden, 2005).  Furthermore, shame has been found to act as a barrier to 
treatment in some cases by inhibiting disclosure of behaviours (e.g., Swan & Andrews, 2003).  
This is important because barriers to disclosure may prevent individuals from fully engaging 
with interventions, thereby potentially reducing their effectiveness.  It could therefore be argued 
that shame may be an appropriate treatment target both prior to and during the delivery of 
interventions for a variety of populations. 
In their evolutionary and biopsychosocial model of shame, Gilbert and Irons (2009) 
explicated how experiences of a hostile or critical parenting style and/or bullying by peers 
created an unsafe and socially rejecting environment.  They posited that this can then lead to the 
internalisation of shame, whereby the self is ‘put-down’ through processes of self-criticism and 
self-denigration, particularly when the externalisation of the anger evoked through the rejection 
by key attachment figures was not permitted or possible.  This theory supports findings from 
other studies which have observed a link between restrictive and rejecting parenting styles and 
increased self-criticism in later childhood and adolescence (Koestner, Zuroff, & Powers, 1991).  
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An interesting gender difference has also been noted, whereby for girls, the link between 
maternal style and attitudes towards the self seems more robust and patterns of self-criticism are 
more stable across adolescence and early adulthood (Koestner, Zuroff, & Powers, 1991; Shahar, 
Blatt, Zuroff, Kupermine, & Leadbeater, 2004). 
1.3.6.3 Self-compassion as a moderator of shame.  Gilligan (2003) suggested that shame 
equates to a deficiency of self-love.  The evolutionary theory of compassion (Gilbert, 2010a) 
provides further rationale for the relationship between these constructs in its conceptualisation of 
self-compassion as a moderator of shame via the ability of a developed soothe-system to bring 
into balance an over-active threat-system.  In further support of this relationship, there is a 
growing body of evidence to suggest that compassion-focused interventions can lead to 
reductions in shame.  Research into compassion-focused interventions has observed a number of 
positive treatment outcomes, including reductions in shame or perceived social marginalisation 
(Braehler et al., 2012; Gilbert & Procter, 2006).  Numerous other studies have also repeatedly 
found an inverse correlational relationship between shame and self-compassion (e.g., Gale, 
Gilbert, Read, & Goss, 2014; Lucre & Corten, 2012).  There has also been some evidence for a 
further mediating effect of ‘fear of compassion’ on the existing relationship between shame and 
self-compassion (Kelly, Carter, Zuroff and Borairi, 2013). 
1.4 Young People Who Engage in Harmful Sexual Behaviour 
 Since the 1990s there has been increasing recognition that sexual abuse can be, and often 
is, perpetrated by children and young people (Home Office, 2002).  Widespread media coverage 
of cases such as the murder and suspected sexual abuse of two-year-old James Bulger in 1993 by 
two ten-year-old boys shocked the nation and precipitated discussions around the criminal 
culpability of children, resulting in the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility in England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland from 12 to 10.  For reasons outlined below, sexual abuse – when 
perpetrated by children and young people – is now commonly referred to as harmful sexual 
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behaviour (HSB).  Whilst professional interest in the domain continues to grow, HSB remains a 
vastly under-researched area.  The following sections will summarise the current thinking around 
HSB and those affected by it. 
 1.4.1 Defining harmful sexual behaviour.  Numerous organisations, including the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), Department of Health, and 
Department of Education, have adopted their own, varying, definitions of HSB.  In the absence 
of a globally accepted definition of the term, a recent enquiry into HSB by the charitable 
organisation Barnardo’s (2016) used the following: “Harmful sexual behaviour is when children 
and young people (under 18) engage in sexual discussions or activities that are inappropriate for 
their age or stage of development, often with other individuals who they have power over by 
virtue of age, emotional maturity, gender, physical strength, or intellect and where the victim in 
this relationship has suffered a betrayal of trust.  These activities can range from using sexually 
explicit words or phrases to full penetrative sex with other children or adults” (p.10).  This 
definition extends other frequently used definitions (e.g., Rich, 2011) to include the role of 
power differentials in HSB (Calder, 1999). 
 The conceptualisation of HSB came in response to criticisms of previous labels such as 
‘adolescent sexual offenders’ and ‘sexually abusive behaviours by young people’ for 
stigmatising the young person who subsequently became viewed as an ‘abuser’ or ‘sexual 
offender’ (Bernardo’s, 2016).  Furthermore, these earlier terms were deemed too narrow and 
prescriptive; for example, ‘adolescent’ precludes the consideration of behaviour by children 
younger than adolescence, and use of the word ‘offender’ implies commission of a criminal act 
and subsequent conviction, whereas in reality a large proportion of HSB is dealt with outside of 
the Criminal Justice System through welfare agencies such as social care (Bernardo’s, 2016).  
‘Abuse’ and its connotation with ‘abuser’ suggests an awareness for the individual that their 
actions are wrong, which is not always true in cases of HSB.  ‘HSB’ therefore emphasises the 
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behaviour over the individual, both reducing stigma and allowing for the consideration of 
potential developmental issues, as well as the propensity for the young person to change 
(Hackett, 2014).  Additionally, HSB provides a much broader definition that can encompass the 
wide spectrum of inappropriate sexual behaviours likely to result in harm and those who engage 
in them.  It has also been proposed that the term ‘HSB’ allows for the acknowledgment of harm 
caused to the individual who engages in such behaviour, as well as any additional victims, by 
including both sexually abusive behaviour involving coercive victimisation (Burton, Miller, & 
Shill, 1998) and sexually concerning or problematic behaviour where there is no victimisation of 
another (Bernardo’s, 2016; Hackett, 2004). 
1.4.2 Prevalence.  The exact prevalence of HSB is difficult to assess for a variety of 
reasons.  Perhaps most significantly, the number of HSB cases brought to the attention of 
services, and therefore included in official statistics, may not reflect the true number of incidents 
of HSB within society.  As evidenced by an increase in referrals for HSB, particularly among 
younger children, between 1992 and 2000 (Hackett et al., 2013), the increasing recognition and 
understanding of HSB among professionals over time has facilitated the detection of a larger 
number of cases for support and intervention.  Whilst the identification of cases therefore 
appears to have improved, there are still likely to be cases who remain undetected and therefore 
current figures could potentially be under-representative.  Hackett et al.’s (2013) finding that in 
many cases of HSB the behaviour had been occurring for several years prior to the referral to 
services is again likely to suggest an underestimation of prevalence when figures are determined 
by service involvement.  Societal stigma, fear, and taboo surrounding sexual offences and HSB 
(Bernardo’s, 2016) may also deter families and individuals from reporting and/or seeking help, 
which again could lead to statistics being misrepresentative. 
Research suggests that between a quarter and a third of all reported sexual offences in the 
UK are carried out by young people under the age of 18 (Hackett, 2014).  Erooga and Masson 
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(2006) reported that children and young people were responsible for between 30 and 50 per cent 
of all sexual abuse coming to the attention of professional systems within the UK.  When the 
potential underestimation of national statistics highlighted above is taken into consideration, it is 
clear that the prevalence of HSB is widespread and worthy of professional attention.  The 
National Children’s Home Report (NCH, 1992) was one of the first publications to raise HSB as 
a national concern in the UK, sparking research attention to the field.  Since then, attempts have 
been made to identify risk factors associated with HSB, as well as inform treatment and 
intervention for individuals and families affected by HSB.  This remains, however, a relatively 
under-researched area warranting further investigation. 
1.4.3 Risk factors associated with HSB.  Studies that have been conducted to establish 
the likely characteristics of and risk factors associated with those who engage in HSB have 
revealed remarkably similar findings across various samples in the UK and North America and 
are summarised here. 
1.4.3.1 Age.  The largest study of HSB undertaken in the UK to-date (Hackett et al., 
2013) analysed data for 700 young people referred to nine services across England and Wales 
over a nine-year period (1992-2000) to investigate individual, familial and victim characteristics, 
developmental histories, and the nature of the HSB.  They found that referrals for HSB spanned 
a wide age range from children as young as five, up to the cut-off age for services of 18.  They 
also reported that one per cent of their sample included referrals for young people between 18 
and 28, often with an intellectual disability, for whom professionals felt support and intervention 
from HSB services skilled in work with young people would be more appropriate than services 
for adult sexual offenders.  Hackett et al. (2013) reported that half of their sample were aged 14 
to 16 and a third under 13. 
A large study of 1,616 adolescent sexual offenders across 30 North American States 
(Ryan, Miyoshi, Metzner, Krugman, & Fryer, 1996) reported that the most frequent referral age 
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for HSB was 14.  Hackett et al. (2013) do however note that the age at referral was not 
necessarily synonymous with the age of onset of HSB, which was likely to have been earlier.  
These data seem to suggest that children can engage in HSB from a very young age, but that this 
is more likely to result in a referral to services during adolescence.  Possible explanations for this 
include referrals occurring at an age when the young person becomes more autonomous and 
adults therefore feel less able to manage any concerning behaviour, or when the sense of risk 
elevates due to increased power differentials (e.g., the young person becoming bigger and 
stronger, their intellect or emotional intelligence developing beyond some others) or opportunity 
for HSB behaviour to occur (e.g., due to increased independence).  Indeed, a multi-site study in 
North America indicated that the average age of onset for a range of problematic sexual 
behaviours was between 10 and 12 (Zolondek, Abel, Northey, & Jordan, 2001). 
Potentially, concerning sexual behaviour may also be more readily recognised in 
adolescence than in younger children due to preconceptions around the onset age of sexual 
interest, as well as a societal reluctance to acknowledge the prevalence of sexual abuse against 
young children (Bernardo’s, 2016).  The fact that the frequency of referrals for younger children 
has increased alongside society’s understanding of HSB (Hackett et al., 2013) may support this 
proposition. 
1.4.3.2 Sex.  All available research considering the sex of those who engage in HSB 
reports that the overwhelming majority of cases that come to the attention of services are male.  
UK studies appear to have consistently found there to be over 90 per cent males among their 
samples (e.g., 92%; Taylor, 2003; 97%; Hackett et al., 2013) with similar proportions being 
identified in the USA (97.4%; Ryan et al., 1996).  It is difficult to gauge the extent to which 
underreporting may impact these percentages, or whether a bias for reporting HSB in relation to 
males may exist.   Such a bias may be perpetuated by gender stereotyping around sexual 
behaviour, including sexual aggression, or even the fact that there are far more services available 
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to males who engage in HSB than females, meaning that referrals for males may be easier to 
make and/or include in national figures.  Nevertheless, these figures do seem to strongly support 
the view that HSB is more likely to be perpetrated by males. 
1.4.3.3 Ethnicity.  Hackett et al. (2013) reported that the vast majority of their UK 
sample were white (93%) with far fewer numbers of young people described as black (1%), 
mixed race (3%), or Asian (3%).  They did note that for around a third of their sample 
information on ethnicity was not available, which they attributed to the fact that during the 
earlier years of their study (from 1992) it was not common place for ethnicity to be recorded by 
services in Britain.  These percentages are fairly reflective of the estimated proportions of ethnic 
populations across the UK at the time (Schuman, 1999); however, as a number of services were 
located in metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of people from black or minority ethnic 
groups, it is possible that young people from these groups are underrepresented in services 
working with HSB.  Whether this is because young people from these groups do not engage in 
HSB, or whether there are barriers to these young people being identified and/or engaging with 
services is unclear.  This could also reflect cultural differences in the conceptualisation of HSB 
and which behaviours are subsequently viewed as a cause for concern. 
1.4.3.4 Intellectual disability.  Also commonly referred to as a learning disability or 
cognitive impairment, the reported prevalence of intellectual disabilities (ID) among young 
people involved with services because of HSB is quite striking.  Around two per cent of the 
general UK population are reported as having an ID (Holland, 2011).  The proportion of young 
people with an ID reported to be engaging in HSB in the UK, however, is much higher, with 
previous research suggesting figures as high as 25 per cent (Masson & Hackett, 2003) and 38 per 
cent (Hackett et al., 2013), and in a specialist adolescent forensic service, 45 per cent (Dolan, 
Holloway, Bailey, & Kroll, 1996) of service users.  It is however important to bear in mind that 
individuals with an ID are likely to be overrepresented in samples of young people engaging in 
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HSB due to their increased visibility within professional systems (O’Callaghan, 1998), and it 
should not therefore be assumed that young people with an ID pose a much greater risk of HSB 
than those without (Thompson & Brown, 1997). 
1.4.3.5 Living circumstances.  Hackett et al. (2013) reported that of their UK sample, 42 
per cent were living at home with their families at the time of their referral to services for HSB, 
12 per cent were living with other relatives, 18 per cent were in ‘voluntary care’ (i.e., under s.20 
of the Children Act, 1989), and 14 per cent were looked after under a Care Order.  They reported 
that just six per cent had been transferred to secure accommodation.  Given that we think a 
significant proportion of HSBs are perpetrated against a family member (see below 1.4.3.9), it is 
important to consider the impact this may have on key attachment relationships (including how 
family members respond to the young person) and how this may influence whether or not the 
young person remains at home or with the family.  Likely disruptions to attachment 
relationships, impacted, for example, by anger and shame (Gilbert, 2010a), may therefore be a 
central focus for interventions in this area (see also 1.4.4). 
1.4.3.6 Trauma history.  It has been suggested that around half of young people referred 
to services because of HSB have a trauma history of non-sexual abuse, including physical 
violence, domestic abuse, emotional abuse, severe neglect, parental rejection, family breakdown 
and conflict, and parental drug and alcohol use (Hackett et al., 2013).  Rates of prior sexual 
abuse vary substantially across the literature, with some reporting around a quarter of their 
sample as having been victimised sexually (Dolan et al., 1996) and others reporting rates as high 
as 75 per cent (Worling, 1995).  Gender differences have also been observed, with reports that a 
higher percentage of females who engage in HSB having been the victims of sexual abuse than 
males (Hackett et al., 2013).  Whilst these findings may suggest that females are more likely to 
have been the victims of sexual abuse, recent events, such as the ‘English football sexual abuse 
scandal’ (2016) where hundreds of adult males have come forward to disclose historic childhood 
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sexual abuse by their football coaches, may indicate that sexual abuse against young males is 
much more prevalent than currently believed, but that there have clearly previously been barriers 
– perhaps linked to societal stigma – to victims disclosing. 
1.4.3.6.1 Exposure to pornography.  There are a number of sources that highlight 
exposure to pornography, and in particular violent pornography, as a risk factor for HSB (e.g., 
Flood, 2009).  Whilst it has been argued that explicit content falls along a continuum of 
extremity and that the degree to which this material can impact behaviour depends very much on 
the level of exposure coupled with where the content falls on the continuum (Hackett, quoted in 
Bernardo’s, 2016), there is also some concern that advances in technology have led to an 
increase in the amount of pornography and explicit material that can potentially easily be 
accessed by young people (Vizard, quoted in Bernardo’s, 2016).  Exposure to pornography is 
not, however, a sole contributor to engagement in HSB, and individual resilience to exposure, 
thought to be influenced by factors such as ‘good parenting’, may play a role in mediating the 
link between the two (Barnardo’s, 2016). 
1.4.3.7 Convictions.  Findings from UK research suggest that many young people 
referred to services for HSB do not have a history of convictions (58%; Hackett et al., 2013).  
Similarly, many cases of HSB themselves do not result in a criminal conviction (Masson & 
Hackett, 2003).  This may, in part, be due to the fact that the age of criminal responsibility across 
most of the UK is 10, with the exception of Scotland where it is 8, although a child can only be 
prosecuted from age 12 (NSPCC, n.d.).  This means that children under 10 cannot be tried and 
convicted of any criminal act and would therefore not have a conviction history.  In many cases 
where the young person is of an age of criminal responsibility, there is a lack of evidence or 
motivation from those involved to pursue a conviction, and it is increasingly common for HSB 
within the UK to be dealt with via a child protection route (i.e., through Social Care) instead of 
through the Criminal Justice System (Bernardo’s, 2016).  As highlighted earlier, the term HSB is 
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relatively broad and can also therefore include problematic sexualised behaviour where there is 
no victimisation of another, and therefore is unlikely to constitute a criminal offence.  For those 
young people who do have existing convictions, these have been found to range from a number 
of sexual offences (contact and non-contact) including indecent assault and rape, to non-sexual 
offences including burglary, arson, and drug/alcohol use (Hackett et al., 2013). 
1.4.3.8 Nature of the HSB.  There is a broad consensus across the literature that HSB 
covers a wide range of behaviour from non-contact sexualised behaviour through to attempted or 
actual penetration.  The categories of HSB do not appear to be mutually exclusive and it is 
reported that many young people display multiple types of behaviour (Hackett et al., 2013).  
Hackett and others (2013) warned that whilst it is often assumed that HSB among young people 
is experimental in nature, their findings revealed that just over half of their sample had 
penetrated or attempted to penetrate another individual.  They also reported that almost a fifth 
had used, often expressive, violence.  This is important as there is some, albeit limited, research 
to suggest that adolescents who commit sexual offences involving physical violence are at a 
greater risk of recidivism (Butz & Spaccarelli, 1999; Prentky, Harris, Frizzell, & Righthand, 
2000; Sipe, Jensen, & Everett, 1998). 
1.4.3.9 Victim characteristics.  Hackett et al. (2013) found that in most cases young 
people had victimised children under 11 years of age.  Just under half of their sample had 
victimised young people aged 11-17, and around 17 per cent had victimised adults (over 18).  
Varying frequencies for victim gender have been reported in the literature, but Hackett et al.’s 
(2013) research suggested that most frequently (in 51% of cases) young people victimised 
females only, with 19 per cent of cases victimising males only, and 30 per cent offending against 
both males and females.  This finding was surprising given that previous studies had revealed 
much lower rates of multi-gender victimisation (e.g., Dolan et al., 1996), but is significant as this 
has been proposed as a risk factor for recidivism for both adolescent and adult sexual offenders 
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(Worling, 2002).  In a UK sample, Yates, Allardyce and McQueen (2011) reported that in 33% – 
50% of cases, HSB occurred within the family home and victim and perpetrator were related. 
 1.4.4 Interventions for young people who engage in HSB.  In recognition of the fact 
that the approach to HSB in the UK was previously incoherent and ill-managed, with over a 
quarter of young people charged with HSB not being subjected to any form of assessment, the 
Assessment, Intervention, Moving on project (AIM Project, n.d.) was established in 1999 to 
provide a coherent and consistent strategy and protocol for the strategic assessment and 
intervention with this group (Henniker, Print, & Morrison, 2002).  A core principle of AIM is 
that interventions for this diverse population of young people need to range in intensity across 
various levels of concern.  The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has developed 
guidelines for services and professionals working with young people who engage in HSB (NICE, 
2016).  These state that interventions should be multi-modal and flexible, and include, where 
appropriate, both individual and systemic therapeutic work.  Individual work might include 
cognitive-behavioural (CBT) approaches that may, for example, help young people identify and 
address cognitive distortions that serve to justify their harmful behaviour (e.g., Apsche, Evile, & 
Murphy). 
Systemic work including the wider family network is also advocated, and in many cases 
involves a multisystemic therapeutic (MST; Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, Rowland, & 
Cunningham, 2009) approach.  MST is an intensive family- and community-based intervention 
that views the young person as embedded within several interconnected systems, such as their 
family, peer group, school, and community.  Intervention is aimed at the various system levels 
and adopts a strengths-based approach, focusing on what strengths and resources are available 
and how these can be developed.  Another important strengths-based approach, initially 
developed for adult forensic populations (Ward, 2002) but also employed more recently for 
adolescents who engage in HSB (e.g., Wylie & Griffin, 2013), is the Good Lives Model (GLM).  
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The GLM recognises that all humans possess a set of fundamental needs, known as ‘primary 
goods’, that they will try to meet or access using the resources available to them.  Ten primary 
goods are identified: relatedness (desire to belong and have relationships); community (being 
part of a cultural or social group); life (healthy physical functioning); agency (desire for control 
and autonomy); knowledge (desire for wisdom and information); excellence in work and play 
(striving for mastery and desire for fun); inner peace (emotional self-regulation and safety); 
spirituality (seeking a sense of purpose and meaning in life); happiness (overall satisfaction 
including sexual pleasure); and creativity (novel and creative experiences) (Ward & Gannon, 
2006).  In this context, HSB can be understood as an inappropriate means to meeting core 
personal and social needs (Wylie & Griffin, 2013).  The focus of interventions following the 
GLM, like MST, is therefore on maximising the young person’s ability to obtain their primary 
goods through appropriate and prosocial means.  Further argument for strengths-based 
approaches such as these is gleaned from research such as Borowsky, Hogan, and Ireland’s 
(1997) study, which indicated that the most significant protective factors against HSB were 
academic achievement in adolescent females and emotional health and community 
connectedness in adolescent males. 
 Although not explicitly identified in the literature, it is possible to draw conceptual links 
between these strengths-based approaches to intervention and the evolutionary theory of 
compassion outlined earlier in this chapter.  The identification of an ‘inner peace’ primary good, 
associated with emotional self-regulation and safety (Ward & Gannon, 2006), may be related to 
the systems of emotional regulation and connected social mentalities posited by Gilbert (2000a), 
developed through the experience of attachment to a caregiver, which can act as a safe-base from 
which to encounter the world.  Such assertions would predict that in the absence of a secure 
attachment relationship, experiences of safety and emotional self-regulation may be 
compromised, thus leading to a deficit in the domain of inner peace and therefore potentially 
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compassion.  This idea would also present an argument for concentrating interventions on the 
wider systems surrounding the individual, such as in MST, in order that secure and appropriate 
attachment relationships with family and peers can be promoted.  The focus of these 
interventions on enhancing strengths and promoting social engagement also serves to avoid 
stigmatising individuals, and therefore potentially reducing shame and increasing motivation to 
engage (Wylie & Griffin, 2013).  Following the increasing evidence that compassion-focused 
interventions can also reduce shame through enhanced self-compassion, it is worth noting a 
potential rationale for the integration of compassion-focused approaches for young people who 
engage in HSB, particularly in relation to the promotion of social connectedness and reduction of 
shame to maximise the chance of the individual achieving meaningful social (re)integration. 
1.5 Shame and Self-Compassion in Young People Who Engage in HSB 
A current dearth of research exists in the area of HSB alone, even more so in relation to 
the role of the self-conscious and affiliative emotions in HSB.  It shall, however, be argued in the 
following sections that what can be gleaned from the wider literature on shame, compassion, and 
offending behaviour, points to the likely importance of compassion to self and others for this 
group of young people. 
1.5.1 The role of shame in HSB.  As outlined in section 1.3.6.1.1, shame is conceived by 
many as a painful emotion, underpinned by beliefs about the worthlessness of the self (Gillgian, 
2003).  Shame can be triggered by the perception that others will view the self as defective in 
some way (Gilbert & Miles, 2002) and can therefore be linked to the concept of stigmatisation.  
Goffman (1968) conceptualised stigma as arising from the judgement that another person is 
distinguishable from the self as a result of significant negative attributes, such as that they are 
bad, dangerous, or weak.  Stigmatisation is therefore underpinned by strong social prescriptions 
about what it is to be ‘normal’, and recruited by members of society to distinguish between those 
who conform to social norms and those negative others who do not.  In this sense, the experience 
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of being stigmatised by another can be said to evoke feelings of shame (Lewis, 1998).  This link 
is important because of the highly stigmatised nature of sexual offending (McAlinden, 2005).  It 
therefore follows that young people who have engaged in sexual behaviours that are so 
vehemently denounced by society, are likely to experience heightened levels of shame as a 
result, as has been observed for adult sexual offenders (Marshall, Marshall, Serran & O’Brien, 
2009).  Young people who engage in HSB are arguably even more susceptible shame, when 
considering that adolescence is “a time of particular psychological vulnerability to the risks 
associated with feelings of social isolation” (Hall-Lande, Eisenberg, Christenson & Nuemark-
Sztainer, 2007, p.265). 
This issue is further compounded by the significant prevalence of previous interpersonal 
trauma and negative early interpersonal experiences among this population (e.g., Ward, 
McCormack & Hudson, 2002).  Early interpersonal trauma is often associated with high levels of 
internalised shame (Gilbert & Irons, 2009), which may amplify the effects of stigma and 
subsequent shame experienced as a result of engagement in HSB.  In relation to Gilbert’s three-
systems model (2010a), this would likely lead to an over-developed threat-system and 
difficulties activating processes associated with the soothe-system, such as adopting a 
compassionate stance.  Furthermore, the punitive measures endorsed by criminal justice agencies 
to address serious transgressions, such as sexual offending, have been criticised for stigmatising 
and shaming individuals to such a degree that it may increase the likelihood of further offending 
(McAlinden, 2005). 
1.5.1.1 Shame and recidivism.  Importantly, there is evidence within the literature on 
offending behaviour to suggest that shame may predict recidivism.  In relation to ‘white-collar’ 
tax offence crimes, Murphy and Harris (2007) found that feelings of stigmatisation experienced 
during an enforcement event were positively correlated with re-offending rates.  In a ten-year 
follow-up study of 130 incarcerated male property offenders, LeBel, Burnett, Maruna, and 
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Bushway (2008) found that feelings of being stigmatised (or ‘doomed’) predicted the likelihood 
of both reconviction and re-imprisonment, even after controlling for the number of social 
problems an individual experienced after release.  Tangney, Stuewig, Mashek, and Hastings 
(2011) assessed 550 jail inmates’ shame-proneness and guilt-proneness.  Whereas guilt appeared 
to be a protective factor in relation to severity of crime, involvement with the Criminal Justice 
System, and known predictors of recidivism, shame-proneness was positively related to violence 
and antisocial subscale scores.  Shame-proneness was inversely related to measures of self-
control and was not found to be a protective factor in any domain. 
Van Vugt et al. (2011) carried out a meta-analysis of 19 studies to investigate the link 
between moral development (including the development of moral emotions such as shame) and 
recidivism.  They found that a more mature moral development was associated with lower rates 
of recidivism.  Whilst this might suggest that shame could reduce the likelihood of re-offending, 
the relationship between moral cognition (e.g., empathy) and recidivism was clearer than that of 
moral emotion (e.g., guilt and shame) and recidivism.  This might be explained by their 
conflation of guilt and shame into one category, whereas (as highlighted above) these two 
emotions may have very different relationships with re-offending.  Tangney, Stuewig and 
Martinez (2014) assessed shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and externalization of blame in a 
longitudinal study of prison inmates.  They found that guilt-proneness negatively, and directly, 
predicted recidivism in the first-year post-release; shame-proneness did not. 
In a study of 1,243 incarcerated young offenders, Hosser, Windzio and Greve (2008) 
found that shame and guilt ratings predicted post-release recidivism.  Specifically, shame ratings 
at the outset of incarceration predicted higher recidivism rates, whereas guilt ratings predicted 
lower re-offending.  It is, however, necessary to highlight that, similarly to the existing study of 
compassion, much of this research has been conducted using quantitative, self-report measures, 
which assume shame as a valid and distinguishable construct from other self-conscious 
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emotions.  That is not to say that there is no substance to the findings from these studies, but 
rather that much more research utilising alternative approaches is required. 
These findings point to the likely importance of targeting and reducing shame in 
interventions for groups who offend, but also highlight the possible risk that punitive – and 
therefore potentially shaming – interventions may be counterintuitive and actually serve to 
increase recidivism rates.  This follows evolutionary theories of shame, which suggest that 
shame is a threat-based emotion, responded to with self-preservation strategies such as 
externalisation of blame and outwardly-directed anger, and could therefore conceivably lead to 
further harmful behaviour (Gilbert & Miles, 2002).  The work of Gilligan (2003) provides 
further argument for the link between shame and recidivism.  Based on his thirty-years working 
with men convicted of murder and other violent crimes, he observed that virtually all acts of 
serious violence followed feelings of shame and humiliation – a sense that they had been 
disrespected in some way.  Given then the level of stigmatisation and shame following acts of 
sexual violence, such as HSB, it is hardly surprising that heightened levels of shame have been 
linked to an increased likelihood of re-offending for those convicted of sexual offences 
(McAlinden, 2005).  Further evidence for this can be gleaned from the recidivism literature 
(albeit limited), which suggests that adolescents who employ physical violence in their HSB may 
pose a higher risk of sexual re-offending (Butz and Spaccarelli, 1999; Hackett, 2004; Prentky et 
al., 2000; Sipe, Jensen, & Everett, 1998). 
1.5.2 Compassion to self and others among young people who engage in HSB.  To the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is currently no published literature directly exploring the 
understanding and experience of compassion to self or others in young people who engage in 
HSB, although a handful of studies point to self-compassion as a relevant treatment target for 
adolescents (e.g., Neff & McGehee, 2010) and groups of offenders (Laithwaite et al., 2009).  
What can be ascertained from the literature points to the likelihood that young people who have 
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engaged in HSB will experience heightened levels of shame as a result of the highly stigmatised 
nature of their harmful behaviour, along with their experience of being engaged with punitive 
systems, like the Criminal Justice System (McAlinden, 2005).  Furthermore, adolescence is a 
time when young people are likely to be particularly susceptible to the perceived judgements of 
others and the adverse effects of social isolation (Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Hall-Lande, Eisenberg, 
Christenson & Nuemark-Sztainer, 2007).  This is further compounded by the significant 
prevalence of previous negative early interpersonal experiences among this group (e.g., Ward, 
McCormack & Hudson, 2002), which, as we have seen above, may lead to an over-developed 
threat-system and under-developed ability to self-soothe (Gilbert, 2010a).  Additionally, levels of 
internalised shame may be heightened within this group, as a result of previous exposure to 
interpersonal abuse (Gilbert & Irons, 2009), which is beyond their control to change. 
Whilst it might be argued that a degree of shame for individuals who engage in harmful 
behaviour may be functional in motivating desistence and reparative action (Braithwaite, 1989), 
research in fact suggests that guilt would be a more successful precipitant of this, and that 
heightened and prolonged shame may even increase the risk of recidivism (see 1.5.1.1).  Shame 
may therefore be an important treatment target for this population, and as we have seen in other 
areas of the literature, interventions aimed at fostering a self-compassionate stance may be a 
helpful way of achieving this (Braehler et al., 2012; Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b; Gilbert & 
Procter, 2006).  As has been highlighted above, however, there are some significant weaknesses 
in the current body of literature on (self-)compassion, not least that the meaning and experience 
of (self-)compassion as a construct has rarely been explored among clinical or disadvantaged 
populations. 
1.6 Aims of the Current Research 
 Whilst there may well be a rationale for the development of compassion-focused 
interventions for young people who engage in HSB based on their potential proclivity for shame, 
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it is difficult to begin to know how and why, if at all, these interventions might be of benefit, 
without first knowing how compassion is understood and experienced by them, or if it even 
represents a construct to which they can relate.  The current research therefore intended to 
provide an initial platform from which to direct future research in this area, as well as to 
contribute to and extend the current literature base on (self-)compassion by adopting a qualitative 
approach to exploring this concept among a disadvantaged and under-researched population.  
The initial focus of this research was therefore: 
 
To explore compassion towards self and others among young people who have 
engaged in harmful sexual behaviour 
 
Adopting a Constructivist Grounded Theory methodology (Charmaz, 2006, 2014), 
participant data were explored in response to this question through an iterative process of 
constant comparative analysis – to be described in the next chapter – leading to a substantive 
theory of compassion to self and others among young people who have engaged in HSB. 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
 This initial chapter provided an overview of current literature in the domain of 
compassion to self and others.  Drawing on existing research, the argument for a theoretical link 
between (self-)compassion and shame was outlined, whereby the ability to foster self-
compassion may have a moderating impact on the adverse effects of shame.  The chapter then 
turned to the topic of harmful sexual behaviour, outlining the likely relevance of exploring 
compassion within a population of young people who have engaged in HSB, given the 
heightened risk of stigmatisation and shame likely to be experienced in this group.  It was argued 
that the existing literature-base on compassion is limited in its predominantly quantitative nature 
and would be greatly enriched by further qualitative exploration of the understanding and 
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experience of compassion amongst populations of clinical interest, such as young people who 
engage in HSB.  Having built the case for the current research question, the next chapter shall 
outline factors pertaining to the methodological approach and offer a detailed overview of how 
the research was conducted. 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
2.1 Overview of Chapter 
 This chapter outlines the methodological approach and procedures adopted for this 
research.  Beginning with a discussion of the philosophical position taken-up by the researcher, a 
rationale is then provided for the use of a Constructivist Grounded Theory methodology.  The 
approach to data collection and method of analysis is outlined, with consideration paid to ethical 
issues and plans for dissemination of the research. 
2.2 Philosophical Assumptions and Positioning of the Research 
 This research drew on a constructivist paradigm and subsequently employed a 
Constructivist Grounded Theory methodology in addressing its aim: to explore the 
understanding and experiences of compassion to self and others among young people who have 
engaged in HSB.  In explicating the rationale for this approach to the research, it is first 
necessary to acknowledge the researcher’s position in relation to two core philosophical 
concepts: ontology and epistemology.  An ontological stance reflects a belief about the nature of 
social reality (Klakegg, 2015) and falls somewhere along a continuum between two juxtaposed 
positions: realism – the belief in an objective external reality, independent of the human mind 
(Fletcher, 1996), and (extreme) relativism – the belief that an external world, and therefore 
‘reality’ or truth, exists only to the extent of our thoughts about it, and not therefore beyond 
one’s own subjective experience of it (Blaikie, 2007).  Epistemology is essentially the theory of 
knowledge, or knowing, and is primarily concerned with the “origin, nature, limits, methods, and 
justification of human knowledge” about the world we live in (Hofer, 2002, p.4).  A belief about 
the nature of reality will necessarily inform a belief about how knowledge of that reality can be 
acquired.  Ontology has therefore been framed as the starting point of all research (Blaikie, 
2007), from which an epistemological position will be taken and a subsequent methodology 
selected, resulting in the overall paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). 
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The current researcher’s ontological stance reflects a belief in equally valid multiple 
realities, or multiple subjective ‘truths’, and does not assume that reality can ever be fully 
known.  The epistemological position recognises knowledge as value-laden and subjective, and 
holds that knowledge is best gleaned through detailed exploration of people’s lived experience.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that knowledge is co-constructed through social interaction and 
dialogue, and therefore the researcher’s role in co-constructing knowledge through their 
conversations with participants must be acknowledged.  Such assumptions lend themselves to a 
constructivist paradigm, which holds that “the mental world – or the experienced reality – is 
actively constructed or “brought forward,” and that the observer plays a major role in any 
theory” (Riegler, 2012, p.237). 
2.2.1 The rationale for a qualitative approach.  Research methods can be broadly 
categorised into one of three approaches: qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods – a 
combination of the former two (Klakegg, 2015).  Historically, researchers in the social sciences 
have tended to employ quantitative methods, reflecting the positivist paradigm that has largely 
prevailed over alternative philosophical positions in this domain (Tuli, 2010).  Positivism asserts 
that the truth pertaining to an existent external reality can be accessed via rigorous experimental 
research methods involving hypothesis-testing; thus, quantitative methods are associated with 
large participant groups, quantification, and seeking valid and reliable data that is free from bias 
and generalisable across population and context (Charmaz, 2014).  Conversely, qualitative 
approaches facilitate the exploration and understanding of personal experiences and the meaning 
ascribed to them.  They can produce rich descriptive data (Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott, 2015) and 
seek to understand multiple subjective realities, positioning participants as the experts of their 
own lived experience (Charmaz, 2014).  As such, qualitative research is more commonly 
associated with in-depth interviewing procedures with smaller participant groups, and seeks to 
understand the meaning of an experience in a given context (Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott, 2015).  
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Qualitative methods have gained increasing credibility in social scientific research over the last 
decade (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008) and it is becoming widely acknowledged that they 
have much to offer in contribution to the existing knowledge-base built on predominantly 
quantitative research. 
The decision to employ a qualitative approach in the current research was an obvious one 
given the ontological and epistemological position of the researcher outlined above.  The focus 
of this research is concerned with understanding the meaning and experience of compassion to 
young people who have engaged in HSB, and as such, it was felt that an interview-based 
qualitative study with the population of interest would be the most appropriate method to explore 
the personal meaning of this phenomenon to this group.  Furthermore, given that this is a 
relatively novel research area, it is argued that qualitative methods would be better suited to 
making initial explorations.  As was highlighted in the previous chapter, the existing literature in 
the area of compassion to self and others has generally employed quantitative methods that seem 
to assume compassion as an objective construct that can be accurately measured.  Whilst the 
existing research in this area has no doubt offered important contributions to the field, it is 
proposed here that a qualitative approach would greatly enrich the literature-base, by facilitating 
the exploration of compassion as a construct and seeking to understand the subjective meaning 
of compassionate experiences for a population of clinical interest.  Having made the case for a 
qualitative approach to the current research, the argument for the specific application of a 
Constructivist Grounded Theory methodology shall now be outlined. 
2.3 Grounded Theory 
 Grounded Theory (GT; Charmaz, 2000, 2006, 2014; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) is a systematic general methodological approach to research, 
which places emphasis on an inductive process of constant-comparative analysis and data-led 
theory development, in order to construct a theory about issues of importance to people’s lives 
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(Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006).  Although often employed in qualitative research (Charmaz, 
2014), GT can in fact be utilised for quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-methods designs (Glaser, 
1978).  GT differs from many other methodologies in the importance it places on approaching 
participant research under as little influence as possible from existing theories and ideas.  It is 
proposed that by not developing hypotheses or predictions about the outcome of research before 
it has begun, the researcher will remain open to new ideas emergent from the data as it is 
gathered and analysed (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  The aim of GT is to, through the coding and 
memo-writing procedures associated with its application (Charmaz, 2014), identify concepts and 
categories arising from the data, and ultimately to construct a substantive theory that is grounded 
in the relevant data (Charmaz, 2000, 2006, 2014; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990).  Whilst there are a number of defining features associated with any application 
of GT methods (see 2.3.1), there are also several ways in which GT is conceptualised and 
applied.  Whilst it is beyond the scope of this research to provide a full overview of the history of 
GT, the evolution of the methodology through three of the central approaches will be briefly 
outlined. 
 GT was first delineated in the late sixties by Glaser and Strauss (1967).  Developed at a 
time when the positivist paradigm dominated the world of social research (Fletcher, 1996), 
Glaser and Strauss sought to bring some rigour and precision to the application of qualitative 
methods, which have been heavily criticised for being biased and ungeneralisable (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008).  In their seminal text The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967), they outlined 
their initial approach to undertaking GT research.  The distinguishing feature of this ‘classic’ 
approach to GT, is its assumption that an objective theory about the process of interest was 
observed to ‘emerge’ from the data.  As such, the researcher in classical GT is viewed as an 
objective party who ‘discovers’ theory, or truth, through the process of constant comparison 
inherent in GT (Glaser, 1978).  Sometime after their original GT text, Glaser and Strauss parted 
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ways, and Strauss ultimately went on to develop, along with his colleague Corbin, what has since 
been termed an ‘evolved’ GT (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006).  This evolved GT (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) diverged from the original methodology in terms of a paradigm shift towards a 
relativist pragmatist position, acknowledging the subjectivity and contextual and temporal 
relevance of the theory constructed (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006).  Whilst this approach 
accounted for multiple realities experienced between participants, the implication that knowledge 
about these realities can be gleaned by an impartial observer still existed (Charmaz, 2014).  The 
final GT approach outlined here has been proposed by Kathy Charmaz (2006, 2014) as a 
Constructivist Grounded Theory (CGT).  Whilst preserving many of the defining features of 
classic and evolved GT, Charmaz extends these principles to include the recognition that the 
researcher will bring their own subjective experience to the research context, and will play an 
active role in co-constructing meaning with participants throughout the process of data collection 
and analysis (2006, 2014). 
 2.3.1 Defining features of Grounded Theory.  As suggested above, despite some major 
shifts in the philosophical assumptions underpinning various versions of GT, virtually all 
approaches retain a set of defining features that are central to the approach.  These were 
identified by Charmaz (2014, p.7) as: 
• Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis 
• Constructing analytic codes and categories inductively from data 
• Using the constant comparison method 
• Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and analysis 
• Memo-writing 
• Theoretical sampling 
• Conducting the literature review after developing independent analysis  
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Furthermore, all GT approaches place participants’ voice and experience at the centre of theory 
development.  This is particularly important when exploring novel areas as the researcher is 
encouraged to remain open to new perspectives and restrictions arising from theoretical dogma 
may be limited. 
 2.3.2 The rationale for a Constructivist Grounded Theory methodology.  Given the 
researcher’s ontological and epistemological position, and following the argument made at the 
start of the chapter for a constructivist paradigm, the decision was taken to adopt CGT for the 
current research.  Furthermore, a qualitative CGT design was selected because of its focus on 
data-led theory development and the systematic approach it brings to qualitative research, which 
ultimately enhances rigour and trustworthiness (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2014).  It was 
considered that this approach would not only facilitate the construction of novel theory from 
fresh perspectives in this under-researched domain, but would also further enrich the current 
literature on compassion which has thus far been pursued from a largely positivist position, 
employing quantitative methods to quantify ‘levels’ of compassion among individuals (see 
Chapter One).  Furthermore, CGT acknowledged the researcher’s own subjectivity and 
involvement in the co-construction and interpretation of data (Charmaz, 2014).  This was 
considered particularly relevant in the current context as the researcher had some prior 
knowledge in the domain of compassion, and it was therefore important that this could be taken 
into account throughout the research process through the self-reflexive processes encouraged in 
this approach (Charmaz, 2014).  As is common for many CGT studies, data were derived from 
qualitative interviews with participants (Charmaz, 2014). 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Participants and recruitment.  Nine young people who were receiving input from 
the Youth Offending Service (YOS) in relation to HSB were recruited for this research.  A 
further two young people were approached by their YOS workers, but declined for their 
60 
 
information to be passed to the researcher as they did not wish to participate.  The emphasis on 
theoretical saturation (described in 2.4.3.2) prescribed by CGT supersedes the need to pre-
determine the number of participants to recruit.  That is, the aim of CGT is to keep recruiting 
until the categories identified through the analysis are saturated (Charmaz, 2014).  It has 
however been noted that situational factors, such as running out of time or money, can mean that 
recruitment is forced to stop before saturation is reached (Wiener, 2007, cited in Charmaz, 
2014).  In the current research, barriers to recruitment (to be addressed in Chapter Four) meant 
that nine was the total feasible participant number that could be recruited within the relevant time 
constraints. 
In the build-up to recruitment, links were established with three YOSs covering three 
counties in the UK.  YOSs fall under the umbrella of local council services (rather than the 
police or courts) and are responsible for working with young people who are convicted of a 
criminal offence, for the purposes of addressing their risk factors and supporting them to avoid 
further offending (Crime, justice and the law, n.d.).  The researcher spent time attending YOS 
meetings and developing relationships with the teams, liaising with staff to ascertain the likely 
numbers of potential participants and to discuss the logistics of recruitment.  Following 
conversations with YOS staff around the demographics of young people on their caseloads for 
whom there was a concern over HSB, and taking into consideration staff concerns about the 
ability of young people of a certain age and intellectual capacity to engage with the research, the 
following inclusion and exclusion criteria were established: 
Inclusion criteria: 
• Males or Females 
• Aged between 12 and 18 (inclusive) 
• Currently receiving input from the YOS in relation to HSB 
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Exclusion criteria: 
• Young people who were unable to give informed consent due to an intellectual or 
communication disability/difficulty 
• Young people for whom a mental health difficulty (e.g., psychosis) was likely to 
compromise their ability to give informed consent or to engage in the research 
• Young people for whom staff from the relevant service felt it would be inappropriate 
or harmful to include in the research (e.g., likely to become distressed by the 
interview content or process) 
The decision to define the age bracket for inclusion as 12-18 stemmed from conversations with 
YOS staff who felt that the young people on their caseloads under the age of 12 would have 
difficulty engaging in discussions around compassion.  Although considered an adult at 18 and 
therefore no longer a ‘young offender’, YOS staff advised that sometimes young people who 
receive a Youth Offending Order at 17 and turn 18 before completing this may continue to be 
managed by the YOS for the final few months of their order.  The upper age bracket was 
therefore extended to 18 to account for these cases. 
Having been provided with information about the research (see Appendix A), YOS staff 
were asked to identify young people from their caseloads who met the inclusion criteria and to 
approach them to discuss taking part, using guidance provided by the researcher to facilitate 
these discussions (see Appendix B).  In this sense, recruitment was purposive (Teddlie & Yu, 
2007).  CGT prescribes the use of initial purposive sampling, followed in the later stages by 
theoretical sampling, which enables the researcher to identify the credentials of further 
participants who are likely to be of particular interest in relation to the emerging theory 
(Charmaz, 2014).  Due to the relatively small number of young people receiving input from these 
YOSs for HSB, coupled with the presence of several obstacles to the recruitment process (see 
Chapter Four), options to be selective in recruitment were limited.  Theoretical sampling was 
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pursued, however, in the active recruitment of a female participant following the discussion by 
some male participants of potential gender differences in compassion.  Furthermore, theoretical 
sampling can be said to have been achieved through the adaptation of the interview schedule 
throughout the research process to facilitate further exploration of emerging categories from 
different participant perspectives (see 2.4.2.1). 
Once potential participants had been approached by their YOS caseworkers with some 
brief information about the research, they were asked for their verbal consent to be contacted by 
the researcher if they were interested in taking part.  If verbal consent was gained, caseworkers 
passed the relevant contact details to the researcher who then contacted potential participants and 
their carers to provide further detailed information about the research (see Appendix C) and gain 
their consent to participate.  All participants and their carers were asked to sign a written consent 
form (see Appendices D & E) – provided over email or via their YOS caseworker – prior to 
arranging an interview date.  Participants and carers were also asked to provide additional 
participant information, such as participant demographics and details of their involvement with 
the YOS, including the nature of their HSB (see Appendix F), and asked for their consent for this 
information to be checked with the YOS they were recruited through.  In anticipation of the fact 
that this population may have been difficult to engage, an incentive in the form of a £10 high 
street voucher was offered to each participant 
2.4.1.1 Setting.  Interviews took place in a setting where the young people were used to 
meeting their YOS workers.  For five of the young people, this was in the interview rooms at 
their local YOS office.  Two young people were interviewed in a quiet room at their school, and 
the final two were seen at their homes with care workers or family members also present at the 
address, but not present in the room during the interview.  Each interview involved careful 
liaison with young people and their carers, YOS workers, and staff at the relevant interview 
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location to ensure interviews could be carried out adhering to local risk protocols, and ensuring 
the safety of participants and researcher (see 2.5). 
2.4.2 Data collection.  The data for this research comprised interviews with the nine 
participants, along with the additional participant information generated through the 
corresponding form completed by participants and their carers (Appendix F).  Interviews were 
chosen as the method for data collection as it was felt that this approach would best facilitate the 
detailed exploration of participants’ subjective experiences of compassion.  All participants were 
interviewed on a one-off basis over a period of six months, with interviews lasting between 22 
and 68 minutes (M = 42.22 minutes).  Interviews followed a semi-structured interview protocol 
(see 2.4.2.1) and were recorded using a Dictaphone, enabling subsequent verbatim transcription 
by the researcher.  Participants were informed that they could stop the interview at any time and 
were offered an opportunity at the end of the interview to comment on the research process, raise 
any concerns, or ask any questions they had for the researcher. 
2.4.2.1 Materials.  In addition to the information and consent forms mentioned above 
(see Appendices A to F), an interview schedule was developed to guide the semi-structured 
interviews with participants (see Appendix G).  The interview schedule was semi-structured in 
that it outlined the general themes to be covered in interview, along with some suggested 
questions that could be used flexibly should participants require prompting.  The decision to use 
a semi-structured interview protocol was influenced by the CGT approach to data-led research 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006, 2014).  It was felt that a structured interview would be 
too directive and undermine the initial inductive nature of CGT (Charmaz, 2014) and the 
intention was for the interviews to also be guided by participants and the themes that were 
important to them. 
The interview schedule, developed specifically for the present research, was adapted 
from one used by Pauley and McPherson (2010) in their exploration of the experiences of 
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compassion in a clinical sample who were experiencing depression and anxiety.  However, 
whilst Pauley and McPherson drew on Neff’s (2003a) three-facet conceptualisation of 
compassion to structure their interview questions, the present schedule followed Gilbert’s 
evolutional model, within which compassion is expressed and experienced in three directions: 
from others, towards others, and towards the self (Gilbert & Choden, 2013).  The schedule was 
therefore structured to facilitate the exploration of participants’ understanding and experience of 
compassion within these three contexts.  At the start of the interview, participants were asked for 
their definition of compassion, before being presented with two alternative definitions: noticing 
when someone’s going through a difficult time and wanting to do something to help and 
compassion is a quality that aims to nurture, look after, teach, guide, mentor, soothe, protect, 
and offer feelings of acceptance and belonging.  The first definition represents the dual-
component definition of compassion widely adopted within the literature (Halifax, 2012) but was 
adapted by the researcher to include simpler language that might be better understood by the 
participant group.  This definition was tested in a pilot interview with a 14-year-old male with 
learning difficulties and feedback indicated that it was understandable.  The second was the 
definition Gilbert offered in The Compassionate Mind (2010a, p.217) and selected by the 
participant in the pilot interview for providing a broader definition of compassion.  Presenting 
these definitions facilitated the establishment of a shared definition of compassion before 
proceeding with questions about participants’ experiences of compassion to/from self and others. 
The proposed interview schedule was tested in the pilot interview and suggested that the 
majority of the questions were accessible to this age group and ability.  The exception to this was 
there being some difficulty understanding the question: Can you think of any positives to being 
able to be compassionate towards yourself? – which was subsequently re-worded to: What’s 
good about being able to be compassionate towards yourself?  The young person who took part 
in the pilot interview was also presented with six varying definitions of compassion and asked 
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for his feedback on which were the easiest to understand.  This discussion informed the selection 
of the two definitions subsequently used in the participant interviews. 
Following the process of constant comparative analysis prescribed by CGT (Charmaz, 
2014), data analysis began soon after the initial interviews took place.  As initial conceptual 
categories were identified in the data through this process, additional questions were added to the 
interview schedule in order to access alternative participant perspectives in future interviews, 
facilitating the exploration of the parameters of such categories through the process of theoretical 
sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2014).  Additional questions were added to explore 
the following categories as they emerged: 
• The reciprocal relationship between self and other 
• Individual factors influencing experiences of and expressions of compassion (e.g., 
gender) 
• Experiences and understanding of different compassionate acts (e.g., emotional 
support vs. provision of physical necessities) 
 2.4.3 Analysis.  Interviews were transcribed verbatim and, along with the additional 
participant information, formed the complete data set.  As is conventional for a CGT approach, 
data analysis began following the first two interviews and continued throughout data collection 
via an iterative process of constant comparative analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 
2014).  Data were subjected to the coding and memo-writing procedures described below and the 
conceptual categories identified in early interviews informed future recruitment, where possible, 
as well as the adaptation of the interview schedule as described above. 
 2.4.3.1 Coding and memo-writing.  Familiarisation with the data was promoted by 
interview transcription being conducted by the researcher (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992).  Once 
transcribed, each interview was subjected to initial coding procedures (Appendix J), consisting 
mostly of line-by-line or paragraph-by-paragraph coding, in which each segment of the dialogue 
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was labelled with a code to summarise its meaning (Charmaz, 2014).  Initial codes were kept 
brief and the use of gerunds as codes wherever possible ensured that coding remained close to 
the data with an emphasis on action (Charmaz, 2014).  The process of grouping similar codes 
together then began and the most frequent or salient of these became focused codes.  Focused 
coding (Appendix K) facilitated the identification of broader concepts within the data that were 
relevant to the topic of study.  As well as the abstraction of initial codes into broader concepts, 
focused coding began the process of explicating the parameters of categories and how they 
related or interacted with one another.  The final stage of coding – theoretical coding (Appendix 
L) – allowed for the abstraction of focused codes, or categories, into higher order conceptual 
categories.  As noted previously, this process was not undertaken in a linear fashion, rather, 
coding happened in an iterative process of constant comparison, whereby data were returned to 
following the identification of new levels of codes, which were then applied and re-applied to 
data until the resulting set of core conceptual categories accounted for all available data 
(Charmaz, 2014).  The process of coding and explicating the parameters of categories was 
further aided by the use of conceptual and analytical memo-writing, whereby memos (Appendix 
M) helped the researcher to organise their thoughts and trace the evolution of quotes, to codes, to 
concepts. 
2.4.3.2 Theory development.  The fundamental task of GT research is to arrive at a 
substantive theory, or model, grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  In the current 
study, and as shall be described in more detail in the next chapter, major and minor conceptual 
categories identified through the coding and memo-writing procedures were drawn together into 
a theoretical model explicating the interactional relationship between the categories identified.  
As noted earlier in the chapter, the concept of theoretical saturation is usually employed to 
identify when to stop collecting data.  Theoretical saturation refers to the assumption that the 
categories, or themes, identified in the data are fully explicated and account for all available data.  
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It also suggests that the recruitment of further participants and data would not result in any 
further categories being identified (Charmaz, 2014).  Whilst adopted by many qualitative 
researchers, theoretical saturation as a concept is vague and subjective, and there exists a dearth 
of guidelines as to how saturation can be achieved (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).  Charmaz 
(2006) notes that as an interpretive approach, CGT can be flexible in acknowledging both the 
importance and limitations of this subjectivity.  Theoretical saturation was therefore employed in 
the current research, but as will be addressed in the next chapter, there were limitations to 
adopting this approach here. 
2.4.4 Trustworthiness.  In order that judgements can be made about the credibility of 
research, it is necessary for those undertaking it to consider matters of rigour and how the 
application of their chosen methodology promotes these.  Positivist principles such as validity, 
reliability, and generalisability, however, become problematic in naturalistic research (Shenton, 
2004).  The philosophical assumptions underpinning qualitative approaches render assertions of 
rigour from a positivist position inappropriate, and so a different set of guidelines is required.  
Guba (1981) has proposed four main criteria to be considered in the assessment of rigour, or 
trustworthiness, for qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability.  Credibility – in preference to the positivist internal validity – refers to the degree 
to which we can be confident that the findings reflect the participants’ ‘truth’ (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985).  Transferability – proposed in place of external validity or generalisability – means 
considering how the findings might apply in other contexts.  Dependability – instead of 
reliability – seeks to show that the findings are consistent and could be repeated.  And finally, 
confirmability, following the recognition that removing all researcher bias would be impossible, 
refers to the researcher’s “comparable concern to objectivity” (Shenton, 2004, p.72).  Several 
steps were taken to enhance trustworthiness in the current research and these shall be outlined 
and discussed later in Chapter Four. 
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2.5 Ethical Considerations 
 The British Psychological Society (2010) have produced a code of conduct for human 
research ethics.  Within this document they specify that research should obtain ‘valid consent’ – 
which requires participants to consent freely to the research having been provided with adequate 
information; that risks to participants/researchers or others should be avoided, or that minimal 
risks are assessed and managed accordingly; and that any information obtained from or about 
participants should remain confidential (unless otherwise agreed in advance) in that participant 
data should not be identifiably linked to them.  The following sections will address these key 
principles in relation to the current research. 
 2.5.1 Informed consent.  Due to participants being under 18 (with the exception of one 
young person who had recently turned 18 but remained under the YOS), carer consent was 
sought in all cases.  Participants and carers were fully informed about the nature of the research 
and what would be required of them prior to taking part.  The fact that interviews were recorded 
may have been unsettling for some participants – particularly given that they were likely to have 
had previous experience of being recorded for police interview – but the reason for doing so (i.e., 
to ensure that the whole interview could be transcribed verbatim and thus effectively analysed) 
was explained to them at the consent stage.  They were then able to make a decision on whether 
or not they were happy to agree to this.  Whilst efforts were taken to promote participants’ 
autonomy in their decision to take part, there was a possibility some participants may have felt 
an element of coercion to engage, given that they were recruited through a service under which 
their appointments were usually enforceable.  The fact that two potential participants decided not 
to take part, however, indicated that at least some young people felt they had the freedom to 
choose. 
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2.5.1.1 Data collection and storage.  Participants were informed that they could choose 
to stop the interview at any time.  They, and their carers, were informed that they were able to 
withdraw their data at any time before, during, or after the interview, up until April 2017, when it 
was anticipated that data analyses would be finalised and submitted as part of the researcher’s 
Doctoral thesis.  Withdrawal from the study was possible by contacting the researcher directly, 
or by requesting that staff from the relevant YOS contacted the researcher on their behalf.  In 
line with the Data Protection Act (1998), data that was not withdrawn was stored securely for the 
duration of the research and will continue to be stored for three years following the completion 
of the study, in case any unforeseen amendments or corrections are required in the write-up or 
analysis. 
2.5.2 Confidentiality.  Participants were informed that their data would remain 
confidential, in that their names (or any names of other people, locations, etc., they mentioned in 
interview) would be changed to prevent them from being identified.  Participants were allocated 
a participant number so that their data could be traced should they wish to withdraw from the 
study.  The specific locations of the YOSs where the research took place have been omitted from 
the write-up of the research in order to further protect participant confidentiality, and this was 
fully explained to participants when gaining their consent.  It was made clear to participants that 
whilst confidentiality would be upheld wherever possible, any disclosure they made during their 
participation in the research that raised concerns over their safety or the safety of someone else, 
or any disclosure of details of a past serious offence or abuse, would need to be passed on to the 
relevant person or authority in the interests of safeguarding.  They were also informed that 
should that need arise, they would, wherever possible, be notified about what information would 
be passed on and to whom. 
2.5.3 Risk of harm to participants.  There was deemed to be a small risk of participants 
becoming distressed by the interview topic, particularly in relation to participants potentially 
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finding it difficult to think of examples of times where they have experienced compassion and 
feeling upset by this, or by becoming distressed by emotions such as shame or guilt.  To 
minimise the risk to participants in this way, young people who were deemed by either the 
researcher or YOS staff to have been experiencing levels of psychological distress too great to be 
able to complete the study, or where it was thought that the nature of the questions were likely to 
evoke significant distress, were not asked to participate.  Participants were also not required to 
discuss any aspect of their previous offending during their participation and were explicitly 
informed that their involvement in this research would not impact on the input they were 
receiving from the relevant YOS in any way.  Furthermore, the researcher drew on her skills and 
experience in clinical interviewing to facilitate participants’ engagement and alleviate any minor 
discomfort during interview.  It was agreed that in the event of a participant becoming 
significantly distressed, however, the interview would be terminated and staff and carers made 
aware so that they could provide any necessary follow-up support. 
2.5.4 Risk of harm to researcher.  Interviews were conducted by a single researcher, 
alone with young people who had a history of HSB and in some cases other types of offending, 
including violence.  There was subsequently a potential risk of the researcher being harmed by a 
participant.  This risk was effectively managed by adhering to the relevant YOSs safety and lone 
worker policies, speaking to staff involved with the young person to ensure that any known risks 
were accounted for prior to the interview, and notifying staff and carers of when and where the 
interviews were taking place and when they had been completed.  It was also assumed that 
because the interview material was not intended to be provocative in any way, the risk of conflict 
occurring within the interview itself was very minimal.  The researcher further employed her 
clinical experience in dynamic risk assessment and remained alert to any potential arousal or 
agitation on the part of the young people being interviewed. 
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2.5.5 Ethical approval.  Prior to the recruitment stage, research governance and ethical 
approval was sought and granted from each of the three local authorities where the participating 
YOSs were based (see Appendix H).  Ethical approval was also granted by the University of 
Essex (see Appendix I). 
2.6 Dissemination 
It is intended that a summary of the findings of the current research will be provided to 
the services through which participants were recruited.  Participants and carers who indicated 
that they would like to receive a summary of the findings of this research will also be sent a 
summary via their preferred contact method (as indicated on their consent form; see Appendices 
D & E).  The current research was undertaken as part of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
and submitted as a Doctoral thesis.  As such, the final draft will be available at the University of 
Essex for future trainees, students and staff to read and make use of.  It is also planned for the 
results from this study to be submitted for publication by a peer reviewed journal that has 
published research in similar areas, such as Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research 
and Practice or Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the methodological approach and procedures 
utilised for this research.  Accounting for the researcher’s ontological and epistemological 
position, the case was made for a constructivist paradigm and therefore the use of CGT.  It was 
further argued that a qualitative CGT approach was expected to enrich the existing literature in 
the area.  Procedures for recruitment, data collection, and analysis were outlined and ethical 
considerations were made.  The following chapter provides further details of the analytic process 
data were subjected to and presents the results from this. 
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Chapter Three: Results 
3.1 Overview of Chapter 
 This chapter begins with an overview of key characteristics of the final participant group 
recruited for this research.  What follows is a summary of the analytical interpretation of 
participant interviews through the coding and memo-writing procedures detailed in the previous 
chapter.  Data were synthesised into a substantive theoretical model to explain the dynamic and 
relational experience of compassion to self and others among young people who have engaged in 
HSB.  The model is first presented in its entirety before the explication of each major conceptual 
category in turn.  Minor and sub-categories are also delineated and the relationships between 
categories are outlined.  Participant quotes help to demonstrate how the model is grounded in the 
data and the process of member checking the model for its relatability and fit is described. 
3.2 Participant Demographics 
 A total of nine young people – eight males and one female – were recruited for this 
research.  Participant ages ranged from 14 to 18 (M=15.44 years) and the sample were almost 
exclusively White British (N=8), with just one participant of Black British origin.  Participants 
were recruited across three YOSs spanning three counties in the UK.  Two participants disclosed 
previous mental health difficulties relating to low mood and anxiety, one of whom was currently 
under Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) and the other had been seen by 
CAMHS previously.  Three participants were diagnosed with an intellectual disability, one of 
whom was also diagnosed with a social and communication disorder.  A further one participant 
had a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder.  The education level of participants ranged from 
Key Stage Three to AS Level.  One participant attended special education and another had left 
full-time education to pursue employment.  The remaining participants attended mainstream 
educational establishments. 
73 
 
One young person’s family declined consent for the researcher to access information 
relating to their offending or engagement with the YOS.  The remaining eight participants were 
receiving input from the YOS in relation to HSB ranging from inappropriate sexualised 
comments and sending indecent images, to forced penetrative sex with a child.  Seven of the 
eight participants who consented for their information to be shared with the researcher had 
received a criminal conviction for offences relating to HSB.  One participant had been convicted 
of other violent offences, but concerns around HSB had emerged during their work with the 
YOS.  
 Regarding living arrangements, four participants lived with immediate family, one with 
other relatives, and the remaining four participants were in care.  Participants varied in the length 
of time they had been working with the YOS, ranging from 10 months to three years.  All 
participants had engaged in some level of individual work with YOS staff, with most having 
completed some work on victim empathy and self-esteem.  At the time they were interviewed for 
this research, five of the nine participants were approaching the end of their sentence and 
therefore their involvement with the YOS.  Whilst the challenge of recruitment (see discussion of 
limitations in 4.4) reduced the researcher’s ability to sample selectively, the final participant 
group did appear to be representative of the general population of young people known to 
services for HSB, given that the group were predominantly White British males, a third of whom 
had a diagnosed intellectual disability, and who between them had engaged in a wide spectrum 
of concerning behaviours classed under the umbrella term HSB (Bernardo’s, 2016). 
3.3 Analysis and Introduction to the Model 
 As detailed in the previous chapter, data included in the analysis comprised written 
transcriptions from the nine participant interviews undertaken.  Transcribing was carried out by 
the researcher, promoting familiarity and closeness to the data (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992), thus 
beginning the process of constant comparative analysis prescribed by CGT (Charmaz, 2014).  
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Data were collected in four waves, with interviews being transcribed and subjected to coding 
procedures following interviews with participants two, five, seven, and nine.  Initial coding 
(Appendix J) enabled all incidents within the data to be coded, resulting in over 400 initial codes 
for the entire data set.  Further focused coding (Appendix K) allowed for the abstraction of open 
codes into emerging higher-level categories, resulting in the identification of twenty-five 
categories, which for ease of reference shall be referred to as minor categories.  Engaging in 
focused coding alongside data collection meant that the parameters of emerging categories could 
be further explored with future participants through theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2014).  The 
final stage of coding – theoretical coding (Appendix L) – led to the identification and integration 
of eight major conceptual categories. 
Frequent memo-writing (see Appendix M) throughout the process of constant 
comparative analysis facilitated the recording and elaboration of conceptual and analytical ideas 
occurring to the researcher at different stages of the research (Charmaz, 2014).  This process was 
fundamental in developing an understanding of the parameters of conceptual categories and the 
variances both within and between participants in their experience of them.  Furthermore, memo-
writing helped to explicate the relationship and interaction between major categories. 
Once satisfied that the emergent categories and their subsequent dimensions accounted 
for the available data, it was possible to amalgamate these abstractions into a substantive 
theoretical model that sought to explain the range and meaning of experiences of compassion for 
the young people who participated.  The model, in its nascent form, was presented to participants 
eight and nine at the end of their interviews to facilitate member-checks (see 3.5).  Following the 
analysis of the final two participant interviews, it was apparent that no new codes had been 
generated and the model accounted for all available data.  Whilst this may be grounds to argue 
that theoretical saturation had been reached (Charmaz, 2014), it is acknowledged that due to a 
lack of depth to some participant interviews (as a result of participants giving very short 
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answers), it is difficult to know whether further categories would be identified through further in-
depth interviews, and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.  A 
diagrammatic representation of the resultant model is presented in Figure 3.1 and each aspect of 
the model shall each be discussed in detail below. 
3.4 Explication of the Model 
 The theoretical model illustrated in Figure 3.1 not only draws together the various levels 
of conceptual categories identified through the systematic analysis described above, but also 
indicates the apparent relationships between these.  It is intended that this visual representation 
be taken alongside the following narrative discussion of conceptual categories in elucidating the 
experience of compassion to self and others among young people who have engaged in HSB. 
 3.4.1 Defining compassion.  Participants varied in their familiarity with and 
ability to define the word compassion.  In defining it, participants engaged in a process of 
relating to compassion as a concept, distinguishing it from other concepts, and defining what was 
meant specifically by self-compassion within the wider construct of compassion (see below).  
Whilst defining compassion was distinct from enacting compassion (see 3.4.5) – in that some 
participants struggled to elaborate on the provided definitions of compassion with their own 
interpretations, despite clearly having had experiences of it, and others conceptualised various 
enactments of compassion that they felt they had not experienced first-hand – the two categories 
also interacted with each other.  This interaction was observed in how their experiences of 
enacting compassion shaped their understanding of it as a concept, and vice versa. 
 3.4.1.1 Relating to the concept.  Two participants extended the two definitions 
presented during the interview with their own conceptualisations of compassion.  These young 
people both acknowledged the central aspect of recognising that someone was in a difficult 
position and being moved in some way by this, relating this to feelings of sympathy and 
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empathy.  One of these participants also recognised a desire to act and the need to act in the best 
interests of the other: 
 
“Doesn’t it relate to, like, your conscience in a sense?  So, if you feel, like, sorry for someone, 
then, like, you can tell that that’s your compassion towards them” [P1; 10-11] 
 
“I think it means showing someone respect and empathy towards the, if they’re like down, or 
something.  Or showing you care about them and not making a joke of it.  Caring for them, 
helping them, and, just being positive and not trying to make them feel worse, I guess” 
[P4; 10-12] 
 
One participant initially misunderstood compassion as an accumulation of personal 
characteristics (height, weight, looks), but after being presented with the two definitions, was 
able to demonstrate his understanding of the concept: 
 
“…you can look after a person, you can teach them different skills, um, you can guide them on 
the right path, you can mentor them in their favourite hobby, you can try to soothe them with 
kind words and, and, and try cheer them up with poems or paragraphs, you can protect them in 
school, or out of school, you can keep an eye on them” [P2; 33-36] 
 
The remaining six young people expressed that they had either not heard the word compassion 
before, or that it was an unfamiliar concept to them: 
 
“I dunno to be honest.  Um, I just come ‘round it and don’t even think about it, so… But just cos 
I, I don’t normally use that word, or just don’t even think about…Just don’t even think about 
this” [P3; 12-37] 
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Emphasis was placed on reaching a shared definition of compassion before proceeding with the 
interview.  Through discussing the two definitions presented by the researcher, participants 
identified related constructs that were meaningful to them; namely kindness, care, and support.  
Throughout the course of the interview, participants also connected to other important aspects of 
compassion: 
 
“…helping people through difficult times of isolation and just coming together” [P1; 95-97] 
 
“I guess it’s more like a pep talk and pat on the back, I guess, like comforting someone” [P4; 
154] 
 
“…my mum supports me through everything, you know, she tells me if something’s wrong, or if 
something’s right…” [P9; 100-101] 
 
 3.4.1.2 Distinguishing compassion.  Participants who were able to extend the definitions 
of compassion, also specified what it is not.  Compassion was distinguished from other emotions 
as involving an act between parties – 
 
“I find compassion more of a, a giving thing.  I find my emotions are privately mine… and I 
don’t like sharing my feelings” [P4; 691-692] 
 
- perhaps indicating a fear of exposure or vulnerability, but also the relevance of social 
connectedness, associated with compassion.  Participants noted that compassion in the context of 
some close relationships did not really feel like compassion at all: 
 
[Showing friends compassion] feels good but I don’t, like, I just know that it’s one of them ones 
that’s just like, it’s normal to me now… I’m not like a, like, so evil person that if I do something 
nice or something to keep a record…” [P1; 368-373] 
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“…when it’s, like, your close friends, it doesn’t feel like it’s compassion, it’s just like banter and 
talking to each other” [P4; 317-318] 
 
This may suggest that compassion involves a response to suffering in a way that feels ‘out of the 
ordinary’ – or alternatively this could represent a difficulty distinguishing compassion from 
related constructs like kindness, which may feel more commonplace to some.  This point also 
raises the importance of distinguishing between wanting to help (see 3.4.5.3) and help being an 
expectation within the context of a specific relationship: 
 
“…it’s your mum, so you gotta express that [compassion]” [P1; 328] 
 
“…cos you’re sticking up for your mates to be honest.  If you didn’t, they’d think that you didn’t, 
don’t like ‘em anymore to be honest, so you have to try and keep your friends” [P6; 594-595] 
 
“…if you’re not nice to them [friends] and that, you can sometimes lose a friend” [P7; 183] 
 
 3.4.1.3 Defining self-compassion.  Most participants reported being unfamiliar with self-
compassion as a concept.  Drawing on earlier discussions around compassion however, all could 
understand self-compassion as a similar process, only directed inwards.  Again, participants’ 
ability to comprehend the complexity of self-compassion varied.  For some, enacting self-
compassion involved prioritising and treating oneself over others: 
 
“Do things I enjoy…Umm, playing games, watching tv…” [P5; 380-382] 
 
“Say if you was caring for yourself, you could, um, buy yourself some clothes and not buy 
anyone else any…” [P6; 492-493] 
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“…when you’ve, like, had a good day and, like, and you just wanna go out and get yourself 
something nice, like, for the weekend or something” [P7; 290-291] 
 
Whereas others recognised the relevance of acting in one’s best interests, rather than simply 
fulfilling any personal desire: 
 
“…say…you’re on a diet or something, you need to buy something healthy, but then you know 
there’s like sweets and you’re really tempted, yeah that that type of thing, so you know you need 
to like think what’s better for you in that way” [P9; 286-288] 
 
“You wouldn’t really be showing yourself love if you’re just always getting in trouble.  Always in 
handcuffs or something” [P1; 488-489] 
 
 3.4.2 Triggers to suffering.  Participants spoke about specific events that led to some 
degree of suffering for themselves or others.  Triggers to suffering were important to the 
experience of compassion in that they precipitated suffering which could then be recognised, 
thus beginning the process of enacting compassion (see 3.4.5).  Previous suffering also 
influenced future suffering via participants’ ability to learn from experiences (see 3.4.3.2).  
Participants talked about suffering in the aftermath of making a mistake – including for some 
their offending, suffering a loss, and being hurt or betrayed by others. 
 3.4.2.1 Making a mistake.  Four participants referred to their own mistakes as potential 
triggers to themselves or others suffering.  A significant feature of the nature of these mistakes 
was that they either threatened a valued relationship or attracted some undesired judgement by 
an important other: 
 
“…if I got something wrong, say the teacher says I got something wrong, I’ll go back and do it.  
Like, the correct way…[to] please the teacher” [P6; 473-478] 
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 “…if you done something wrong to your mates as well, you would try and put it right” 
[P6; 480] 
 
“So, because now she’s [ex-girlfriend] going out with someone else, I’m a bit sad about it.  So, 
like, that’s my big mistake.  I won’t forgive myself for a long while for that” [P8; 481-483] 
 
This points not only to the potential role of perceived criticism, or even rejection by others – 
perhaps associated with feelings of guilt (Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014) or externalised 
shame (Gilbert, 2002) – in personal suffering, but also its possible potential for motivating 
reparative action. 
 3.4.2.1.1 Offending.  Interestingly, only three participants referred to the offences that led 
to their involvement with the YOS.  Two young people framed these as mistakes that had led to 
personal distress: 
 
“…if it’s like major mistakes, like, let’s say I got into trouble…Like when I got arrested.  I’ll just 
be like ‘Woah! What is happening here, like, chill!  What did I do?  How am I here?’” 
[P1; 423-428] 
 
“…I’ve been through hard times as well, from my past, like, cos years ago I done something 
stupid and that’s why [YOS worker]’s involved…” [P8; 60-61] 
 
Another participant reflected on the harm that had been caused to others by his offences, despite 
him not having intended it: 
 
“I may have hurt people through the situation I’m in now, but, that wasn’t always intentional.  
And, you know, yeah, it’s not great…” [P4; 463-465] 
 
Importantly, this young person linked the lack of compassion he had received from others in his 
life to his later engagement in HSB: 
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“…they weren’t showing compassion towards me for my hurt point of view, by just saying yeah 
ok, all they had to do was put me in a different form and I’d have been completely happier.  I 
probably wouldn’t be in any of the situation I’m in now.  But, just from me being put in that one 
class.  I’d have shown more people compassion, cos I knew I could trust the people I was with.  I 
wouldn’t be in this situation.  No offence, but I wouldn’t even know this building, I probably 
wouldn’t have to do this…” [P4; 480-485] 
 
 3.4.2.2 Suffering a loss.  Five young people spoke of suffering a loss.  Personal losses 
were framed in terms of losing a significant other – either through the end of a relationship or a 
bereavement.  The death of a valued other was linked to feelings of sadness, but the response of 
others at this time of sadness played an important role in alleviating or exacerbating distress: 
 
“[Teacher] just blurted out in assembly ‘oh yeah, [participant]’s grandad died, give him space’ 
and everything.  They didn’t give me space at all, I was crowded, not by people showing me 
compassion, by people taking the piss cos I was crying about it” [P4; 368-370] 
 
“…when my dad told me my nan passed away, I like was really upset and that, cos that was 
really hard for me…a couple of my mates, family as well helped me…They, it stopped me 
thinking about my nan at the time, just think about school and all that…” [P8; 74-86] 
 
The end of a relationship resulting from rejection by another appeared to trigger not only sadness 
but also anger and blame – 
 
“…when I was younger I didn’t control my anger, cos I come back in Year 8 cos I lived with my 
mum for about 2 months – it didn’t work out” [P8; 286-287] 
 
“She [girlfriend] dumped me last night [87] … And she didn’t even give me a reason why…so 
me and my mates ain’t speaking to her today, at all.  She wants to speak to us but we ain’t.  
We’re just blocking her” [P6; 122-125] 
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- and similarly, this could also be the case for the individual’s own rejection of another which 
was later regretted: 
 
“I’ve made loads of mistakes in my life, but, the one that always, big mistake, I don’t wanna 
forget myself on that one, and that was leaving my ex-girlfriend” [P8; 479-480] 
 
When considering losses that might precede suffering for another, participants tended to 
exemplify physical losses, such as homelessness, or temporary losses of wellbeing, as a result of 
illness or injury for example: 
 
“…recently my nan has gone into hospital, cos, like, she had a fall…and she was a bit upset” 
[P5; 43-45] 
 
“…if it’s a homeless person, well I’m, if I had change I’d give it to them cos they’re homeless 
and they might need it for food or home” [P8; 427-428] 
 
“…but when there is something definitely happened like, um, say someone hurt themselves or 
something like that, then I’d be like, ‘ah, are you alright?’” [P3; 117-118] 
 
This may suggest participants had more difficulty recognising interpersonal loss for others than 
in themselves, particularly perhaps in the absence of physical indicators of distress, which points 
to the significance of suffering needing first to be recognised for compassion to be felt. 
 3.4.2.3 Being hurt or betrayed by others.  Seven participants described suffering as a 
result of harm caused by others through criticism or physical attacks: 
 
“…if I’m not upset, then I know that I’ll have like 3 to 4 people targeting me at once. 
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And, and, they say horrible things to me, and I take offence to it, and, and then I try to, I try to 
keep it out my head, but it keeps coming in” [P2; 125-128] 
 
“…being beaten up, nearly hospitalised, pushed down the stairs, having chairs thrown at me, 
being stabbed by screwdrivers and pencils, and everything.  And then trying to help people and 
then them throwing it back at me.  Just adds all of that together, and I just felt it all again, every 
time” [P4; 268-271] 
 
Furthermore, experiences of feeling that their trust in another had been betrayed not only led to 
personal suffering, but could also influence an individual’s willingness to accept or offer 
compassion in the future: 
 
“Like what happened with me, you can say like ‘ah, yeah, I care’ and then the next thing you 
know you can turn ‘round and they’re, like, being a complete nasty, spiteful, backstabber, and 
you’ve told them everything that was wrong, and people are just gonna use that” [P4; 344-347] 
 
“…when I tell someone something it goes to the next person and moves on.  I lost my trust with 
certain people in the school” [P8; 102-103] 
 
Recognising when valued others were at risk of being hurt was also important, and several young 
people characterised themselves in a protective role in response to this: 
 
“I stick up for my mates and everything…inside of school...If they’re being bullied [P6; 43-48] 
 
“…if they’re [friend] in trouble, like, if there’s a fight or something, I’m just there, like, they are.  
Like the beef, you feel me?  But yeah, that’s, that’s bad, I’m not encouraging it.  Just in case this 
gets sent out, I wouldn’t encourage it for anyone else. But, yeah man, you wouldn’t really see 
your friend get beat up, would you?” [P1; 275-278] 
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 3.4.3 Background influences.  Participants referred to factors in their personal 
backgrounds that they felt have shaped their experiences of compassion.  These were expressed 
as relating to the way they were brought up, to what they had learned about compassion from 
previous interpersonal experiences, and to individual factors inherent in themselves as a person.  
These background factors influenced how compassion was enacted and received, mediated by a 
range of contextual factors that served to inhibit or enhance compassion in different ways (see 
3.4.4). 
 3.4.3.1 Upbringing.  Five participants referred to their upbringing, or highlighted 
the role of upbringing, in shaping how they or individuals communicate their suffering or ask for 
help: 
 
“I would find it harder, or maybe it was just the way I was brought up but, it’s harder for, if I’m 
not like, tight with you, or close with you, I wouldn’t go around asking people for, for certain 
stuff” [P1; 181-182] 
 
“I suppose because there was more of us [growing up].  So, like, mum and dad just paid 
attention to the older lot…And then me, so that’s when, like, I just started to, just hold it all in, 
and just now, it’s just stuck with me, so I just couldn’t go out there and just shout, like, ‘I’m 
really sad’ or anything like that” [P3; 273-278] 
 
“Most probably the way they’re brought up.  Say if you’re, like, brought up with a really posh 
family, you’re most probably gonna be like, say if someone pokes you, you’re like ‘oww!’ and 
then say if you’re like brought up, like say, in a normal house with strict parents, you’re most 
probably gonna be like that, kind of, tough son or whatever that don’t care about anything to be 
honest” [P6; 530-533] 
 
Upbringing was thus seen as a contributory factor in shaping beliefs around how pain should be 
dealt with and communicated to others, as well as whom it would be acceptable to approach for 
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help.  Of particular note was participant three’s reference to hiding difficult emotions as a self-
protection strategy (see 3.4.4.5), because in his past caregivers were seemingly unavailable to 
provide appropriate care or containment. 
One participant spoke of the potential relevance of cultural expectations on beliefs about 
compassion, using India as an example: 
 
“But the Indians would be like nah, we don’t wanna receive it, cos like, it’s shameful.  So yeah.  
Like, some people would feel, like, nah … they don’t wanna receive compassion cos they’re like, 
ah it’s them accepting that they’re below someone else that’s giving it to them” [P1; 124-128] 
 
This points to the role of an individual’s cultural upbringing in shaping their attitude to giving 
and receiving compassion, and whilst culture was not referred to explicitly by other participants, 
cultural prescriptions were alluded to by some participants in their consideration of gender 
differences in compassion (see 3.4.3.3). 
 3.4.3.2 Learning from experiences.  Seven participants felt that previous experiences of 
compassion had shaped their current outlook on giving and receiving it.  In terms of identifying 
compassionate others, most participants spoke about compassion in the context of peer 
relationships.  A few mentioned family members and, perhaps unsurprisingly, these tended to be 
the young people who remained in the care of their family.  Only three young people mentioned 
other significant figures of compassion for them, namely teachers, a therapist, and staff from the 
clubs they attended.  Some young people recounted how they had been helped in the past, and it 
later became apparent that these experiences had influenced the ways in which they had learnt to 
express compassion (see 3.4.5.4):  
 
“…people looking out for me when I was in a low place.  Um, people were taking me out for 
meals, spending more time with me, calling me up some days, um, people texting me to check if 
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I’m ok, people sending me poems, paragraphs, um painting, pictures, um, um, I had people 
buying me, like, tops, t-shirts, trousers, things like that” [P2; 76-80] 
 
“…if someone has depression and they have like a therapist, like I had, then they help you get 
through, like, if you’re having a really hard time, and it really does help” [P9; 71-72] 
 
“My dad.  He’s just like, the best guy on earth.  Like me and him gets on like really well.  We’ve 
got the same hobbies and stuff like that.  So yeah, he’s just those, that kind of person that’s just 
like compassion, to be looking after you, with kindness, and just step beside you through thick 
and thin I suppose” [P3; 157-166] 
 
One participant highlighted how familiarity with experiences of compassion could ease the 
process in future: 
 
“Cos if you’ve never done it [shown compassion] before, so yeah, it’s gonna be like hard…But if 
someone’s done it before, they’d just be like, it’d just be really easy, to, to just chuck it all out 
there and just, yeah, and just don’t care about it, but if you’ve never done it before”  
[P3; 524-527] 
 
However, another young person explained that receiving a negative response to an act of 
compassion deterred him from being too quick to show compassion in future: 
 
“I can remember I made a really bad mistake when I was bullied at school.  One of the guys was 
really down who actually bullied me a lot, and I went up to him and said ‘what’s wrong?’ and 
then he bullied me more for asking him what was wrong, and I don’t really know why…he 
started pushing me over, all sorts, and I just think ‘wow.’  That, that that was, yeah.  That’s the, 
why I’m now very cautious” [P4; 122-128] 
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 Participants contrasted experiences of compassion with examples of times they have felt 
hurt or rejected by others.  Importantly, in the same way that their compassionate encounters 
seemed to have shaped their approach to care and kindness, encounters that might be deemed 
‘uncompassionate’ impacted negatively on participants’ ‘state of mind’ and influenced self-
protection strategies such as self-reliance to avoid being let-down, or avoiding compassionate 
acts in order to limit the possibility that this will invite further harm to the self: 
 
“When people are not kind to me, it feels like, I have, I have, I have like 10 kilos on my back, and 
I’m tryna, like, trying to pick it up, and I’m tryna move away from it, but it keeps me in the same 
spot, and it, and it keeps, keeps going on and on” [P2; 139-141] 
 
“…if you’re so reliant on other people, then you’re just gonna be disappointed every single time.  
I remember when I was a kid and my best friend, well, ex-best friend, he’s cool now but I don’t 
really chat to him that much, but um, his dad, obviously I liked chilling with them, and his Dad’s 
just like yeah yeah yeah like, we’ll go out, we’ll go out, we’ll go out.  I waited for this guy, like, 
he was meant to take us all to the cinema, but obviously he’s got a family of his own, so, he’s like 
oh yeah [name] I’ll come and pick you up.  He sold me dreams, and I was just chilling at home, I 
was waiting for this guy who never came … Yeah it was just sad, like yeah … I don’t wanna rely 
on anyone too much” [P1; 539-551] 
 
“After everything that’s happened to me before: being beaten up, nearly hospitalised, pushed 
down the stairs, having chairs thrown at me, being stabbed by screwdrivers and pencils, and 
everything.  And then trying to help people and then them throwing it back at me.  Just adds all 
of that together, and I just felt it all again, every time.  And I was just like, I can’t keep doing 
this.  Cos I’m trying to get over that stuff that’s happened before, and every time something bad 
happens to me I just see it again and again” [P4; 267-273] 
 
An accumulation of past uncompassionate episodes was also felt by some to outweigh many of 
their more compassionate encounters: 
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“…more negatives have happened than positives, and, more people are negative towards me 
than positive things, so, one outweighs, like … one negative thing you said, then two positives, 
then another negative, and the negative will just blow the two positives out” [P4; 778-780] 
 
 3.4.3.3 It’s “just how I am.”  Four participants spoke about compassion (or difficulties 
with compassion) as an inherent personal quality: 
 
“People who have goodwill will have, like, compassion in them, as in, as a sense of their 
personality.  Because if you’re not, if you don’t go out to do nice stuff then I don’t think you’d 
ever feel very compassionate about anyone” [P1; 38-42] 
 
“I can’t do that [be self-compassionate], no, but I think other people can… don’t know [why] 
really…It’s something that some people can’t do” [P6; 422-430] 
 
“[For those who are self-compassionate it’s] mostly the kind of people they are” [P6; 434] 
 
In a similar vein, some participants noted that for them it was easier to offer compassion to 
others than to accept it from others or themselves, and felt the most fitting explanation was that 
this was just the kind of person they were: 
 
“I’m the caring person, but when someone tries and cares for me I don’t want them to be caring, 
like, for me.  Cos, that’s just how I am” [P8; 183-184] 
 
Another possible influential individual factor was gender.  Some participants reflected on 
how gender roles could affect how men and women communicate their emotions and enact 
compassion.  Most however agreed that whilst this could influence compassion, it was not a 
defining factor: 
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“Yeah, like, men don’t show their emotions as much as females, which is obviously [pause].  I 
definitely don’t show them for one” [P3; 106-107] 
 
“Well, girls are more like, kind of, you know, like, soft kind of thing.  Like, and then boys are 
just, like, don’t really care to be honest” [P6; 523-524] 
 
“If I get compassion from female colleagues, it doesn’t really feel any different, but they’re more 
touchy feely and like ‘ah, give us a hug’ and everything.  Male colleagues are more like ‘do you 
just wanna go out for a drink or a coffee or anything?’… Yeah I think they do sort of, but, it 
depends how the person is anyway cos you get some tough girls, you get some cuddly guys.  I 
don’t really think gender makes any difference” [P4; 861-868] 
 
 3.4.4 Contextual barriers and catalysts to compassion.  Participants spoke about the 
importance of context in any given moment where compassion could be experienced.  The 
factors they felt were relevant could be understood in terms of the emotional ‘state of mind’ of 
either party, the individual’s attempts to regulate their proximity to others, how they related to 
the other or object of compassion, particular beliefs and attitudes held about compassion and the 
other, and their attempts to ensure self-protection.  These factors were talked about in different 
ways amongst participants, but were conceptualised by all in terms of how these factors could 
increase or decrease the likelihood that compassion would be enacted.  Contextual factors are 
therefore framed here as barriers and catalysts to compassion, and directly influenced the process 
of enacting compassion and relating reciprocally to the other via the individual (or self). 
 3.4.4.1 “State of mind.”  Described by participant one as “state of mind” [240], the 
emotional experience or sense of ‘how I am’ in a given moment was felt by participants to have 
the potential to inhibit or enhance an act of compassion.  Participants spoke of the potential 
impact of ‘feeling good’ vs. ‘feeling bad’ as well as more specifically about feeling angry or 
ashamed. 
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 3.4.4.1.1 Feeling good.  Seven participants concurred that they found it easier to 
acknowledge the suffering of others and respond with compassion when they themselves were in 
a positive state of mind: 
 
“Oh yeah, I’m a nice guy, but, it just depends on my state of mind.  Um, if I’m feeling generous 
then yeah, I’ll help you out” [P1; 240-244] 
 
“If I’m, if I’m feeling happy, like, it would be easier to show compassion… Yeah, it probably 
does just depend on your emotion…It depends what emotion they’re feeling as well.  If I’m 
feeling particularly happy and I can see that they’re sad or something, then I’ll just be like, yeah, 
like, let me just lighten your mood” [P1; 341-357] 
 
“I guess when I’m in a really good mood and someone’s in a really bad mood then I would like, 
you know, sit them down and tell them everything’s gonna be ok and I’ll help them through it” 
[P9; 201-202] 
 
One participant also reflected that they would find it easier to accept compassion when feeling in 
a better frame of mind.  This assertion is interesting given that the process of enacting 
compassion was conceptualised as being necessarily preceded by some degree of suffering (see 
3.4.2), which would suggest that being in a positive state of mind might negate the need for 
compassion in the first place. 
 3.4.4.1.2 Feeling bad.  Whilst eight participants talked about the impact of ‘feeling bad’ 
on compassion, they varied in their thoughts about whether this would be a barrier or catalyst.  
Most, however, agreed that a negative state of mind was a potential barrier to acting 
compassionately towards others, regardless of whether feeling bad was specifically related to 
that particular other or not: 
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“…if I’m like angry in myself, or, like, I’m just, like, not willing to give it, I’m just not gonna give 
it to you to be honest” [P1; 244-245] 
 
“Suppose if you’re not, not really in a, in a nice mood, you might not feel like doing it [being 
compassionate] as much” [P5; 461-462] 
 
“Well it depends on the mood I’m in…When I’m really, like, not happy.  And when I’m tired.  
Um, I’m not really nice” [P7; 143-153] 
 
Some participants felt that feeling bad would make it easier to accept compassion – 
 
“...when I’m not in the best place, and I have someone who supports me to get, get, to get 
through it, or when I’m finding it hard…because then no one’s actually targeting me…So like, if 
I’m upset, then I know that I’ve like, 4,5 to 10 people who keep an eye on me…” [P2; 117-123] 
 
“[It’s easier to accept compassion when I’m] quite sad I suppose” [P5; 183] 
 
- whereas others felt this would in fact be a barrier: 
 
“…when I’m in a bad mood she tries to talk me out of it.  But I don’t let anyone talk to me, cos 
when I’m in a bad mood I don’t like anyone talking to me cos it just makes me worse” 
[P8; 185-186] 
 
“…if I’m having a bad day, I’d probably, like, not really talk to many people” [P9; 142] 
 
“[It’s harder to be self-compassionate] when you’re not that happy and err, um, like, when 
something’s, like, sort of on your chest and that” [P7; 272-273] 
 
This discrepancy might be explained by some participants’ conflation of all negative affect into 
‘feeling bad’, whereas different negative emotions may have very different influences on 
compassion.  Indeed, some participants were specific in their reference to anger, shame, and 
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criticism, which can perhaps act as a barrier in terms of their link to social isolation, whereas 
feelings of sadness may more readily evoke sympathy in others and therefore promote 
compassionate encounters. 
 3.4.4.1.3 Feeling angry, ashamed, or critical.  Eight young people talked about shame, 
anger, and criticism.  Anger and shame were associated with seeking distance from others (see 
3.4.4.2.2) and in this sense acted as a barrier to compassion, which would instead necessitate 
feelings of empathy and connection.  Being critical of the self and/or other was felt to inhibit 
compassion to the self or other respectively through its association with the belief that the object 
of criticism was not worthy of compassion (see 3.4.4.4.2).  For some participants, however, there 
was an acknowledgement that feelings of shame or self-criticism could precede an experience of 
self-compassion: 
 
“I guess, if I put myself down or something then, you know, I just think, like, you know, nobody’s 
perfect, and, you know, just next time I’ll just, you know, you know, if someone’s bullying me or 
saying something then I just ignore them because no one’s perfect” [P9; 342-344] 
 
One explanation for this difference could be the degree to which feelings such as anger or shame 
impede compassion.  Participant one, for example, reflected on how it was easier to feel self-
compassion and get past personal mistakes when they were minor: 
 
“[It’s easier to be self-compassionate] if it’s not, um, major, like, yeah.  If it’s just a lickle ting” 
[P1; 522-524] 
 
The apparent discrepancies both within and between participants’ accounts of the contextual 
impact of state of mind on the likelihood compassion will be experienced or enacted points to the 
potential complexity in the relationship between the self-conscious and affiliative emotions. 
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 3.4.4.2 Regulating proximity to others.  Participants described how their desire to adjust 
their proximity to others in a given context could affect their experience of compassion.  As 
suggested above, whether participants sought increased closeness to or distance from others was 
influenced by their current state of mind. 
 3.4.4.2.1 Seeking closeness.  Seven participants acknowledged that when in a positive 
state of mind, they were motivated to approach and spend time with others, and therefore found 
it easier to offer warmth and compassion.  Compassion was also viewed by some as a potential 
means of establishing closeness with others: 
 
“…it’s nice to them, when you’re being nice to them…Plus you can make friends as well” [P7; 
115-117] 
 
In several cases, the topic of romantic relationships arose, through which it was made clear that 
participants valued the sense of connection experienced with a partner: 
 
 
“…she [ex-girlfriend] was like my, my, part of my life kind of thing, but when someone like take 
it out, it’s like you’re just by yourself and you don’t know what to do” [P8; 487-488] 
 
For other young people, the desire for a romantic relationship but lack of opportunity to establish 
one evoked feelings of sadness and even resentment: 
 
“…until you see people, like on the train, you know like, boyfriend and girlfriend together, on 
the train, leaning on one another, kissing each other, cuddling each other, and you’re sat there 
by yourself thinking…I want that, but I’m just gonna get really depressed if I think about it” [P4; 
730-734] 
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 3.4.4.2.2 Seeking distance.  Seven young people reflected on their need to seek distance 
from others when feeling angry.  This appeared to facilitate headspace and time to calm down, 
but was also framed by some as necessary to protect the other from harm, as in some instances 
being compassionately approached by another when distance was sought only served to fuel 
anger: 
 
“I just say ‘please leave me alone, and then let me calm down and I’ll talk to you after’…I might 
go outside and just sit down to just try and like forget what happened and just, relax” 
[P8; 198-203] 
 
Say if you’re in a really, like, annoyed mood, and you don’t want anyone to talk to you, if they 
could try talk to you.  Say you’re that angry that you really wanna punch someone, you might 
turn round and hurt them” [P6; 298-300] 
 
When participant six talked of his upset following a recent relationship break-up, he described 
how he used distance to communicate his anger and punish the person he perceived to have 
caused his suffering: 
 
“So, me and my mates ain’t speaking to her today, at all.  She wants to speak to us but we ain’t.  
We’re just blocking her.  We’re just, she wal-, comes up to us we just walk away” [P6; 124-125] 
 
But distance was not always framed as beneficial.  In fact, some young people directly linked 
experiences of social isolation with a lack of compassionate experiences: 
 
“But no one’s openly compassionate towards me.  I don’t…  I’ve never been popular to get that.  
I’ve always been sort of on my Larry, and, through school, after school…” [P4; 630-634] 
 
“…if you’re isolated like you keep away from everyone else then, like, you wouldn’t know 
anyone else’s view apart from your own.  Because you’re just, like, in a box in a sense.  Like, you 
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wouldn’t know, or you’d be strange to the compassion, the whole thing about compassion and 
everything, good for other people” [P1; 50-53] 
 
It is possible that there may be a distinction to be made here between ‘distance’ and ‘isolation’, 
in which the individual who seeks distance from others does so through their own volition to 
promote functional processes highlighted above, such as ‘head-space’, whereas social isolation 
may not be explicitly chosen by the individual but imposed on them as a result of experiences of 
social rejection. 
 3.4.4.3 Relating to the other.  The relationship between self and other was significant in 
predicting compassionate enactments between parties.  Eight of the nine participants identified 
that the likelihood of compassion was influenced by the nature of a pre-existing relationship 
between self and other, and by whether they felt the other could be trusted.  Relating to the other 
appeared to set the back-drop for the reciprocal interaction that occurred between parties as 
compassion was enacted (see 3.4.6), via the impact this had on the self. 
 3.4.4.3.1 Knowing the other.  Whilst participants acknowledged that it was possible to 
feel compassion for anyone, eight young people felt that they were more likely to offer and 
accept compassion for people they valued and who they knew well.  Knowing the other 
facilitated an ability to help, through knowing what would be helpful specifically for that person: 
 
“…I know with that particular person, doughnuts is a way in.  But, like I said, knowing people 
helps” [P4; 107-108] 
 
“…but you’d have to get to know each other first…Cos you don’t kn-, you don’t know what he’s 
like, you don’t know what he likes and…  Well, you don’t know him” [P7; 337-342] 
 
Although one participant acknowledged that receiving compassion from someone less well-
known to them could feel more special: 
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“…it’d be more special I guess, or more of a novelty, it’d make you feel better, if someone else 
has noticed rather than people you see, what, everyday, or talk to everyday” [P4; 321-323] 
 
Having received compassion from somebody in the past also made it more likely that 
compassion would be reciprocated: 
 
“…if someone comes to me, I’ll be like, you know what, if you’re kind to me, I’ll be kind to you” 
[P2; 191] 
 
“…if someone has done it [shown compassion] to you then you can understand what it feels like 
for the other person” [P3; 480-481] 
 
I’m always nice and polite to people.  It don’t, don’t matter if I like them or not, I just try and 
still be nice and then just see if they’ll be nice back.  But if they don’t I’m just like ‘yeah, just 
leave it there’ [P3; 445-449] 
 
“I try and help people more, and they help me back in return, and it’s just a cycle” 
[P4; 157-158] 
 
For one young person in particular, being helped by a therapist who they did not know 
personally was helpful for that reason.  What remained important within this relationship though 
was trust: 
 
“…talking to someone that I didn’t really know very well, but I could trust them. Cos it was like 
really personal. But they really helped because, you know, I couldn’t really tell many people 
about it” [P9; 84-86] 
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 3.4.4.3.2 Valuing trust.  Five young people highlighted the importance of feeling able to 
trust the other in a situation with the potential to evoke compassion.  This related to knowing the 
other, as knowing somebody well potentially led to trust: 
 
“I suppose cos if you just know each other it should be, like, easier.  Cos you’ve got that good 
bond.  But if someone else from, like, outside the family comes in, there’s not like such a good 
bond cos you couldn’t trust that person” [P3; 196-198] 
 
When it came to accepting compassion, young people needed to trust the other to feel safe in 
revealing the extent of their suffering: 
 
“I guess the closest people in my family, I can trust them more than, say, my friends, I mean I 
can trust my friends quite a lot with things but it’s kind of, um, like maybe personal like type of 
things I don’t want them to know” [P9; 128-130] 
 
“So, it’s a trusting as well, cos if I trust them with the things that’s upset me, they trust me back.  
So, if I don’t trust someone, I’m not gonna tell them what’s wrong” [P4; 160-161] 
 
Previous experiences of feeling betrayed (see 3.4.2.3) appeared to play a significant role in this.  
Trust also extended to perceiving the genuineness of the other’s desire to help and subsequently 
how effective this was in helping the individual or enabling them to internalise a compassionate 
experience (see 3.4.7.1).  This was exemplified in participant four’s reflection that help from 
professionals was potentially less genuine because they are paid to help: 
 
“I think it’s cos they’re professionals though, it’s their job to try and make people feel better.  
Isn’t it?  It’s not your friends doing it” [P4; 815-816] 
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This point presents an interesting contrast with participant nine’s observation above that 
speaking to an unknown professional facilitated their seeking and acceptance of compassion.  
Whilst this may speak to a difference between individuals, perhaps influenced by their 
perception of trust and genuineness as noted above, this may also conceivably relate to the 
perceived role and agenda of the professional, as participant nine spoke of her encounter with a 
therapist – often framed as ‘helping professionals’ – whereas participant four spoke in reference 
to professionals within the YOS who may be associated with punitive action. 
 3.4.4.4 Beliefs and attitudes.  Five young people spoke about specific beliefs and 
attitudes that served as barriers or catalysts to compassion.  The degree to which particular 
attitudes or beliefs held by participants became more or less salient in terms of their influence on 
compassion was very much context-dependent, in that they became more or less significant 
depending on how the individual related to the other and how compassion was enacted. 
 3.4.4.4.1 Beliefs about compassion.  Some participants framed compassion as a 
weakness, in that it renders one open to being taken advantage of and potentially undermines 
self-reliance: 
 
“You can get taken advantage of…People assume that you’re such a nice person they’ll just… 
feel like it’s easier to push you or to sway you, in a sense…Like, people will just, like, take 
advantage of you” [P1; 557-565] 
 
“…if you’re so reliant on other people, then you’re just gonna be disappointed every single 
time” [P1; 539] 
 
This related to self-protection strategies such as hiding feelings or “trying to be the hard guy” 
[P3; 136].  Participant one raised an interesting point about the need for compassion indicating 
that one party is worse off than the other, and reflected on how accepting help could be 
experienced as shaming for this reason: 
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“But the Indians would be like nah, we don’t wanna receive it, cos like, it’s shameful.  So yeah.  
Like, some people would feel, like, nah … they don’t wanna receive compassion cos they’re like, 
ah it’s them accepting that they’re below someone else that’s giving it to them” [P1; 124-128] 
 
Beliefs about self-compassion specifically could also act as a barrier: 
 
“I don’t [show myself compassion]…No.  I, if, something’s wrong I just get on with it.  I think 
stop feeling so sorry for yourself and just, you know, get on with it” [P4; 723-726] 
 
“…some people might think, if you’re you know being like too kind to yourself, people might 
think that’s a bit boasting, or like you know, your life is great and you know, that type of thing” 
[P9; 377-378] 
 
 3.4.4.4.2 Judging worthiness.  Five young people spoke about judging the worthiness of 
the object of compassion.  Judgements about the other’s worthiness of compassion were felt to 
influence compassionate acts, and these could be shaped by an individual’s attitude or belief 
about the other based on their characteristics or behaviour, or the previous interpersonal 
encounters they have had with each other: 
 
“I suppose if you were in, like, a sort of group, and you got, saw someone being picked on or 
something, you’d probably, sort of, not be as nice to...the person…that’s picking on someone” 
[P5; 571-574] 
 
“…if, some people are a bit, er, racist, or sexist…they might not, might not wanna help, or be 
kind to that, kind of…colour…[and] probably religion, I suppose…well if you, you think that 
their beliefs are different to yours you might not wanna help them [P5; 478-494] 
 
“…if people show hatred towards me, I’m not gonna show any sort of compassion to them.  No 
way.  I wouldn’t spit on any of them if they was on fire” [P4; 472-473] 
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“…why am I gonna show, in a sense, love, to someone I don’t like.  That doesn’t really make 
sense” [P1; 260] 
 
Similarly, participants who spoke of feeling highly self-critical were also less likely to relate to 
having had experiences of self-compassion, perhaps linked to a personal judgement that they are 
undeserving, and reported finding it more difficult to accept compassion from others: 
 
“After they say something, and you just walk off like ‘that hurt so much from taking that in.’  
But, yeah…Cos I can’t take compliments or like applause, or achievements, or anything…I find 
it hard so I’m like ‘yeah, thanks’ and then I just walk off, like, that hurt a lot, from taking that 
in” [P3; 360-365] 
 
“[It might be harder to be self-compassionate]…if you think you’re not good enough” [P5; 454] 
  
 3.4.4.5 Protecting the self.  For six of the young people, the emphasis placed on self-
protection was evident throughout their interview.  Participants appeared to have developed 
strategies following past experiences of hurt and rejection, that served to protect the self in 
limiting the opportunity to be hurt again.  This was observed in young people avoiding 
compassion in some situations through fear of getting it wrong – 
 
“…but if you don’t know them, like, if I see someone in the street and they’re just, like, 
grumpy…you don’t really know how they’re gonna react to you anyway.  So, I find it easier just 
to ask the people I know, otherwise you’re just gonna get a punch in the face, and I don’t need 
anymore of those” [P4; 67-74] 
 
- or, as was detailed in 3.4.3.2, through the promotion of self-reliance to avoid being let-down by 
others.  Some participants also spoke of their tendency to hide their emotions as a means of self-
protection: 
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“Umm… Emoti… You know what, I, ah, I don’t, I don’t really feel like I’m the type of person to 
show too much emotion so…If people are giving emotional compassion I wouldn’t really notice, 
I’d just be like, mmm” [P1; 214-217] 
 
“I’ve never showed full emotion, but when people have been bad to me it just…proves that I 
shouldn’t anyway” [P4; 681-682] 
 
“I don’t say like show my feelings, I keep everything inside.  So, everyone knows I do not like 
talking about how I feel and that.  And like a lot of people say ‘you need to get help, you need to 
talk about how you feel’ but I’m the guy who just wants to keep all my feelings inside…I’ve 
always been that, always” [P8; 94-98] 
 
“…mum and dad just paid attention to the older lot…so that’s when, like, I just started to, just 
hold it all in, and just now, it’s just stuck with me, so I just couldn’t go out there and just shout, 
like, ‘I’m really sad’” [P3; 275-278] 
 
Of course, the difficulty with hiding one’s emotions in the context of compassion, is that without 
the ability to communicate suffering, the process of enacting compassion (discussed below) is 
unlikely to happen. 
 3.4.5 Enacting compassion.  Through the analysis it was identified that the process of 
enacting compassion – whether between two people or to the self – involved four key stages: 
recognising suffering, feeling moved, wanting to help, and acting with compassion.  All 
participants spoke in some way about recognising suffering and acting with compassion.  Six 
young people referred to feeling moved in some way by suffering, and seven talked of wanting 
to help as a precursor to acting with compassion, which linked to a perceived sense of agency 
(see 3.4.6.1). 
 3.4.5.1 Recognising suffering.  In order that an experience of compassion be triggered, it 
was first necessary to recognise that someone – be it the self or another – is suffering.  Suffering 
could be recognised through a change in body language or someone’s ‘usual self’ – 
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“I get really emotional and they know.  So, they try and, like, be really car-, like caring for me 
and that…it’s how my body language goes” [P8; 334-336] 
 
“…most of my friends are bubbly, so if they’re not normal, if they’re not bubbly then you know 
there’s something wrong” [P4; 38-39] 
 
- which appears to explain some of the importance placed on having pre-existing knowledge of 
the other.  Being attuned to suffering also allowed individuals to recognise signs of emotional 
states that would potentially discourage them from approaching the other person, such as anger: 
 
“Say if I see ‘em not, like, going red and clenching their fists I’ll go up to them, but if they’re 
clenching their fists I’ll just, like, leave it” [P6; 308-309] 
 
 3.4.5.2 Feeling moved.  Recognising suffering led to feeling moved on some emotional 
level.  Recognising suffering in another evoked an emotional response through the process of 
empathising and/or sympathising – 
 
“…if you see the adverts, like of the little kids suffering or something, like, it could go to your 
conscience and you could feel, you could react in a certain way, for the benefit of the children” 
[P1; 18-19] 
 
- whereas one’s own suffering could also be associated with the evocation of guilt or shame: 
 
“I probably react [to mistakes] like, kind of, I dunno, ashamed of myself in a way” [P9; 296] 
 
 3.4.5.3 Wanting to help.  Feeling an emotional response to suffering led to a desire to 
alleviate the suffering.  However, wanting to help was influenced by how worthy of compassion 
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the individual deemed the potential object of compassion to be (see 3.4.4.4.2).  Furthermore, the 
desire to help and subsequent decision to help could be affected by the perceived costs and gains 
likely to occur through helping (see 3.4.8). 
 3.4.5.4 Acting with compassion.  Participants had different ideas about what, for them, 
would constitute an act of compassion.  For some, compassion in the form of providing physical 
necessities, such as money, felt more familiar – 
 
“Friends show compassion, in school.  Like, if I, if I had no school money, or something” [P1; 
157] 
 
“[Aunt] does quite a lot for me…makes me dinner...cleaning” [P5; 131-133] 
 
“I’ve got a cousin that gives me quite a lot…get quite a lot of clothes from him” [P5; 140-141] 
 
“Do something for me…Like, do my work or something” [P7; 75] 
 
- whereas for others, compassion was related to in the sense of providing emotional support: 
 
“…you can try to soothe them with kind words and, and, and try cheer them up with poems or 
paragraphs, you can protect them in school, or out of school, you can keep an eye on them, you 
can keep going over to their house, see if they’re alright, check on their family, check on them” 
[P2; 34-37] 
 
“…say if my mate’s going through a hard time, I’ll tell ‘em what happens and everything” 
[P6; 148-149] 
 
“…if I’m having problems he’ll, like, tell me, you know, you know, you should stick up for 
yourself … my mum supports me through everything” [P9; 95-100] 
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This suggested that participants’ previous experiences of compassion from others (see 3.4.3.2) 
influenced which acts of compassion they were likely to offer others.  Alternatively, the 
examples of compassionate acts offered by participants may have reflected their own 
understanding and definition of compassion, which may then explain why similar examples were 
talked about in relation to compassion to and from others.  In this case, it could be argued that 
the way participants spoke about specific acts of compassion gave clearer insight into their 
understanding of compassion as a construct than by asking them to define the word.  Relating to 
the other (see 3.4.4.3) also had an important link with this category, as participants described 
how they drew on their knowledge of the other to determine which compassionate act would be 
most appropriate. 
 3.4.6 Reciprocal interaction between self and other.  Through the process of constant 
comparison employed in this analysis, the reciprocal interaction between self and other emerged 
as the core category.  As is often the case with a core category, the researcher is prone to seeing 
it across many aspects of the data (Glaser, 1978).  In the present study, the concept of a 
reciprocal interaction between self and other was not only evident in the immediate interaction 
occurring at the time of a compassionate act, but also occurred across earlier relational 
experiences through which participants learnt from and responded to, and could be internalised 
as a process of self-relating (see 3.4.7).  Other types of reciprocal interaction – such as between 
various processes conceptualised in the categories and subcategories identified within this 
chapter – also appeared to play an important role in shaping participants’ experiences of 
compassion to self and others, which by and large constituted a dynamic and relational process.  
The reciprocal interaction occurring at the point of a compassionate act between self and other 
represented a dynamic whereby a perceived sense of agency and a process of appraising and 
responding to the changing relationship between the self and other, influenced by patterns of 
self-relating (see 3.4.7) and characteristics of the compassionate enactment (see 3.4.5), were key. 
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 3.4.6.1 Perceiving a sense of agency.  Six participants identified a perceived sense of 
agency within the reciprocal interaction involved in an act of compassion as a key influential 
factor to how compassion was experienced.  Perceiving that another had chosen to help them 
was important in marking the genuineness of compassion received from another: 
 
“…if I was tight with someone then I, I would accept it [compassion].  Like, I would feel, like, 
more comfortable to ask…Because, in a sense, like, you, you would know what the person’s 
thinking, like.  Or you’d, like, feel more comfortable to say ‘ah yeah, they’re giving, giving it to 
me out of their free will’” [P1; 199-203] 
 
Similarly, some young people reflected on how in enacting compassion themselves, it was 
important that they had decided to offer compassion, as being told by another to act 
compassionately ran the risk of triggering a negative emotional response such as anger: 
 
“Say if my mates, like, forced me to go over and speak to them [someone upset] cos they don’t 
wanna go speak to them, and they annoy me from doing that.  It’s like basically, I won’t go speak 
to them, no one will go speak to them, so.  So, they’ve just made another person angry, by 
making them go over to them” [P6; 350-352] 
 
Agency was also talked about in terms of people’s desire to help themselves; infringements of 
personal agency were framed as potential barriers to accepting compassion: 
 
“…sometimes they might not want help or, um, wanna do it themselves” [P5; 162-166] 
 
“I’m always that sort of guy who just wants to sort my own self out…I just like wanting to vent 
my own things” [P8; 206-210] 
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 3.4.6.2 Appraising and responding.  This category reflected the nuances of reciprocal 
interaction that participants recognised within a compassionate encounter, and all participants 
spoke about this process in some way.  Enacting compassion was not as straightforward as the 
stages outlined in 3.4.5, as during and following an expression of compassion, individuals 
remained sensitive to responses in the self and other, appraising these and responding 
accordingly: 
 
“[When] I’m with a person and they want to have a go at me, then I feel like there’s no point of 
being kind to them…or trying to keep myself happy” [P2; 132-133] 
 
“I try and talk to them, and sometimes they don’t want me to help, so like ‘I’ll let you clam down, 
and then I’ll come back later.’  I come back later and they’re still in a bad mood, I thought fine.  
I wait for a while and then come back, and just like, they calm down and then they try and talk to 
me” [P8; 363-365] 
 
Responding negatively to compassion, such as with anger or ridicule, served to stop a 
compassionate act and promote distance between parties.  The specific act of compassion and the 
way it was presented was also important in influencing the reciprocal interaction between self 
and other: 
 
“Maybe it’s just the way it’s presented…cos if no one is actually saying “yeah, I’m above you, 
that’s why I’m gonna show it,” not that they say, “I’m above you,” but they’re in a sense 
implying it.  So, if no one’s like really showing that they’re above you, they’re just, like it’s just a 
step for you for you to just get higher, then, you would take it” [P1; 140-154] 
 
The dynamic process of appraisal and response appeared to serve the function of maximising the 
efficacy of a compassionate enactment where possible, but at least promoting the ability to 
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protect the self in an instance where a mismatch between parties – with regard to the willingness 
to accept compassion – occurred. 
 3.4.7 Self-to-self relating.  The process of relating to oneself was identified through the 
analysis as an important concept.  Self-to-self relating became particularly relevant in the context 
of self-compassion, and whilst the process of relating to oneself with compassion was similar in 
many ways to the process of enacting compassion between the self and other, self-to-self relating 
was identified as a distinct concept that was heavily influenced by previous relational 
experiences with others.  Participants talked about self-to-self relating in terms of their ability to 
internalise previous compassionate experiences with others, as well as the importance of self-
reflection and its role in self-compassion. 
 3.4.7.1 Internalising compassion.  The ability to be self-compassionate was seen, by 
those who could engage in discussion about the concept, as influenced by previous experiences 
of compassion from others.  In this way, previous compassionate experiences could be 
internalised and replicated from self-to-self: 
 
“I got support first, and then when I got that support I kind of helped myself cos then I was 
taking in what people were saying” [P9; 312-313] 
 
However, previous experiences of rejection and criticism from others could equally be 
internalised and presented a barrier to self-compassion via the relationship with the self: 
 
“I don’t like myself, I have no self-confidence whatsoever.  I’ve had 18 years of people telling me 
I’m not worth it, I should die, I should be dead, I sh- not worth it, I’m not intelligent enough, I’m 
ugly, I’m stupid, I’m not worth it, all sorts, everything like that, and, you know what, after a 
while you just get so bored of hearing it you start to believe it” [P4; 762-765] 
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Exposure to compassionate experiences over time was also important in influencing how easy or 
hard participants found it to internalise compassion: 
 
“Cos if you’ve never done it [shown compassion] before, so yeah, it’s gonna be like hard…But if 
someone’s done it before, they’d just be like, it’d just be really easy” [P3; 524-526] 
 
Two participants who struggled in particular with self-compassion, noted that they instead 
focused their attention on providing support to others: 
 
“I don’t show myself compassion, I help other people to make me feel better” [P4; 755-756] 
 
“[Those who don’t show themselves compassion] focus on other people more than themselves to 
be honest… Like, put your friends first, before yourself” [P6; 434-437] 
 
 3.4.7.2 Self-reflecting.  The ability to reflect on one’s own mistakes was viewed by three 
young people as an important step to be able to learn from these and to consider how things 
might be done differently in future (see 3.4.8.3): 
 
“I need to, you know, think what I did [wrong] before and then, you know, become a better 
person” [P9; 326-327] 
 
One young person related this to his experience of being arrested: 
 
“…what did I do wrong?  And, you just feel like ‘ah ok cool, now I know I have to do this again’ 
[be in a police cell] so it’s just a time for self-meditation” [P1; 429-430] 
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 Self-reflecting required space, and therefore, in some cases was associated with seeking distance 
in order for reflection and learning to occur. 
 3.4.8 Realising costs and gains.  Following an act of compassion and the subsequent 
responses from the parties involved through the reciprocal interaction outlined in 3.4.6, 
participants acknowledged that there ensued a realisation of the resulting costs and gains.  
Recognising costs and gains to a compassionate enactment was a further type of appraisal that 
fed back directly to learning from experiences, in order that this information be integrated and 
therefore drawn on in judging future acts of compassion.  Overall, participants viewed the 
concept of compassion to/from self and others as positive, but recognised that undesired costs 
can arise when there is a mismatch between parties, due to some kind of misjudgement.  
Participants identified the potential gains to enacting compassion in terms of feeling connected to 
others or through achieving self-betterment. 
 3.4.8.1 Misjudging compassion.  Three participants recounted specific experiences 
where compassion had been ‘misjudged’ by themselves or others, in the sense that there had 
been a mismatch between the intended impact and the response: 
 
“…I just got to the point where I stopped helping so many people, cos they kept making jokes of 
me, fools of me…” [P4; 241-242] 
 
“…sometimes, like, people could upset, upset you, like, doing something…they could do 
something that you didn’t want doing” [P7; 203-205] 
 
The costs associated with encounters such as this were integrated through learning and 
subsequently shaped how compassion was approached in future (see 3.4.3.2).  This learning 
could occur in the immediate aftermath of a compassionate encounter, but it was also possible 
for perceptions of a compassionate encounter to change over time, as can be seen in participant 
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four’s recount of how his perception of another’s use of compassion changed following new 
information: 
 
“I thought I could trust that girlfriend but then she went out with a guy who hurt me quite badly 
last year, and, she said beforehand, like, she tried to comfort me about it and say ‘no 
everything’s fine’ and everything, and then she goes out with him.  That’s compassion and being 
stabbed in the back afterwards, which didn’t help the compassion in the first-place cos that 
weren’t showing compassion” [P4; 175-179] 
 
 3.4.8.2 Feeling connected.  Seven participants spoke in some way about feeling 
connected following an act of compassion.  Acting with compassion was viewed by some as an 
opportunity to gain friends and/or promote positive relationships with others: 
 
“[Through compassion] like, you could earn another friend” [P7; 260] 
 
“Well say if I didn’t like them as much, I’d like them a bit more [after they showed me 
compassion]” [P6; 289] 
 
“I risked my own life to save, to save a little kid’s life, cos I knew that if that kid got killed, their 
parents would be upset and they wouldn’t forgive themselves.  But I knew that, I knew that if I 
saved that kid’s life, his parents would be happy and say, and say thank you, and that’s all I 
needed” [P2; 166-169] 
 
“I suppose if you were being compassionate, er, it might be quite a nice feeling to be helpful.  
You get praised” [P5; 214-215] 
 
Receiving compassion from others could also enhance feelings of social connection through 
demonstrating that somebody cares: 
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“…it’s, like, kind of them to actually see what could be the problem and stuff like that” 
[P3; 300-301] 
 
In a similar vein, self-compassion was seen to promote connection on a level of common 
humanity (Neff, 2003a) through the understanding that everybody suffers: 
 
“I mean everyone makes mistakes, I don’t feel, like, terrible” [P9; 296-297] 
 
 3.4.8.3 Achieving self-betterment.  One significant gain that five participants identified 
as attainable through acting with compassion was the opportunity to better the self.  This was 
understood as a process that could occur within the individual through internalising compassion 
and self-reflecting (see 3.4.7) – 
 
“…and then you just start thinking, and then, that’s when you start evaluating, like, ‘ok, maybe I 
got lost’, in a sense, just after.  And then that’s when you just start thinking about steps on how 
to improve…the betterment of the, of yourself…” [P1; 463-467] 
 
- but could also be enhanced with the compassionate support of another: 
 
“…it’d make them a better person if, like, say like they, they did something wrong and they 
needed help, so I would give them advice what to do. Then they’d probably, hopefully, they’d 
take the advice and then, you know, probably think about what they did wrong and then become 
a better person” [P9; 245-248] 
 
3.5 Member Checking 
 An important feature of any substantive theory generated through CGT methods is its 
relatability and relevance to the lived experience of the population to whom it pertains to apply 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992).  One way of assessing a theory’s relevance is to seek feedback 
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from members of the relevant population (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  Member checking was 
undertaken with two of the nine participants in the current study.  As data analysis began 
following the first interview and continued as an iterative process throughout data collection, a 
nascent theoretical model was constructed by the time data for seven participants had been 
collected and analysed.  The opportunity was therefore taken at the end of the final two 
participant interviews to introduce the emergent model and invite feedback on its feel and fit 
with each of their experience. 
 Both participants reported that all aspects of the model made sense to them when 
explained and felt relevant to their understanding and experience of compassion to self and 
others.  When invited to give feedback on the wording or asked if they would make any changes, 
both participants maintained that they felt the model fit with their experience and did not 
recommend changes: 
 
“I can’t, um, see changes really.  It’s good [pause] yeah, that’s it really” [P8; 1012-1013] 
 
“Yeah. I think, I think it all makes sense really…Yeah. Yeah, cos like the background, and 
everything yeah, yeah it does make sense” [P9; 520-522] 
 
It is of course necessary to consider how effectively participants’ thoughts about the model were 
accessed via this process, and this is something which will be discussed in more detail in the 
final chapter. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter began with an overview of key characteristics of the final participant sample 
included in the study.  A summary of the analytical process the data were subjected to was 
provided, following which the resultant theoretical model was introduced and discussed in detail 
with reference to the dimensions of and interactions between the major, minor, and sub-
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categories subsumed within the model.  The inclusion of participant quotes demonstrated how 
the model is grounded in the data, and helped to evidence the model’s utility in explaining the 
experiences of compassion to self and others among participants.  The outcome of member 
checking procedures was described.  The following and final chapter will build on the research 
results outlined here through the consideration of the substantive model in the context of extant 
literature, before discussing the strengths and limitations of the current research, along with the 
implications for research and clinical practice. 
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Chapter 
 The final chapter begins with an initial overview of the research findings detailed in 
Chapter 3.  The theoretical model of compassion to self and others among young people who 
have engaged in harmful sexual behaviour (HSB), which emerged from the data analysis, will 
then be discussed in relation to extant literature in the areas of compassion and HSB.  A case will 
be made for the value of the present research and substantive model in terms of extending the 
current literature base and highlighting an important area of clinical interest for future research.  
Strengths and limitations of the study are discussed, leading to a consideration of the 
implications of the findings and directions for future research.  The chapter closes with a self-
reflexive account from the researcher. 
4.2 Summary of Findings 
 The analysis resulted in a substantive theoretical model that sought to explain the range 
and meaning of experiences of compassion for the young people who participated (see Figure 
3.1).  The model subsumed eight major conceptual categories: defining compassion, triggers to 
suffering, enacting compassion, background influences, contextual barriers and catalysts to 
compassion, the reciprocal interaction between self and other, self-to-self relating, and realising 
costs and gains.  Compassion was experienced as a dynamic and relational process influenced by 
a complex interaction between these conceptual categories.  The following section intends to 
explicate key aspects of the model within the context of the existing literature base.  
4.3 Discussion of the Model in Relation to Extant Literature 
4.3.1 Compassion as a meaningful construct.  Participants varied in their familiarity 
with compassion as an abstract construct.  Whilst efforts were taken to establish a shared 
understanding of compassion at the start of each interview, aided by the presentation of two 
definitions, it was of note that only two participants were confident in extending these definitions 
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with their own interpretations.  Furthermore, some participants explicitly stated that they were 
not familiar with the word compassion, or that it was just not part of their everyday language.  In 
these cases, constructs such as kindness and caring – which have been viewed as facets of 
compassion (e.g., Neff, 2003a) – were more relatable for them.  Despite this, participants were 
all able to engage in some discussion around personal experiences of compassion.  This suggests 
that experiences of compassion did not necessarily demand an ability to discuss, at length, 
compassion as an abstract concept.  Rather, compassion could be experienced in the absence of 
familiarity with the construct, and similarly, the concept of compassion could be discussed on a 
hypothetical basis by some, without the presence of specific corresponding personal experiences. 
  It was notable that participants who were better able to engage with discussions around 
compassion as a construct were at the upper end of the demographic age bracket (16-18) and also 
educated to a higher degree – although these two trends naturally correspond.  This may reflect 
the fact that compassion is a relatively abstract concept and, as suggested by some participants, 
uncommon in many people’s everyday language.  It is perhaps therefore less familiar to those of 
a younger age who are less likely to have been exposed to thinking around complex constructs, 
for example through higher education, and be less mature in their abstract reasoning (Hatcher, 
Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, & Richards, 1990). 
The natural advancement of cognitive abilities observed in normal adolescent 
development (Hatcher, Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, & Richards, 1990) could in-part explain why older 
participants found it easier to engage with the topic.  Again, this would lend itself to the 
suggestion that compassion is a complex construct requiring a particular level of abstract 
thinking to be fully articulated.  Further support for this idea was gleaned through the 
observation that participants with an ID and/or ASD appeared to find it harder to engage in 
detailed discussions around the nuances of compassion.  This finding lends itself to the 
conclusions of previous research that moral reasoning abilities and the development of cognitive 
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and affectual capacities central to compassion are positively correlated with factors such as age, 
education, and social opportunity (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983; Comunian & 
Gielen, 2006), and that deficits or delays in the development of such abilities would be expected 
in cases of ‘atypical’ development – such as in the case of ID and ASD (Ashcroft, Jervis, & 
Roberts, 1999; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Danielsson, Henry, Messer & Rönnberg, 2012; Langdon, Clare & Murphy, 2011; Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Smith & Matson, 2010). 
It is however important to note the potential relevance of context in relation to individual 
factors; it is possible that being older, having engaged with higher levels of education, and 
possessing more developed cognitive abilities may each contribute to feeling more confident in 
the interview context, and perhaps therefore feeling better able to engage in discussions around 
compassion with an unfamiliar researcher.  Furthermore, it should not be assumed that 
difficulties in discussing compassion in abstract terms reflect a lack of understanding on the 
participants’ part.  More so, it feels important to recognise that difficulties in discussing the topic 
at an interpersonal level may act as a barrier to the development of a shared understanding of 
compassion and to accessing a reflection of participants’ compassionate experiences through 
dialogue. 
4.3.2 Enacting compassion.  The results indicated that four key stages were involved in 
enacting compassion: recognising suffering, feeling moved [on an emotional level by the 
suffering], wanting to help [the person suffering], and acting with compassion.  These stages 
corroborate and extend the dual-component definition of compassion outlined in the introduction 
chapter (Halifax, 2012) and can also be said to correspond with three of the five aspects 
proposed by Strauss at al. (2016): namely ‘recognition of suffering’, ‘emotional resonance’, and 
‘alleviating suffering’ (which subsumes the current categories of wanting to help and acting with 
compassion).  It should however be noted that Strauss and her colleagues drew on much of 
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Gilbert’s work, amongst others, in developing their definition, and so it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the current model revealed a similar process considering the interview schedule was based 
on Gilbert’s conceptualisation of compassion.  The two additional aspects of compassion 
identified by Strauss et al. were ‘tolerating uncomfortable feelings’ and ‘understanding the 
universality of suffering’ (Neff, 2003a; Gilbert, 2009; Strauss et al., 2016).  Whilst a category 
akin to tolerating difficult feelings did not appear in the present model, participants did speak 
about difficult feelings, such as anger, shame, and sadness, as contextual barriers or catalysts to 
compassion.  This finding could potentially be understood in relation to previous assertions that 
compassion involves a tolerance of uncomfortable feelings (Gilbert, 2009; Strauss et al., 2016), 
in that the degree to which a difficult emotion can be tolerated in the moment, may dictate 
whether compassion is enacted or not – and thus whether the emotion serves as a catalyst or 
barrier.  ‘Understanding the universality of suffering’, however, appears to directly correspond to 
the current model’s category ‘feeling connected’, as one way of feeling connected to others in 
the face of shame was through an understanding that “everyone makes mistakes” [P9; 296].  
Whilst it can therefore be argued that both the additional aspects of compassion identified in the 
earlier literature are indeed represented in the current model, it is of note that neither were 
conceptualised by participants as necessary elements to an act of compassion, without which 
compassion would be unachievable; rather, both the ability to tolerate uncomfortable feelings in 
a given moment and understand the universality of suffering, would be more readily understood 
as contextual catalysts to compassion, either facilitating the stages involved in enacting 
compassion or increasing the gains to be made through feeling connected. 
The four stages outlined above were necessarily preceded by either the self or another’s 
suffering; the triggers to which participants spoke of in terms of making a mistake, suffering a 
loss, or being hurt or betrayed by others.  This provided partial support for Goetz, Keltner and 
Simon-Thomas’s (2010) review of the compassion literature, which identified that the most 
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common antecedents to compassion included pain, sadness and homelessness (raised by 
participants in suffering a loss).  The main focus with regard to the current participants’ own 
suffering was largely on interpersonal loss, which can perhaps be understood in terms of the 
evolutionary function of compassion in facilitating human social connection (Gilbert, 2010a) and 
caregiving/seeking (Bowlby, 1969), which may be sought following an interpersonal loss which 
signals rejection and a subsequent threat of isolation (Gilbert, 2000b).  Participants’ examples of 
other people’s suffering, however, often centred on observable losses, such as those arising from 
physical health problems or deprivation of physical necessities.  Where another’s distress did 
result from interpersonal difficulties, it tended to involve a transgression with a clearly 
identifiable social script, such as bullying.  This indicated that past interpersonal conflicts or 
losses held significance for participants with regard to their own distress, but implied that similar 
events were potentially less recognisable to them in others.  This finding could perhaps reflect 
immature or under-developed capacities central to recognising suffering – such as interpreting 
social cues, information processing, ToM and empathy – amongst some participants.  Such a 
pattern may be explainable by the ‘neurotypical’ developmental trajectory of such abilities, 
which would predict that participants who are younger may be less advanced in these domains 
(Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983; Comunian & Gielen, 2006); but also by the fact 
that 4 participants had either an identified ID or ASD, both of which have been associated with 
difficulties or delays in ToM, empathy, and the interpretation of social cues (Ashcroft, Jervis, & 
Roberts, 1999; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Smith 
& Matson, 2010).  This could have implications in the context of HSB – particularly given the 
prevalence of ID and ASD in this group (Hackett, Phillips, Masson, & Balfe, 2013) – whereby 
suffering may not be readily noticed in the absence of clear physical indicators of distress; such 
as with a passive victim.  Whilst this is merely an implication and not an explicit finding of the 
current research, it may be a point for future exploration in this group. 
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Participants additionally framed ‘making a mistake’ in terms of interpersonal loss, as 
mistakes led to suffering when they resulted in the breakdown of a relationship or involved the 
threat of negative judgement by a valued other.  Within this context, participants spoke of acting 
to repair relational damage or correct mistakes that invited criticism from others.  This finding 
points to the important role interpersonal criticism and perceived social loss play in personal 
suffering, but also in motivating reparative action.  This process is perhaps facilitated through the 
activation of moral emotions such as guilt (Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014) or 
[externalised] shame (Gilbert & Miles, 2002), and would thus fit with evolutionary theories that 
humans are motivated to maintain affiliative social bonds to ensure access to resources through 
enhanced social rank (Gilbert, 2000b), therefore adopting strategies such as heightened self-
monitoring or self-criticism in the face of perceived criticism from others, in order to meet other 
people’s expectations of the self and avoid social rejection (Goss & Allen, 2009).  An interesting 
distinction within this category, however, was the response of participants in the face of ongoing 
repeated negative interpersonal experiences with specific others, such as in the context of 
bullying.  In these cases, distance was sought in favour of reparation, and feelings of anger and 
criticism were evoked.  This finding provides much support for the literature on shame and its 
socially isolating effects (e.g., Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Gilbert & Miles, 2002).  It is plausible that 
the difference observed in these two responses were underpinned by two separate emotional 
experiences, namely shame and guilt (Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014).  This can also be 
understood in terms of attachment theory (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 
1969), in that participants are motivated to respond to ruptures in their significant attachment 
relationships, such as with family or friends, but for those with whom an attachment bond did 
not exist, there was perhaps less need to maintain ties in order to promote personal safety and 
survival. 
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4.3.3 Compassion as a dynamic and relational process.  Whilst compassionate 
enactments were talked about in terms of the four key stages discussed above, the present model 
in fact indicated that compassion involved much more than this, suggesting that compassion was 
experienced by participants as a dynamic and relational process influenced by a broader 
interaction involving background and contextual factors.  Whilst the participant who proclaimed, 
“if you’re kind to me, I’ll be kind to you” [P2; 191] was referring to the relationship between 
himself and an object of compassion – insinuating that previous acts of compassion from another 
would enhance the likelihood of him ‘returning the favour’, this phrase also effectively 
encapsulates the significance of past experiences of compassion from others and how these shape 
future compassionate enactments.  In a transactional-like process, participants felt that the more 
compassionate interpersonal experiences one has, the more likely they will be to act with 
compassion both to themselves and others.  Conversely, an accumulation of negative 
interpersonal experiences damaged the relationship with the self and others via feelings of 
criticism, anger, and shame, and subsequently made it harder for individuals to accept 
compassion or internalise it for themselves.  This pattern of previous interpersonal experiences 
impacting on compassion would lend support to Gilbert’s (2010a) three-systems model, whereby 
increased negative interpersonal experiences would lead to an under-developed soothe-system 
and over-developed threat-system. 
Interestingly, even when participants spoke of difficulties accepting compassion from 
others and showing themselves compassion, they usually characterised themselves as 
compassionate to others.  This finding supported that found by Hermanto and Zuroff (2016), 
who proposed that this may reflect a compulsive caregiving attachment style (Bowlby, 1977, 
cited by Hermanto & Zuroff, 2016).  This may therefore highlight an interaction between 
caregiving and care-seeking mentalities involved in self-compassion (Gilbert, 2000a), in that if 
previous care-seeking, or ‘care-receiving’ has resulted in harm, individuals would be motivated 
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to avoid this mentality in future as a self-protection strategy.  Attempts to provide self-care 
through internalisation of the caregiving mentality may prove futile if the internalised care-
seeking/receiving mentality cannot be accessed, or is experienced as threatening, for this reason. 
Some participants saw compassion as a means of developing relationships, such as 
friendships.  In this sense, it could be understood as functioning to promote favourability, social 
connectedness and rank, and therefore fits with the ideas underpinning social rank theory 
(Gilbert, 2000b).  This finding also supports the notion of an appraisal process involved in 
assessing the costs and gains associated with engaging in an act of compassion, but brings an 
additional perspective to the one offered by Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas’s (2010) 
appraisal model.  They suggested that individuals would be more likely to enact compassion 
when the other was assessed as ‘self-relevant’, which they explained usually meant the 
individual had a pre-existing relationship with or felt close to the other, such that they would 
benefit from their wellbeing.  Whilst appraising the other as a potential friend would not be too 
dissimilar from this idea, in that it frames the act of compassion in terms of social self-benefit, it 
does suggest the potential role of imagined future relationships, not just ones that already exist in 
some form. 
Further support was found for Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas’s (2010) model in the 
current data.  Participants placed importance on knowing the other, and all agreed that a pre-
existing positive relationship would enhance the likelihood of a compassionate act.  Whereas 
Goetz and her colleagues framed their self-relevance appraisal in terms of maximising self-
wellbeing however, current participants spoke more of the importance of trust.  Although 
Goetz’s model only addressed compassion directed towards others, current participants placed 
weight on trust across each directional possibility.  The current category ‘judging worthiness’ 
appeared to correspond to Goetz’s ‘blame’ appraisal, in that judgements that the other was 
undeserving of compassion would prevent compassion being enacted.  Their ‘coping ability’ 
123 
 
 
appraisal is reflected in the current category ‘protecting the self’, in which appraisals that 
determine an act of compassion as posing a risk of threat to the self will lead to compassion 
being avoided.  However, the current research extends Goetz’s notion of coping ability from 
assessments about self-coping, to include appraisals about the other’s ability to cope.  For 
example, if it was decided that the other would not be able to tolerate receipt of compassion 
(based usually on appraisals of the other’s body language and signs of emotional dysregulation, 
such as aggression), then compassion would not be enacted.  This could also be said to link back 
to the emphasis on protecting the self.  It can be argued that these findings again provide support 
for social mentality theory (Gilbert, 2010a), which posits that individuals are engaged in a 
constant process of detecting and decoding social signals, as well interpreting the emotions 
evoked within them as a result of the response in others to their role enactment.  The appraisal 
process identified in this research can be understood from this perspective, in that individuals are 
sensitive to social cues between themselves and others in order to assess which mentalities and 
roles they need to enact. 
Whilst there was clear support for the appraisal process previously outlined by Goetz, 
Keltner and Simon-Thomas (2010), the current model can be said to extend and develop this.  
Whilst their model delineated factors involved in the appraisal process preceding an act of 
compassion, the current model highlights a continued, dynamic appraisal process occurring 
throughout and following compassionate acts.  Whilst enacting compassion, participants spoke 
of the reciprocal interaction between themselves and the object of compassion, and how they 
adjusted their approach depending on their appraisals of the others’ responses, and in turn, their 
own responses to these.  Again, this would fit with social mentality theory for the reasons 
outlined just above.  Following the compassionate act, participants identified how a further 
appraisal process occurred, enabling them to realise the actual costs and gains involved.  These 
were then processed and integrated as learning points, which would then be drawn on in future 
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compassionate experiences as a function of ‘learning from experiences.’  This appraisal process 
demonstrates the complexity of the reciprocal interaction between self, other, and contextual 
factors – including the act of compassion itself – that occurs in a single ‘compassionate moment’ 
and suggests that the process of enacting compassion may be much harder to define and predict 
than other models have previously attempted. 
The identification of an appraisal process suggests a degree of autonomy and agency in 
enacting compassion.  This is important as ‘purist’ evolutional theories have been criticised for 
assuming that emotional (and the resulting behavioural) processes result from innate, 
unconscious systems ‘hard-wired’ in our brains, thus negating human agency (Bandura, 2006).  
The findings here suggested that participants were able to appraise and decide whether or not to 
enact compassion.  Furthermore, perceived agency in itself was fundamental to enacting 
compassion.  Participants felt they would be less likely to act with compassion if they did not 
feel it was their autonomous decision to do so.  Compassion from others was also more 
acceptable when it was perceived to have been an act of the other’s free will.  This supports 
previous assertions around the importance of human agency in experience (Bandura, 1991, 2006) 
and may reflect some participants’ promotion of self-reliance as a self-protection strategy, as 
well as reiterating the significance of trust and perceived genuineness in an act of compassion. 
Of interest is the fact that participants could still notice and experience an emotional response to 
suffering, regardless of the agency they exercised in acting on this, perhaps suggesting that some 
processes involved in compassion – such as processing social cues, affectual empathy, and 
emotional arousal – are more automatic, or develop earlier, than others which are more 
consciously processed or complex.  This may further relate to the observation by some moral 
theorists that moral reasoning is underpinned by both affectual and cognitive processes (e.g., 
Gibbs, 2010), and may subsequently point to a relevant distinction between the internal 
emotional experience of compassion and the cognitive processes underpinning the understanding 
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of and appraising of compassion, both of which warrant further exploration through future 
research.  If indeed compassion calls for a similar ‘co-primacy’ model (Gibbs, 2010), it would be 
reasonable to assume, on the basis of previous developmental research (Decety, 2010), that 
various cognitive and affectual capacities would be involved; each with their own developmental 
trajectory.  This raises an interesting point for discussion; namely whether individuals who have 
not fully developed the cognitive and/or affectual capacities implicit in the experience of 
compassion – such as in the area of ToM and empathy, as is frequently seen in populations with 
ID and ASD (Ashcroft, Jervis, & Roberts, 1999; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) – can truly experience compassion as it has been defined here.  
Moreover, can individuals who have developed some but not all of these capacities still 
experience aspects of compassion?  Whilst the findings from the current research indicated that 
some participants – particularly those who were younger and/or presented with developmental 
difficulties associated with ID or ASD – appeared to struggle to cognitively understand 
compassion as an abstract concept, all participants could reflect to some degree on personal 
experiences of compassion.  Previous developmental research indicates that humans can detect 
distress in another, and subsequently become distressed themselves, from birth (Dondi, Simion 
& Caltran, 1999).  This would suggest that there may be an innate human capacity to experience 
at least some of the affectual processes involved in compassion.  In this sense, there may well be 
an argument for an experiential continuum, whereby compassion is experienced to varying 
degrees dependent on the level to which central capacities have developed in the individual (i.e., 
the inherent ability of the individual to experience compassion), as well as the contextual barriers 
and catalysts to compassion present in a given context (i.e., the momentary likelihood that 
compassion will be experienced).  Further research would be needed to explore the utility of this 
idea, although it would first be crucial to determine exactly what is meant by ‘compassion’ and 
decide whether this does in fact differ from related constructs such as empathy and kindness. 
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 4.3.3.1 The importance of background influences.  Participants reflected on how 
learning from past interpersonal encounters had affected their perception and experience of 
compassion and how they reported enacting compassion.  This included specific compassionate 
(or uncompassionate) acts from others, but also their ‘upbringing’ in terms of the general 
interpersonal dynamics within the familial (or care) system participants were raised in.  This 
finding provides support for much of the existing literature on compassion, which highlights the 
importance of early interpersonal experiences, particularly in the context of key attachment 
relationships, in shaping caregiving and care-seeking behaviours (Bowlby, 1969; Gilbert, 2010a; 
Gilbert & Irons, 2009).  The fact that participants associated previous negative experiences with 
others – usually resulting in some form of social rejection – with difficulties in expressing or 
receiving compassion, appears to fit with Gilbert and Irons’ (2009) model of shame, whereby 
experiences of shaming, for example through criticism or bullying, lead to feelings of 
devaluation by others.  Such feelings can then be attributed to external threats and lead to 
devaluation of others, or may be internalised and attributed to the self, leading to self-
devaluation.  Devaluation of others and/or the self may then inhibit compassion through judging 
the self or other to be unworthy of receiving it.  This may be further confounded by difficulties 
enacting compassion, experienced by individuals who have had a lack of compassionate or 
‘soothing’ experiences from key attachment figures from which to securely develop and 
internalise functional caregiving and care-seeking behaviours, such as compassion (Ainsworth, 
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1969; Gilbert, 2010a; Gilbert & Irons, 2009;).  This 
finding therefore provides further support for the argument of a close link between shame and 
compassion (Gilbert, 2010a). 
The people who participants associated with compassionate acts were generally 
attachment figures such as parents, peers, teachers, or club leaders, again highlighting the likely 
significance of attachment relationships in modelling compassion (Bowlby, 1969; Gilbert, 
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2010a).  Participants’ examples of their own compassionate acts tended to reflect the types of 
compassionate experiences they reported from others.  Whilst this may provide further evidence 
for the development of caregiving/seeking through the attachment system (Bowlby, 1969; 
Gilbert, 2010a), this may also reflect participants’ own definitions of compassion.  For example, 
if participants’ understood compassion as giving advice, it would follow that their examples of 
both compassion to and from others and the self may centre on giving or receiving advice. 
 Possible gender differences observed by some participants suggested that compassion 
may be expressed differently by men and women.  Whilst most agreed that gender alone did not 
determine the ability to be compassionate, there were suggestions that men may find it harder to 
openly provide emotional support, which seemed to link to social prescriptions around how men 
and women ought to behave, such as males needing to be “the hard guy” [P3; 136].  This finding 
relates to the influence of gender roles on experiences of shame and anger that have been noted 
in the existing literature (e.g., Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Gilligan, 2003), whereby influences 
associated with social and cultural norms and group ecologies mean that hostile social 
environments tend to evoke gender identities such as the ‘fearless’ male.  For young people who 
have been repeatedly exposed to hostile environments this may be particularly pertinent and 
linked to the development of self-protection strategies such as concealing negative affect or 
promoting self-reliance, as was observed for several participants in the present study.  Such 
social identities may present a barrier to compassion, and it may be fruitful for future research to 
consider the association, if any, between various gendered social identities and expressions of 
compassion, as this may go some way to explaining why some gender differences have been 
observed for related experiences such as shame and self-criticism (Koestner, Zuroff, & Powers, 
1991; Shahar, Blatt, Zuroff, Kupermine, & Leadbeater). 
Some participants reflected on compassion being a quality that some people ‘just had’.  In 
this sense, compassion was framed as a trait-like feature, supporting Neff’s (2003a, 2003b) view 
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that it is something which develops in early childhood and remains relatively stable.  However, 
all participants spoke about specific background and contextual factors which they felt would 
inhibit or enhance compassion in a given moment, supporting much of the evolutionary theory, 
which assumes compassion as both trait- and state-like in different respects (Goetz, Keltner, & 
Simon-Thomas, 2010).  The fact that some participants felt their ability (or inability) to be 
compassionate was simply a function of ‘who they are’, may suggest that the apparent complex 
interaction of factors influencing compassion evident through the analysis may not be 
consciously processed by some young people.  Alternatively, this may reflect a pattern of 
‘learned helplessness’ whereby young people have come to learn that they cannot exert control 
over their environment, often as a result of negative interpersonal experiences where they have 
been unable to exercise personal agency, such as being victimised through abuse (Kelley, 2009) 
or controlled under the CJS (van der Helm, Klapwijk, Stams, & van der Laan, 2009).  
Experiences such as this may also go some way to explaining why participants placed such an 
emphasis on perceiving a sense of agency in compassion. 
4.3.3.2 Contextual barriers and catalysts to compassion.  Several contextual factors 
served as barriers or catalysts to compassion, all of which could be influenced by the background 
factors discussed above.  This was a key finding of the current research, as it suggested that 
compassion is a dynamic and context-dependent experience, not simply an inherent individual 
characteristic.  Moments where there was the potential for compassion appeared to be influenced 
heavily by both the state of mind of the individual and of the object of compassion.  Compassion 
appeared to be most likely when the individual was in a positive state of mind and the other was 
upset (but not angry).  This finding related to the reciprocal interaction between self and other, 
during which an ongoing process of appraising and responding occurred, including appraising 
contextual factors such as state of mind, and therefore can be understood in the context of social 
mentality theory (Gilbert, 2000a), which, as discussed earlier, notes the ongoing process of 
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detecting and decoding social signals in social encounters, and facilitates access to various social 
roles dependent on state of mind. 
Specific beliefs and attitudes about compassion, such as compassion being weak or 
rendering the self vulnerable, or self-compassion being boastful, were framed as barriers to 
compassion.  This finding fits with the existing literature on fears of compassion (Gilbert, 
McEwan, Matos, & Rivis, 2011), which suggests that there exist social and cultural scripts that 
may serve to inhibit compassion in order to promote a positive social image (i.e., not appear self-
indulgent or selfish and subsequently invite social criticism or rejection).  From this perspective, 
a belief about compassion being weak may have resulted from an accumulation of past negative 
interpersonal experiences, which now serves to protect the individual by inhibiting social 
connection, which could render them vulnerable to further social attacks.  Promoting self-
protection was a fundamental aspect of the current model and several contextual factors 
influencing compassion could also be said to relate to protecting-the-self.  Knowing the other 
was important in terms of knowing how to help – and therefore minimising the threat to the self 
through misjudging a compassionate act – but also in terms of being able to trust the other.  
Again, trust promoted self-protection by minimising the risk of betrayal or humiliation.  The 
importance of trust extended to relationships with professionals and the importance of perceived 
genuineness of compassion, which in turn links to the perception that the other has exerted 
agency in deciding to help.  Each of these findings suggest that participants were sensitive to 
signals that the other had their best interests at heart, or that an act of compassion involving them 
would not present a major social threat to the self.  Again, this provides support for Gilbert’s 
(2010a) work on the compassionate mind, whereby a threat response (including safety seeking) 
will always be prioritised in the first instance, and is likely to be over-developed and therefore 
over-stimulated for individuals who have been exposed to multiple adverse interpersonal 
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encounters, such as those common in a population of young people who go on to engage in HSB 
(Ward, McCormack & Hudson, 2002). 
 4.3.3.2.1 The role of anger, shame, and self-criticism.  The findings highlighted a 
potential discrepancy regarding the link between anger, shame, self-criticism, and self-
compassion.  In some cases, participants spoke of seeking distance from others when angry or 
shamed, whereas one participant described how self-compassion could be helpful following 
incidents of criticism or shame.  The fact that in some cases participants did not use the language 
‘shame’ and ‘criticism’ and it was instead inferred by the researcher, may mean that subjective 
misinterpretations were made.  This may, however, also point to the complex nature of the self-
conscious and affiliative emotions, in which case this would provide support for the need to 
further investigate these through research.  Nevertheless, these findings can be understood within 
the existing literature. Shame has been associated with impulses to hide and self-isolate 
(Gilligan, 2003) in order to ‘save face’ and avoid further social rejection/condemnation (Gilbert 
& Miles, 2002).  It is also thought that shame can lead to anger and violence, as intolerable 
internal judgements about self-worthlessness are defended against through externalisation 
(Gilligan, 2003).  The example of employing self-compassion in the face of shame or self-
criticism to get through a difficult experience is supported by the existing literature that 
underpins CFT, of which this is the central tenet.  It is of note that this particular young person 
framed her ability to use self-compassion at these times as a result of internalising the 
compassion she had received from others, again highlighting the significance of previous 
interpersonal relationships, including attachment relationships, and experiences of having felt 
‘safe’ and ‘soothed’ by a trusted other (Bowlby, 1969; Gilbert, 2010a), as well as the link 
between inter- and intra-personal experiences of compassion – as suggested by social mentality 
theory (Gilbert, 2000a). 
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Feeling critical of the self or other inhibited compassion through its association with 
judging the worthiness of the object of compassion.  This can be understood in terms of the close 
fusion between criticism and shame, whereby criticism of others may serve to degrade their 
social status and in turn boost the status or rank of the self as in social rank theory (Gilbert, 
2000b), or where self-criticism acts as a mechanism through which internalised shaming occurs 
(Gilbert & Irons, 2009), both of which may be underpinned by appraisals of the object of 
compassion as undeserving (Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas, 2010). 
4.3.3.3 Self-compassion.  Participants framed self-compassion as an internalisation of 
compassion.  This provides support for social mentality theory (Gilbert, 2000a) and the 
evolutional and attachment models underpinning Gilbert’s three-systems theory (2010a), in that 
relational experiences of compassion to/from others were enacted to the self.  This suggests that 
the systems involved in relating to others in this way can be co-opted for the self, and that their 
function will be influenced by earlier relational experiences with others (such as key attachment 
figures).  It should, however, be highlighted that in the current study, self-compassion was 
defined for participants as compassion directed to the self, and this may therefore have 
influenced the fact that self-compassion was conceptualised in this way. 
Some participants described how previous critical and shaming interpersonal experiences 
were also internalised through self-to-self relating.  This pattern may be akin to the concept of 
internalised shame (Gilbert & Miles, 2002), whereby external threats (being criticised, rejected 
by others) become internal threats (thinking self-critically, self-shaming), and result in powerful 
feelings of shame (Gilbert & Irons, 2009).  Several participants expressed their view that self-
compassion, for them, felt too hard because of their negative self-view.  In this study, 
participants generally seemed to frame self-criticism and shame as clear barriers to compassion.  
The importance of self-reflection, however, was viewed by participants as an aspect of being 
kind to the self, facilitating the ability to make appraisals and learn from the experience of 
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making a mistake.  Interestingly, self-reflection was often facilitated by ‘space’ and thus distance 
from others, which appeared to contradict the emphasis placed in self-compassion definitions on 
social connectedness in preference to isolation (Neff, 2003a).  This may, however, reflect a 
distinction between ‘distance’ and ‘isolation’ whereby the difference comes down to the 
individual’s degree of agency in making the choice to be close to or distant from others. 
Whilst the current research did not reveal explicit data to further unpick what is likely to 
be a complex relationship between shame and self-compassion, the findings did appear to 
support existing theories of a theoretical relationship between the two (Gilbert, 2010a; Gilligan, 
2003).  It will be important for future research to continue to explore the directionality of this 
relationship in more detail. 
4.3.4 Compassion and Harmful Sexual Behaviour.  Only three participants referred to 
their HSB in interview, and in each case only passing reference was made.  The fact that it was 
not raised in detail by anyone, despite the topic area and the fact that participants were aware of 
the researcher’s interest in HSB, may speak to the degree of shame experienced by participants 
as a result of their harmful behaviour and the societal stigma attached to it (McAlinden, 2005).  
Those who did refer to their offences, generally framed them as a mistake which led to their 
personal suffering.  Although one participant acknowledged the potential impact of his actions 
on his victims, he did so in a way that absolved himself from intentionality.  The same 
participant spoke evocatively of his personal experiences of interpersonal trauma, including 
being subjected to ongoing taunting, humiliation, and violence, by peers.  Without wishing to 
make too great a leap, it is conceivable that shame may play a role here in limiting victim-
empathy, given that shame is associated with powerful feelings of worthlessness, defended 
against by bolstering the self and externalising blame (Gilligan, 2003).  This could be an 
interesting point for future research.  Alternatively, the apparent lack of victim-empathy and 
focus on self-suffering could reflect an under-developed ToM and capacity to empathise, perhaps 
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associated with a more organic aetiology such as ID or ASD (Ashcroft, Jervis, & Roberts, 1999; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), or linked to immature 
development due to age (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983; Comunian & Gielen, 
2006).  Interestingly, however, two of the three participants who spoke of their HSB were the 
two eldest of the group, neither of whom had known developmental difficulties, such as might be 
associated with ID or ASD.  Although tentative, this may instead suggest an alternative 
explanation for delayed development of specific empathic capacities in this group; for example, 
changes or impairments in psychosocial- and neuro-development that can result from early 
interpersonal trauma (Creeden, 2004).  Such a link would support Gilbert’s (2010a) assertion of 
the importance of secure early attachment relationships in developing compassion – and perhaps 
also the fundamental cognitive and affectual processes that underpin compassionate experiences. 
Another possible point for future studies to explore would be the role of care- and 
compassion-seeking in HSB.  It was clear from some participants that the desire to feel love and 
connection with another was significant for them, and it may therefore be plausible that they 
attempted to seek closeness through inappropriate means – such as might be formulated within 
the Good Lives Model (Ward, 2002).  Alternatively, feelings of hurt and rejection experienced as 
a result of previous interpersonal trauma and exacerbated by the void of a romantic relationship, 
may lead to intolerable feelings of shame, which are then projected onto subsequent victims.  
Clearly, not enough data in explicit relation to HSB was gleaned in this research to make 
assertions about the role of shame and compassion in HSB, but the findings do suggest that these 
relationships may exist and certainly warrant further investigation. 
4.4 Strengths and Limitations 
This study was the first – to the researcher’s knowledge – to explore compassion among 
young people who have engaged in HSB.  Despite increasing recognition that many sexual 
offences are committed by children and young people, HSB is an under-researched and under-
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resourced area (Bernardo’s, 2016).  It is therefore a strength of the current study that it may 
provide a platform from which to direct further interest and research in a clinically important 
domain.  Furthermore, the existing literature base surrounding compassion has adopted 
predominantly quantitative approaches, utilising questionnaire-based studies to quantify the 
‘level’ of compassion self-reported by an individual over a specified time-period.  The present 
study not only enriches extant literature through the acquisition of qualitative data that explores 
the meaning and lived experience of compassion to the population of interest, but the results also 
highlight some potential flaws with a quantitative approach to compassion research that ought to 
be paid due consideration (see 4.5.1). 
Several steps have been taken in the current research to enhance trustworthiness.  
Credibility (Guba, 1981) was evidenced through the use of a semi-structured interview tool that 
was piloted prior to the research.  ‘Negative case sampling’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was also 
employed in the sense that conflicting and contradicting incidences within the data were 
considered and categories formed and reformed until the resultant model accounted for all the 
available data.  Member checks (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) were undertaken and peer scrutiny was 
achieved through the supervision of two qualified clinical psychologists with substantial research 
experience.  Furthermore, a reflexive journal (Appendix N) was kept by the researcher 
throughout the research process in order to maintain a reflective commentary for the purposes of 
tracing their progressive subjectivity through data collection and analysis (Guba & Lincoln, 
1989).  It is difficult for researchers to make assertions about transferability, given that they can 
only comment on their experience of the ‘sending’ context and not the receiving (Shenton, 
2004).  It is therefore suggested that the researcher make the context of their research explicit, in 
order for readers to make their own judgements about transferability (Guba, 1981).  Contextual 
details of the current research are outlined in Chapter Two and discussed in two sections below 
(4.4.1 & 4.6).  It should, however, be noted that the intention of the current research was not to 
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develop a model that is transferable to other populations and/or contexts.  What was sought in 
this case was a model to explain the idiosyncratic experiences of compassion as described by 
participants at the time of interview, and that is what has been offered.  It may however prove 
fruitful for future researchers to compare new data to the findings from this research to gain 
further insight into the nuances and intricacies between multiple perspectives of compassion. 
The inclusion of a detailed overview of the research design and implementation, data 
collection methods, and reflexive discussion of the research process (see below) go some way to 
illustrating the dependability of the research (Shenton, 2004).  Furthermore, it has been argued 
that steps taken to ensure credibility can also promote dependability due to the close nature of 
these two criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Again, the reflective commentary provided below 
helps to satisfy confirmability (Shenton, 2004).  In addition to the criteria addressed above, other 
guidelines for qualitative research (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme, 2017; Twining, Heller, 
Nussbaum, & Tsai, 2017) have highlighted the need to be clear about the researcher’s 
epistemological position, and offer a reasoned argument for the selected methodology and why it 
is appropriate in addressing the research question.  Furthermore, full details of the data collection 
and analysis process should be offered in order to contribute to “a chain of evidence” 
(Baskarada, 2014, p.10), all of which have been provided within the current study. 
It is worthy of note that much of the existing literature in the area of compassion has 
recruited university students, or other non-clinical populations to assess and measure compassion 
– including studies on which assessment tools are based.  If we are to fully understand the 
potential clinical utility of compassion-focused interventions and their impact on shame and 
compassion, or to develop appropriate approaches to the assessment of these emotions, it is 
important to understand the meaning and relevance of these constructs for the clinical 
populations for whom they are intended.  The current study explored compassion with a socially 
disadvantaged population of clinical interest.  The results indicated that although this group 
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experience compassion to self and others, the word ‘compassion’ can be an unfamiliar and 
problematic term.  Difficulties in developing a shared language around compassion may act as a 
barrier to accessing credible information in research, and may also present issues for 
interventions that rely on the discussion of abstract concepts such as compassion and shame – 
such as CFT (Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b). 
It is, however, necessary to acknowledge some potential limitations to the current 
research.  In defining compassion, some conceptualisation difficulties were evident.  Most 
participants were unable to expand on the definitions of compassion offered by the researcher, 
reflecting their unfamiliarity with the term compassion.  However, participants were still able to 
offer personal examples of experiences of compassion to and from self and others.  This may 
suggest that a familiarity with and ability to define compassion as an abstract term is not a 
prerequisite for first-hand experiences of compassion, which would also be supported by the idea 
that compassionate experiences develop in early infancy through the attachment relationship 
with a caregiver (Gilbert, 2010a), before the ability to articulate experience is possible.  What 
this does highlight is the potential difficulty in researching experiences of compassion through an 
interview process.  Being able to reflect on and talk about compassion seems to involve a 
different capacity than that required to enact compassion to self and others.  It may therefore be 
beneficial to consider alternative research methods for exploring this domain. 
Linked to some participants’ unfamiliarity with the word compassion, in some cases 
alternative language was agreed and adopted in interviews.  In these cases, terms such as 
kindness and caring represented more meaningful constructs for participants.  It could therefore 
be argued that these interviews subsequently explored the constructs of kindness and caring, 
rather than compassion.  It must however be noted that despite this, the current model revealed 
processes involved in the enactment of compassion and definitional elements of compassion that 
corroborated much of the current literature in the area.  It is also worth highlighting the 
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difficulties in distinguishing discretely between the affiliative emotions such as kindness, love, 
compassion, altruism, and caring, that have already been observed by others (Goetz, Keltner and 
Simon-Thomas, 2010). 
 The final participant number of nine was a reasonable one given the qualitative nature of 
the research and the subsequent collection of a rich data set (Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott, 2015).  
The difficulty proclaiming theoretical saturation of categories (highlighted in the previous 
chapter), however, presents a challenge in assessing whether nine was an adequate number to 
conclude that the resultant theoretical model was fully saturated in this case.  This is perhaps not 
unusual given that the concept of saturation is in itself subjective (Charmaz, 2014; Guest, Bunce, 
& Johnson, 2006).  Difficulties with recruitment meant that nine was the largest feasible 
participant size within the relative time constraints.  Developing links with services and 
encouraging staff to review their caseloads for potential participants was time consuming.  
Furthermore, it was noted that a number of staff appeared to make their own judgement on 
whether a young person would want to engage with the research, and in some cases, this 
prevented them from approaching young people.  This is a potential barrier that would be worth 
considering in future studies with this population and/or service. 
 As was highlighted earlier, the fact that many of the findings corroborated Gilbert’s work 
on the compassionate mind (2010a) is perhaps unsurprising given that the interview schedule 
was built on his tri-directional social mentality theory of compassion.  It must also be noted that 
although a full literature review was conducted following data analysis to promote the 
independence and openness of the analysis (Charmaz, 2006, 2014), the researcher did have some 
existing knowledge of the evolutionary theory of compassion.  This is likely to have influenced 
the analysis in terms of the sensitising concepts (Charmaz, 2014) adopted by the researcher.  
However, attempts were made to limit this through self-reflexive practices such as memo and 
journal writing, and transparency of reporting within this text.  Given the level of corroboration 
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the current study provides for the existing literature-base, it is of great importance that the 
findings here also point beyond these, to the complex interaction between a number of 
background and contextual factors in any experience of compassion.  It is particularly worthy of 
note that the reciprocal interaction between self and the object of compassion (self or other) is a 
dynamic process, which continues to shape compassionate enactments throughout and after they 
happen. 
 4.4.1 Impact of the interview context.  In-line with the constructivist paradigm of the 
present study, it is important to consider contextual factors that may have contributed to or 
shaped the results (Charmaz, 2006, 2014).  Participants were each invited to comment on the 
interview process for them, but interestingly none chose to offer much feedback.  It was however 
the researcher’s sense that several participants were conscious of wanting to give the ‘right’ 
answers, with some needing considerable encouragement to be able to contribute to the 
interview, which may also explain the lack of feedback offered in relation to the interview 
process.  This is perhaps unsurprising when considering that interviews were undertaken through 
the YOS – a service through which young people were usually accustomed to conversations 
around right and wrong.  Additionally, adolescents are of an age where they frequently find 
themselves in situational contexts where there is a clear power imbalance and the figure in 
authority holds the ‘correct answers’, such as in educational establishments.  Participants may 
have held back in their responses as a submissive self-protection strategy (i.e., to say nothing 
would be better than to say the wrong thing and invite criticism), which research suggests may 
be particularly likely in contexts where the other – in this case the researcher – is perceived as 
more powerful (Gilbert & Irons, 2009).  This may therefore have limited the extent to which the 
resultant model reflects the full array of social realities and multiple truths experienced by 
participants. 
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Feedback from YOS workers also suggested that some young people had been worried 
that the interview would focus directly on their HSB.  This concern could be understood in 
relation to the wider literature around stigmatisation (Goffman, 1968) and the proposed nature of 
shame in social functioning (Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Gilbert & Miles, 2002; Gilligan, 2003).  If 
shame is such a powerful emotion, associated with rejection, humiliation, and social 
condemnation, participants may have been motivated to avoid discussions around behaviours 
that were likely to be socially denounced by others.  To promote engagement and avoid 
breaching ethical conduct, the decision was taken not to question participants directly about their 
HSB.  Most participants did not volunteer information about their offences and those who did 
refer to them, did so briefly.  It would be beneficial for future research in this domain to consider 
how a more direct exploration of the role of compassion and shame in HSB might be facilitated 
whilst maintaining ethical values.  Some suggestions are offered in section 4.5.2. 
 Efforts were taken to avoid the possible contextual factors highlighted above impacting 
on the results and subsequent trustworthiness of the study.  Ethical and procedural 
considerations, such as reminding participants that there are no right or wrong answers and 
building rapport to help them feel more comfortable in the interview process, were employed in 
an attempt to limit threat-based responses, such as shame or anxiety, from interfering with 
participants’ ability and motivation to engage with the interview process.  Nevertheless, it 
remains likely that the interview context will have played a role in how data were accessed and 
analysed, and should therefore be held in mind as a likely influential factor – and potential 
barrier – in obtaining a detailed reflection of participants’ understanding and experiences of 
compassion in this setting. 
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4.5 Implications of the Study 
 Important implications in the context of both clinical and research applications can be 
drawn from this research.  These shall be addressed in turn below before some suggestions for 
future research are offered. 
4.5.1 Clinical implications.  The results suggested that for participants, trust was an 
important precursor to compassion.  A lack of trust, or the perceived disingenuousness of 
another, acted as a contextual barrier to a potential compassionate experience, perhaps through 
the activation of threat-based self-protection strategies, which in some cases evoked anger, 
possibly underpinned by internalised shame.  This finding has important implications for 
clinicians who wish to work with this population.  It is likely that the development of trust is 
fundamental to working with this group, who are likely to have learnt from past experiences that 
others are untrustworthy and will cause them harm.  Particular focus should be drawn to the 
relationship between young person and practitioner and how trust issues might be overcome, 
such as by being consistent, transparent, and dependable, and remaining sensitive to the 
likelihood that shame-reactions may be easily triggered.  Involving trusted others, such as 
family, friends, teachers, etc., in the process of intervention may also be a way of addressing this 
issue.  This notion would lend further support to the multi-systemic and multi-level approaches 
to interventions currently recommended for this group. 
The findings support previous research suggesting that this population of young people 
have often had negative early interpersonal experiences involving rejection and criticism.  This is 
important from a clinical perspective as it speaks to the likelihood that young people will be 
significantly impacted by internalised shame, as a result of the devastating impact of external 
threats to the self, experienced through rejection by significant others – including key attachment 
relationships – which will have ultimately affected the relationship with the self and the ability to 
form trusting relationships with authoritative others in future.  Clinicians should be aware that 
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this group of young people are likely to be very high in shame and self-criticism, and this may 
play out through anger directed towards potential attachment figures (including clinicians) as a 
self-protection strategy.  Whilst further research into the complex relationship between 
compassion and shame amongst this group will be needed in order to fully direct interventions, it 
is worth noting that developing self-compassion is likely to be difficult for those young people 
high in shame.  Hermanto and Zuroff (2016) suggested that in such cases, concentration be 
focused on the other-directed caregiving and care-seeking behaviours which may be more 
tolerable for the individual, because, they reasoned, social mentality theory suggests that self-
caring behaviour should follow on as a bi-product of this. 
It may be important to also consider developmental perspectives when determining 
appropriate interventions.  In particular, young people may not have developed the specific 
cognitive and affectual capacities demanded for a sophisticated understanding and experiencing 
of compassion to self and others.  This may be for a number of reasons, including organic factors 
such as age or the presence of neurodevelopmental disorders like ID and ASD, or the young 
person’s neurodevelopment may have been affected by social and environmental factors such as 
interpersonal abuse or neglect.  Consideration should be paid to the likelihood that young people 
can further develop capacities such as ToM, empathy, and emotion regulation.  In cases where 
such capacities can be developed, interventions would benefit from sequencing to allow this to 
happen prior to specific compassion-focussed interventions being implemented.  In cases where 
these capacities are likely to remain delayed or immature, compassion-focused interventions may 
be misplaced and unrealistic.  Instead, efforts may be more helpfully focused on interventions 
which capitalise on the factors associated with less mature moral reasoning; such as clarification 
of ‘right and wrong’ as determined by unilateral authority (Gibbs, 2010).  There may however 
remain some argument for the implementation of experiential compassion-focused exercises, 
such as self-soothing practices.  It could be argued that even in the absence of the cognitive 
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capacity to fully understand compassion or effectively perspective take, developing the soothe-
system through experiential means may still enhance the affectual aspects of compassion, in turn 
moderating threat-based negative emotions such as anger and shame (Gilbert, 2010a). 
4.5.2 Research implications and future directions.  This study highlighted some 
potential methodological flaws to the quantitative approach currently adopted by much of the 
existing research on compassion.  Firstly, the results of this study suggest that compassion is 
experienced by this group as a dynamic and relational process influenced by contextual factors.  
This would seem to suggest that compassionate experiences are context-dependent and 
changeable from moment to moment, raising clear limitations with any approach that seeks to 
measure a stable ‘level’ of compassion experienced over time and independent of context.  
Furthermore, this finding may present a challenge to some of the existing literature, which 
frames compassion, both to self and others, as a trait-like emotion and something to be cultivated 
(e.g. Neff, 2003a). 
Additionally, the findings suggested that whilst participants could each relay personal 
experiences of compassion, there were apparent differences between them in their ability to 
discuss in detail compassion as an abstract concept.  These differences appeared to reflect 
participants’ varying cognitive abilities associated with their age, level of education, and the 
presence or absence of an intellectual disability.  This raises important implications for the use of 
self-report measures to explore compassion in this group, and people of varying cognitive 
abilities in general; if participants have difficulty in comprehending compassion as an abstract 
concept, or struggle with any of the language surrounding compassion, it may compromise their 
ability to accurately self-report their experience of compassion through a forced-choice 
questionnaire.  It is suggested that there would be great benefit in conducting further research 
with the aim of developing a shared language for compassion, that is meaningful across a wide 
span of populations and not just to the academic field. 
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It was noted that the use of interviews in this context may have presented a barrier to data 
collection in that some participants may have struggled to fully articulate their experiences of 
compassion due to a lack of familiarity with the term compassion as an abstract concept.  It may 
therefore be fruitful for future research to consider additional, creative ways that may enable 
participants to better share their compassionate experiences, or to also include interviews with 
others who know the young person – such as families and professionals.  It has been 
acknowledged that factors associated with interview context, such as the presence of power 
differentials, may have led to some participants withholding or editing their contributions 
through fear of ‘getting it wrong.’  Future research with this population may seek to limit this by 
conducting interviews over several meetings – and thereby prolonging the time in which the 
young person can become familiar with and develop trust with the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Shenton, 2004).  They may also choose to recruit outside of criminal justice agencies to 
avoid association with punitive systems.  A further alternative would be for interviews to be 
conducted by professionals who are already working with the young people, such as their YOS 
caseworkers. 
Whilst the current findings appear to suggest a link between shame, self-criticism, anger, 
and compassion, as has been highlighted in much of the previous literature (Gilbert, 2005; 
Gilbert, 2010a; Gilbert & Irons, 2009; Gilbert & Miles, 2002; Gilligan, 2003), the complex 
relationship between these emotions, or constructs, remains little known.  This research raised 
the question of whether self-compassion does in fact moderate shame, or whether shame instead 
becomes a contextual barrier to the enactment of (self-)compassion.  There is currently little 
evidence to suggest whether this relationship is uni- or bi-directional, or involves the kind of 
reciprocal interaction that has been observed by so many of the factors contributing to 
compassion in this research.  The challenge of how to further investigate this matter remains for 
future researchers.  As a final point here, whilst the substantive model constructed through the 
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analysis is not intended to be ‘generalisable’ – in the positivist sense – to other populations or 
contexts, the categories observed may provide a useful basis from which to structure further 
research aiming to explore the meaning and experiences of compassion to self and others among 
young people who have engaged in HSB, across alternative contexts, as well as for other 
populations 
4.6 Researcher Reflexivity 
 My decision to conduct research in this area stems from a longstanding interest in the 
nature of harmful behaviour and my experience of working with forensic populations around 
risk.  I have always been intrigued by the apparent dichotomy between punishment and 
rehabilitation that exists within the ethos of services in the Criminal Justice System (CJS), and 
curious about the role of shame within this process.  When I began my clinical training in 2014, I 
first came across the work of Gilbert (2010a) and the compassionate mind.  Drawing on aspects 
of CFT in my clinical work at the time, I became curious about the clinical utility of compassion-
focused interventions for forensic populations, and wondered about the feasibility of undertaking 
such work with individuals who were actively involved with the CJS and therefore caught within 
a system arguably designed to evoke shame in the name of desistance (McAlinden, 2005).  A 
seed was planted.  Over the coming months I familiarised myself with some of the literature on 
compassion, paying specific attention to the application of such theory to forensic groups, and 
was surprised to find there was relatively little published, aside from the odd study reporting on 
the efficacy of compassion-focused interventions for populations who had offended.  I was even 
more surprised to find little published research exploring compassion as a construct.  Most of the 
literature I came across seemed to frame compassion – both to self and others – as a relatively 
objective and stable concept, which could therefore be meaningfully measured through the 
administration of a standardised self-report questionnaire.  From this stemmed my idea for the 
current research. 
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It seemed to me that the literature base on compassion would not only be greatly 
enhanced by a qualitative exploration of the meaning of compassion to a population of clinical 
interest, but this would also present an opportunity to explore compassion within a group for 
whom shame, and therefore compassion, were likely to be important constructs.  Undertaking 
research in this area could pave the way for further research and interest, perhaps even 
eventually leading to enhanced knowledge and direction on which to develop clinical 
interventions.  I therefore entered this research with some grounding in the existing literature, 
and could not be said to have conducted participant interviews from a complete blank slate.  As I 
have mentioned previously, I adopted CGT for several reasons, but a significant one was its 
acknowledgment that I would be bringing my own subjectivity to the construction of knowledge.  
In addition to my previous reading of the compassion literature, I of course have my own 
personal experiences and understanding of (self-)compassion.  Partly, these experiences 
informed my decision to explore this area.  I, for example, have experienced difficulty when 
trying to complete a self-report measure of compassion myself; I have found it both a challenge 
to condense my experience across time to a single numerical value, and have also experienced a 
strong internal urge to moderate my answers in-line with my own beliefs around modesty and 
self-indulgence.  Whilst it is unlikely that I will have eradicated all influence of my subjective 
experience from my interpretation of participant data, it was important for me to reflect on this 
potential throughout the research and try to avoid it where possible.  The use of memos and 
reflective journaling where fundamental to this process. 
Conducting the interviews with young people was a rewarding experience.  After the 
time and effort expended in developing links in the corresponding YOSs and having many 
conversations with staff there about the potential barriers to interviewing participants, I had 
almost begun to lose hope that this research was even possible.  Once the ball was rolling, 
however, I think both myself and YOS staff were surprised at the degree to which most 
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participants engaged.  There is a lesson here, I think, in the danger of our presumptions about the 
abilities or motivations of others getting in the way of just asking a question.  It is easy to see 
how this can prevent research from being undertaken with hard-to-reach groups, and may even 
contribute to why HSB is such an under-researched area currently. 
Of course, there were some young people who expressed they did not wish to engage, as 
was their prerogative, but most who were asked did want to take part, and were able to offer 
some great insight into their experiences.  It must be acknowledged that some interviews felt 
easier than others.  For some young people, short, few-word responses meant that I prompted a 
lot more in my questioning, and I did wonder at times whether this led to more of a directive 
approach, rather than the open one aimed for in CGT (Charmaz, 2014).  Whilst I tried to remain 
aware of this and limit it to the best of my ability, I certainly felt a pull in some interviews to 
take on more of an encouraging and reassuring role, perhaps in the process becoming slightly 
leading in my questioning.  It is also important to note the challenge it was during some 
interviews to remain in the ‘researcher’ role, and not instead slip into my ‘Trainee Psychologist’ 
clinical role, whereby interviewing takes an entirely different shape.  Trying to hold this in mind 
was particularly relevant when participants spoke about incredibly difficult interpersonal 
experiences and the impact these had for them.  Again, remaining self-reflexive and providing an 
honest account of these issues here is important in the promotion of trustworthiness. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 This study was the first – to the researcher’s knowledge – to explore the meaning and 
experience of compassion to self and others among young people who have engaged in HSB.  
The results indicated that whilst all participants could identify personal experiences of 
compassion, some were unfamiliar with the word ‘compassion’ and its definition in abstract 
terms.  Compassionate enactments were influenced by a complex interaction between 
background and contextual factors.  Whilst the specific stages in enacting compassion and many 
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of the factors influencing this supported much of the current literature in this area, the present 
results suggested that compassion may in fact be a much more dynamic, reciprocal, and context-
dependent process than previously thought.  In particular, factors associated with the relationship 
between the self and the object of compassion, such as trust and perceived agency, were 
important for participants.  Previous experiences of social rejection (associated with shame and 
criticism) also played a key role.  Whilst few participants spoke explicitly about compassion in 
the context of their HSB, some tentative links were made and will provide a useful platform for 
future research.  It is hoped that this study will enrich the existing compassion literature-base, but 
also that further research interest will follow in the area of young people and HSB, who, despite 
accounting for over a quarter of sexual offences in the UK (Hackett, 2014), remain a relatively 
under-researched and under-resourced population. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the findings from the research, with a discussion of 
the key aspects of the resultant theoretical model in relation to extant literature.  Strengths of the 
study were acknowledged, as well as potential limitations that should be borne in mind when 
considering the findings.  Theoretical, clinical, and research implications were outlined, and 
suggestions for future research were made.  Finally, the chapter closed with a reflexive account 
from the researcher, highlighting their positioning and learning throughout the research process. 
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Appendix G 
Interview schedule 
''I wanted to ask your thoughts on a particular topic today. Please remember that there are no 
right or wrong answers and that I am looking for your ideas on the different things we cover.  It 
is your experiences and thoughts that I am most interested in.  I will probably ask you at 
different times to explain to me in more detail or in a different way what you have said because I 
am interested in what you have to say and want to understand it better.' 
 
Establish what is understood by compassion: 
Have you heard the word ‘compassion’ before? I am interested in what ‘compassion’ means to 
you? [Focus on the various aspects that the individual suggests in their definitions and go into 
these in more detail]. 
 
• What comes to mind when you think about compassion?  Why do you think this comes 
to mind? 
 
• What particular people/objects/things would you associate with being compassionate? 
[Focus on any examples the individual suggests and explore the significance of these]. 
 
I have some definitions of compassion here and I wondered if we can have a look at them and 
see what you think: 
 
[Present interviewee with some definitions of compassion] 
 
• What do you think of these definitions? 
 
• Is there one that you prefer? 
 
• What do you/don’t you like about them? 
 
[Depending on the participants’ conceptualisation of compassion, the word ‘compassion’ may 
be substituted for the remainder of the interview with other words the participant uses (e.g. 
kindness) if it is deemed that continued use of the word ‘compassion’ would prevent them from 
engaging in the interview] 
 
Focus on compassion from others: 
What do you think about other people being compassionate towards you/showing you 
compassion? 
 
• How have people shown you compassion?  What things have people done for you that 
you think were compassionate? 
 
• Who has shown you compassion in the past? 
 
• When is it easy to accept compassion from others? 
 
• When is it hard to accept compassion from others? 
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• What does it feel like when other people are compassionate towards you/show you 
compassion (versus times when they are maybe not quite so understanding or forgiving)? 
 
• What are the good things about other people being compassionate towards you? 
 
• What things aren’t so good about other people being compassionate towards you? 
 
 
Focus on compassion towards others: 
What do you think about you showing compassion to other people? 
 
• How have you shown compassion towards others before?  What things have you done 
for others that you think were compassionate? 
 
• Who have you shown compassion for in the past? 
 
• When is it easy to be compassionate towards others? 
 
• When is it hard to be compassionate towards others? 
 
• What does it feel like when you show compassion towards other people (versus times 
when it is more difficult to be quite so understanding or forgiving)? 
 
• What’s good about being able to show compassion to others (e.g., when they make 
mistakes)? 
 
• What isn’t so good about showing compassion to others (e.g., when they make 
mistakes)? 
 
 
Focus on compassion towards self (self-compassion): 
What do you think about being compassionate towards yourself? 
 
• How do you tend to react with yourself when you make mistakes/get things wrong/don't 
do as well as you wanted to? 
 
• How do you show yourself compassion?  What things do you do for yourself that you 
think are compassionate? 
 
• When is it easy to be compassionate towards yourself? 
 
• When is it hard to be compassionate towards yourself? 
 
• What does it feel like when you show yourself compassion (versus times when you are 
maybe not quite so understanding/forgiving of yourself)? 
 
• What’s good about being able to be compassionate towards yourself (e.g., when you 
make mistakes)? 
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• What’s not so good about being compassionate towards yourself (e.g., when you make 
mistakes)? 
 
How do you think people could learn to be more compassionate with themselves? 
 
 
Focus on other constructs: 
We have talked about quite a few things today that have all linked together in different ways.  
What other ideas or experiences that we have not thought about do you think would link to our 
discussion? 
 
Do you have any other thoughts about anything that we have talked about?  Or do you have any 
comments about the discussion itself? 
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Appendix H 
Research governance and ethical approval from the three Youth Offending Services 
(anonymised) 
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Hi Sian,  
 
Thank you for your proposal, it's looks really interesting.   
 
The Head of Service is happy for the research to go ahead as long as the parental/carer consent is given for all 
participants as you said. 
 
It might be worth thinking about the language you use, as many of our cases do not come through criminal justice 
routes (more often social care) so many have not been convicted of an 'offence'.  We tend to refer to incident/s as 
sexually harmful behaviour in most cases (just looking at further information form).  It also might be worth 
considering keeping the language reasonably simple, as many of the people in the service have some learning/neuro 
difficulties.   Some young people may not know what compassion means but I see you will use some examples.  Just 
from personal experience of doing qualitative research you might find that there are a lot of questions-if people are 
at all talkative you can get a huge amount of data from just 5 or 6 questions....with teenagers though they can be 
more brief with responses so you might be ok!  
 
I'll leave it with Olly to liaise with you and identify potential participants.  Good luck!! 
 
Warm wishes 
 
 
Becky 
 
Dr Rebecca Morland 
Consultant Counselling Psychologist  
Youth Offending Service 
165a Cromwell Road 
Peterborough 
Cambridgeshire 
PE1 2EL 
Tel: 01733 864210 
Fax: 01733864220 
Email: becky.morland@peterborough.gov.uk 
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Boot Julie <Julie.Boot@cambridgeshire.gov.uk> 
  
  
| 
Fri 22/07/2016, 16:30 
Good afternoon Sian 
 
I have received no objections to your research application and therefore happy to confirm approval is granted for 
you to proceed. 
 
With kind regards 
Julie 
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Appendix I 
Ethical approval from University of Essex 
02 March 2018 
 
MISS S. WILLIAMS 
UNIT 6 
2 MILLERS TERRACE 
HACKNEY 
LONDON 
E8 2DP 
 
Dear Sian, 
 
Re: Ethical Approval Application (Ref 15031) 
 
Further to your application for ethical approval, please find enclosed a copy of your application 
which has now been approved by the School Ethics Representative on behalf of the Faculty 
Ethics Committee.   
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Lisa McKee 
Ethics Administrator 
School of Health and Human Sciences 
 
 
cc.  Research Governance and Planning Manager, REO 
 Supervisor 
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Appendix J 
Initial coding 
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Appendix K 
Focused coding 
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Appendix L 
Theoretical coding 
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Appendix M 
Memo 
01.07.17 - Valuing trust 
The importance of trust featured again in the final two interviews.  I wasn’t necessarily expecting 
this to be a central theme at first, as I wondered if young people might speak about compassion 
in quite general terms – drawing on examples of charity and/or the kinds of explicit suffering 
that confront us in our everyday lives for which there are strong social scripts (homelessness, 
etc.), but I have been surprised at the level of personal experience participants have shared.  (I 
wonder why I didn’t expect them to articulate this level of personal experience? Was I perhaps 
making similar assumptions to some of the staff at the YOS and expecting this will be too 
complex a topic for young people?!).  Nevertheless, trust seems very important.  I don’t think I 
have guided anyone to the topic of trust, but must go back and double check my line of 
questioning before it arises. 
But why is trust so important?  Well, it seems to provide some reassurance about the others’ 
intentions.  When compassion is sought from others, communicating suffering appears to 
represent an exposure of vulnerability – in fact, some participants have spoken about experiences 
of seeking help from others and in turn being ridiculed or having their difficulties shared with 
others without their permission.  When offering compassion to another, some participants have 
talked about being able to trust that the other won’t respond in a way that will present a risk to 
them – “get a punch in the face for my troubles” as participant 4 put it.  In this way, it seems to 
link inextricably to the importance of ‘protecting the self.’ 
05.07.17 - Another thought occurred to me when I looked back over participant 4’s transcript.  
There is something about the perceived genuineness of the others’ compassionate act…  I had 
initially conceptualised this as linking to perceived agency in deciding/wanting to help – and I 
think that still holds true – but there does appear to be a link to trust here as well.  Something 
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about trusting the other’s actions/compassion come from a genuine place of valuing the self and 
wanting to help?  I think this could be important in terms of professionals working with young 
people as they maybe need to trust that professionals truly want to help and this may be harder to 
believe if you have had a multitude of experiences where people have let you down or behaved 
in a way that communicates they don’t really care?  I must go back through the data to clarify 
these links. 
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Appendix N 
Reflexive journal entry 
31.03.17: Interview 7 
Just arrived home from meeting with participant 7.  I was thinking lots about the interview on the 
way home in the car and I’m not sure quite what to make of it.  It was definitely the shortest 
interview so far and I found myself doing considerably more prompting and ‘space filling’ than 
previously I think.  He was a pleasant young man and I didn’t think he seemed particularly 
nervous, although I did sense at times he may have been a little unsure of what I meant in my 
questioning.  The funny thing was, having spent most of the interview giving very short, often 
single-word answers or responding with ‘I don’t know’, as soon as we reached the end of the 
interview he launched into quite a detailed story about what he had been up to the night before 
and how he had helped his foster carer out with various things (feeding the dogs, making her a 
tea).  I am wondering now what had got in the way of us having some more detailed discussion 
during the interview?  Could it have been the subject matter – too abstract, unfamiliar perhaps?  
Or maybe it was the set-up of me asking questions and him feeling he needed to know the right 
answers?  I tried lots of reassurance during the interview but something definitely got in the way.  
I’m a bit worried I may have been too directive in some of my questioning because of his 
difficulty(?) engaging.  Must take note of this when transcribing and coding.  I’m wondering 
whether ideally, this participant group should be interviewed by someone they already have 
knowledge of and have built rapport with?  An idea for future research perhaps? 
Good news though! [YOS worker] thinks he may have another two, or possibly even three, cases 
who may be suitable to take part.  One of whome is a female!  I’ve let him know how keen I 
would be to interview her given the fact gender differences have been raised in previous 
interviews – and of course the fact that it seems to be such a rarity that girls fall under the YOS 
for HSB.  Fingers crossed! 
